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FOREWORD
Scott P. Stedjan

In 1980, the libertarian economist Julian Simon made a bet
with biologist Paul Ehrlich, who gained significant notoriety after the
1968 publication of his book The Population Bomb, warning of the
dangers of overpopulation. Simon bet Ehrlich that the price of five
metals—chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten—would decrease
by the year 1990.1 Ehrlich took the bet, confident that the drastic
increase in human population over the decade would lead to more
demand for these finite materials and would cause the prices to rise.
Although the population increased by 800 million in the 1980s, the
prices of the five metals in 1990 decreased by about fifty percent
since 1980 and Simon won the bet.2
Although Simon may have gotten lucky, we should not miss
drawing an important lesson from this infamous wager. Competition
and human ingenuity have the potential to greatly impact both the
supply and demand for all sorts of commodities, be it energy, food,
water, or less crucial items. Just as Malthus’ predictions of
catastrophe were swept away by the Industrial Revolution and
Ehrlich’s prediction of mass starvation in the 1970s and 80s in The
Population Bomb was disproved by the innovations of Green
Revolution,3 new technologies have the potential to, once again, save
John Tierney, Betting on the Planet, N.Y TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 2, 1990,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/02/magazine/betting-on-the-planet.html.
2 Paul Sabin, Betting on the Apocalypse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/opinion/sunday/betting-on-theapocalypse.html.
3 Jack A. Goldstone, The New Population Bomb, The Four Megatrends That
Will
Change
the
World,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
Jan./Feb.
2010,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65735/jack-a-goldstone/the-newpopulation-bomb.
1
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the world from impending disaster. With food4 and oil5 prices on the
decline and the rise of the United States as a world leader in energy
production, policymakers and news organizations (with some
exceptions) seem to have moved beyond the issue of global resource
scarcity. However, it is also important to remember that the past is
not always predictive of the future, and recent technological
advancements may have only delayed disaster. Climate change and
political inertia have the potential to stretch humanity’s ability to
invent and invest its way out of looming catastrophes. Although the
threats posed to human civilization by the steady exhaustion of the
world’s finite resources will continue to morph in the decades to
come as new technologies emerge and market conditions change, the
dangers posed by climate change require policymakers to not lose
focus.
The articles in this volume derive from the February 7, 2014
symposium hosted by the Penn State Journal of Law and International
Affairs entitled “The Nine Billion People Question: The Challenge of
Global Resource Scarcity,” and are intended to warn against this
inattention. The title of the symposium was taken from a special
report published in The Economist magazine in 2011 and refers to the
fact that the world’s population will likely grow from around seven
billion to over nine billion people by 2050. 6 The goal of the
symposium was to bring scholars, policymakers, and practitioners
together to discuss the challenges raised in The Economist’s report and

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization’s Food Price
Index, all food except meat has fallen sharply in 2014. The Food Price Index,
which is the average of indices of the five staple food groups, has fallen from its
high of 229.9 in 2011 to 188.6 in December 2014. FAO Food Price Index, FOOD
AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ (last updated Jan. 8,
2015).
5 Oil prices at the end of 2014 were at a five-year low. IAEA Market
Report
December
2,
2014,
INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY
AGENCY,
https://www.iea.org/media/omrreports/fullissues/2014-12-12.pdf.
6 Feeding the World: The 9 billion-people question, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26,
2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18200618.
4
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similar articles addressing the potential crises caused by drastic
increases in the demand for food, energy, and water.
The Journal of Law and International Affairs is a multi-discipline
journal, and the essays in this collection fit that mold. The first two
essays in this collection address the geopolitics of natural resource
scarcity. Professor Kent H. Butts of the Pennsylvania State
University and the Center for Naval Analysis provides analysis of the
importance placed on gaining and maintaining access to natural
resources by nation-states throughout the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. Professor Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World
Security Studies and Director of the Five College Program in Peace
and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, builds upon
Professor Butts’ analysis in his exciting essay by applying the lessons
learned from history to the new geopolitics of energy. Klare, who
has long been a leading voice sounding the alarm bells on the impacts
of peak oil and resource scarcity, examines the extraordinary and
unexpected shift from scarcity to what the CEO of ExxonMobil calls
the “new Era of Abundance.”7 What this new era will bring to
energy geopolitics is still largely unknown. Yet, Professor Klare
warns that “while there has been some alteration in the global policy
landscape, conflict over energy continues to convulse international
affairs.”
Professor Bryan McDonald’s essay sets the stage for the next
six essays that specifically address the global food system. Professor
McDonald, a historian at the Pennsylvania State University, maps the
global food system through history and argues that if the societies of
the world are to effectively feed themselves in a sustainable way, we
must understand how global food networks currently operate and
how these networks can and should evolve to address interactive sets
of threats and vulnerabilities.
Professor Carmen Gonzalez’s
contribution adeptly moves from the local to the global levels of food

Rex Tillerson, Capitalizing on the Coming Era of Energy Abundance, Address
to Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, (Apr. 2, 2013) (transcript available at
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-andupdates/speeches/capitalizing-on-coming-era-of-energy-abundance).
7
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insecurity issues and argues “food insecurity is a function of global
economic order that systematically disadvantages poor farmers in
developing countries.” Professor Gonzalez, who in a Professor of
Law at the University of Seattle, proposes six steps affluent countries
can take to relieve the misery that the international order inflicts on
small famers throughout the world. These steps range from
proactive investment opportunities to reform of the current trade
regime so that the benefits and risks of food production can be
allocated in a more just way.
The following two articles by a leading scholar and a
practitioner address global food and agricultural assistance. Although
nominally a humanitarian instrument, food aid remains essentially a
political tool used by governments to further geopolitical ends.
Professor Erin Lentz of the University of Texas at Austin
acknowledges the political role of food aid, but argues that
governments now have a real opportunity to reform food assistance
to make it fit for its primary purpose—to save lives and build
resiliency. Key to this opportunity, Professor Lentz contends, is a
greater understanding about the long-term effects of undernutrition
in the first 1000 days of life. Marc Cohen, senior researcher at
Oxfam America, builds off Professor Lentz’s analysis and addresses
the Feed the Future Program of the United States. Dr. Cohen
welcomes the new approach to agricultural assistance being employed
by the United States, but argues based on field research conducted in
Haiti, Senegal, and Tanzania that “more consistent effort to draw on
farmers’ own knowledge and definitions of problems in [Feed the
Future] programming would improve the initiative’s result.”
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the international
trade system will play a key role in shaping the future of global
natural resource management. In their essay, Terrance P. Stewart and
Stephanie Manaker Bell, both attorneys working on trade issues for
the firm Stewart and Stewart, comprehensively explain how the WTO
has addressed food insecurity throughout its history and argue that
the “international community must continue to examine how trade
rules influence food security issues and how they can be modified to
ensure that the evolving needs of the global community are met.”
iv
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Professor David Blandford of Penn State provides an economists
view of the current international trade regime, with a specific focus
on the Agreement on Agriculture. Professor Blandford contends
that although the existing WTO disciplines on agriculture, and
proposals to strengthen these, are far from perfect, they are on the
right track and warns against loosening these disciplines in the future
should new trade conflicts emerge as a result of global resource
scarcity.
As the essays in this volume demonstrate, the importance of
ensuring that the earth can support nine billion people cannot be
overstated. With such threats potentially looming, we cannot sit back
and hope that technology will save humanity and the earth once
again. Strategies are required, resources must be marshaled, and
political will must be mobilized. Our goal in holding the symposium
and publishing this edition of the Journal of Law and International Affairs
was to educate, challenge, and to some extent, compel readers to take
action so that, in an earth crowded with nine billion people, there will
be room for us all to pursue healthy and prosperous lives. I hope we
have achieved at least one of those goals.
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GEOPOLITICS OF RESOURCE SCARCITY
Kent Hughes Butts, PhD*

INTRODUCTION
Geopolitics refers to the relationship of geographical settings
to political processes.1 The diversity and scale of the geography are
important variables in the exercise of political power. Resources vary
markedly in occurrence, giving rise to global patterns of trade and
creating vulnerability to supply cutoff. National leaders should be
aware of the occurrence of strategically important resources within
their borders, understand which of these are critically important to
sustain human and state security, and develop policies to achieve
sufficiency from domestic or international sources. This paper
addresses resource geopolitics, offers some examples, and provides
concepts for reducing import vulnerability in an era of rising
resource-focused policies by Russia and China.

I. GEOPOLITICS
One of the functions of statecraft is to secure the resources
that sustain the nation state. When strategically important resources
are not found within state borders, relationships with resourceproducing countries and the security of trade routes take on added
* Kent Hughes Butts, Senior Lecturer in Homeland Security, Public
Affairs at the Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg Campus. He holds an
appointment as a Senior Fellow to the Center for Naval Analysis.
1 See generally SAUL B. COHEN, GEOPOLITICS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM (1st
ed. 2002).

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

significance. These relationships are dynamic; often lost on
practitioners of statecraft is that economics and technology
constantly change and with it, the vulnerability of the state to the
decisions made by other states.
The geopolitical focus of statecraft will vary with the
geography of states and is not always determined by resource access,
yet it played a significant role in the work of important geopolitical
writers. Mahan wrote at length about the importance of securing
warm water ports.2 Kjellen stressed the importance of economics.3
Ports were important for trade and were bases for a navy, and
economics turned on industrial production. The factor inputs of
industrial production included, to no small degree, energy and
mineral resources. Thus, geopoliticians such as Ratzel spoke of the
strategic importance of autarky and resource access. 4 Haushofer
clearly had resources in mind when he wrote about the German need
for Lebensraum in the years leading up to World War II.5 These
scholars wrote in an era characterized by European wars and the
application of Darwin’s survival of the fittest concept to geopolitical
theory. States were seen as organisms that were either growing,
driven by a dynamic culture and industrial might, or becoming old
and weaker. Thus, borders could be seen as shifting zones of
assimilation driven by the need for vital resources.
The thinking of state leaders was influenced by these
geopolitical concepts. The Versailles Treaty that ended World War I
stripped Germany of its colonies and constrained resource access;
this relegated Germany to a state of poverty and created a wellspring
of discontent that Hitler used to his great advantage. As Germany’s
Minister of Economics Halmer Schacht stated in 1937 during his trip
to the United States, “[n]o great nation willingly allows its standard of
life and culture to be lowered and no great nation accepts the risk
2 See generally A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON
HISTORY, 1660-1783 (1890).
3 See generally RUDOLPH KJELLEN, STATEN SOM LIFSFORM (1916).
4 See generally FRIEDRICH RATZEL, THE STATE AND ITS LAND
CONSIDERED GEOGRAPHICALLY (E.F. Bergman & T. Pohl trans., 1896).
5 KARL HAUSHOFER, WELTPOLITIK VON HEUTE 22-50 (1936).
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that it will go hungry.”6 Germany, with ample coal resources in the
Ruhr, required access to the iron deposits of French Alsace-Loraine
to rebuild its industry and prosper.7 The creation of the European
Coal and Steel Community, which evolved into the European Union,
was a stark recognition of the power of resource access as a driver of
war and ushered in a new era of resource geopolitics built of resource
access through permissive trade.
In the statecraft of today’s international political realm, the
geopolitics of resources is taking on a new form. Resource
geopolitics is no longer solely about controlling the land where the
resources are produced, but is also about gaining access and securing
supplies to drive the state’s economy. The behavior of a nation state
is partially explained by its resource situation. What resources do
they produce, what are the factor inputs essential to their
manufacturing, and if resources must be imported, on which
countries do they depend and how secure are those imports?

II. RESOURCES
Resources are anything that satisfies the needs of humankind;
as culture and technology changes, so do resources. “Resources are
not, they become.”8 Because of its limited supply and critical role as
a preservative, salt was once a strategic resource, which drove foreign
policy, created trade routes, and precipitated conflict.9 The discovery
of new sources of salt and the development of technology in the
form of refrigeration reduced salt’s strategic importance. Similarly,
whale oil has been replaced by petroleum over the last century,
reducing the importance of whale stocks and making the oil fields of
the Middle East a vital resource to the United States.10 This resource,
6 Hjalmar Schacht, Germany’s Colonial Demands, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.
1937, at 233.
7 EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 32d Sess. 3 (Apr. 21, 1980).
8 ERICH ZIMMERMAN, WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES 15 (2d ed.
1951).
9 See generally MARK KURLANSKY, SALT: A WORLD HISTORY (2003).
10 Brian Trumbore, The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74,
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arguably, has underpinned the two Iraq wars. The dynamics of
resource importance to political processes varies with technology and
economics.
The petroleum resources of Canada provide a good example
of the relationship between economics and technology, and the
determination of resources. At the time of the 1973-74 oil embargo,
Canada’s reserves of petroleum were located on the East Coast in
fields such as Hibernia. 11 The threefold increase in the price of
petroleum as a result of the political decisions made by the
governments of OPEC drove the development of experimental
technology in the oil sands deposits of Western Canada. 12 In
northern Alberta, petroleum is found embedded in the soil rather
than contained in the conventional, easily recovered oil traps found
in the Middle East.13
In 1978-79, a second oil shock drove the price of oil up to
$33 a barrel, making the recovery of oil from oil sands deposits an
economic proposition for oil producers. This price, however, was
not sustained. With sub-economic deposits, production was curtailed
so that Canadian oil reserves totaled approximately three billion
barrels in 2000. The unprecedented growth of the Chinese economy
over the next decade and a half, however, drove the price of oil
above $130 a barrel.14 By 2012, Canada had revised its petroleum
http://www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/history/2002/arab.html
(last
visited Aug. 17 2014); California Standard Newfoundland Well Shows Three Zones of Oil,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1980, at 4 [hereinafter California Standard].
11 California Standard, supra note 10.
12 See generally ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS: THE GREAT
OIL COMPANIES & THE WORLD THEY SHAPED (1975).
13 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, What Are Oil Sands?,
http://www.capp.ca/canadaIndustry/oilSands/Energy-Economy/Pages/what-areoilsands.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
14 WTRG
ECONOMICS, Oil Price History and Analysis,
http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm (explaining that “[w]ith minimal Y2K problems
and growing U.S. and world economies, the price [per barrel of oil] continued to
rise throughout 2000 to a post 1981 high”) (last visited Aug. 17, 2014); see Historical
Oil Prices Chart: Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate – 10 Year Chart,
http://www.forecast-chart.com/chart-crude-oil.html (illustrating the increase in
price per barrel of oil).
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reserve totals up to 178 billion barrels, most of which were located in
Western Canada’s oil sands deposits. When the price of oil rose, the
unconventional oil deposits of Western Canada became economic,
and technology was developed to mine the deposits and produce a
form of liquid petroleum. This rise in the price of oil caused the oil
sands deposits to become economically viable again, and oil
companies returned to large-scale, sustained production. With
carbon fuels and minerals, producers ask if they could recover the
raw material with existing technology at a profit. Often, it is the rise
in price that stimulates technological development and increases
known resources.

III. RESOURCE GEOPOLITICS
During the Cold War the Soviet Union was economically selfsufficient, produced an abundance of strategic minerals, and was the
world’s leading producer of petroleum. The Soviet Union cut off
supplies of manganese and chromium to the United States during the
Korean War and the Berlin Blockade, and was willing to manipulate
resource exports for political advantage. Because the United States
and its Japanese and European allies were heavily dependent on
mineral and petroleum imports, they were vulnerable to Soviet supply
cut off or manipulation of the mineral and oil markets. In his book,
President Richard Nixon describes the Soviet resource geopolitical
strategy as: “to gain control of the two great treasure houses on
which the West depends, the energy treasure house of the Persian
Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern
Africa.”15 Today, Russia practices resource geopolitics by using its
leverage as the dominant regional natural gas producer and frequently
cuts off supplies of gas to Europe for political purposes. With the
rise of China as a potential peer competitor to the United States,
China’s geopolitical strategy to assure resource security has become
important to U.S. national security.

15

RICHARD M. NIXON, THE REAL WAR 23 (1980).
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Unlike the autarkic Soviet Union and resource-rich Russia,
China’s requirement for resource imports is similar to that of the
United States. With a dynamic economy growing at a rate of
approximately ten percent for the last thirty years and the threat of
domestic social instability, China has made resource security a
priority. Its geopolitical “go out” strategy targets petroleum, strategic
minerals, and food-producing countries and regions around the
world. A major player in global commodity markets, China has
driven up resource prices to new levels through its mass demands;
for example, the price of copper escalated from $.70 a pound in 2002
to over $4 a pound in 2010.16 While China is import-dependent for
many critical resources, in some minerals, such as the rare earth
elements (REE), China is a leading producer.17 With over ninety
percent of global rare earth production, China can—and has—
manipulated REE production and export quotas to affect the
profitability of new mining ventures and send a signal to its political
adversaries, such as Japan and the United States.18 At the same time,
China’s profitable trade relations with mineral-producing states have
heightened its political influence in South America, Australia, and
Africa. Importantly, China does not trust the global commodity
markets, which were largely established by the West, and uses its
$652 billion China Investment Corporation 19 to gain control of
international resource producing concessions.20

16 Javier Blas & Jack Farchy, Miners Bullish on Outlook for Copper, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at 25.
17 Keith Bradsher, Challenging China in Rare Earth Mining, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.
21,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/business/energyenvironment/22rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
18 Keith Bradsher, Trade Officials Ponder How to Respond to China’s Rare
Earth
Stance,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
13,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/business/global/14rare.html?pagewanted=
all.
19 China Investment Corporation Releases Annual Report, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUND INST. (Aug. 08, 2014) at http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/chinainvestment-corporation-releases-annual-report/.
20
China Investment Corporation, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST.,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs.china-investment-corporation/ (last visited Aug.
17, 2014).
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The vulnerability of industrial states to a cut off of resource
imports by a producing state is determined by several factors. First,
are there alternative geographically dispersed sources of supply? The
loss of access to the approximately seventeen million barrels of
conventional petroleum production that flows out of the Persian
Gulf daily would be devastating to the global economy.21 Second, as
is the case with REE and China and natural gas and Russia, the
concentration of resource production in one adversarial country
creates political leverage over the consuming country.
Loss of access can also result when trade with friendly
countries is interrupted due to natural or man-made disasters, social
unrest or labor strife, or damage to critical infrastructure. This
vulnerability may be mitigated by several proven but often costly
policies. Stockpiling resources may cover all or portions of the
resource import shortfall for a critical portion of time. Minerals can
be reused or recycled, providing substantial supplies over the short
term. Energy and mineral substitutes may be developed. Alternative
domestically produced sources of supply may be created, although
this may take time. It is important to either institute these policies or
plan for their implementation before import cut off occurs. This
means that the national security community of a state must maintain
awareness of the constantly changing patterns of important
vulnerability. And, quite often, it means that the leaders must
prioritize funding to create this virtual insurance against resource
vulnerability.
In spite of mandated resource vulnerability assessments and
watershed studies such as the Paley Report, the United States has
proven repeatedly that it does not maintain awareness of its patterns
of strategic resource consumption and sources of supply, nor does it
prioritize the mandate of the Paley Report to “ensure an adequate
and dependable flow of materials at the lowest cost consistent with

World Oil Transit Choke Points, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3.
21
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the welfare of friendly nations.”22 For example, the United States was
unaware of the political implications of its overwhelming dependence
on Middle East petroleum in the early 1970s.23 As frankly observed
by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “it was the October
1973 Arab-Israeli War and subsequent embargo that exposed the
vulnerability of the energy system. This came as somewhat of a
surprise. . . . To say we were complacent is an understatement.”24
While developed countries have substantial capacity to
address their geopolitical vulnerabilities, developing countries do not.
The same principles of resource scarcity or imbalance of supply and
demand that call into question the resource security and
governmental legitimacy of developing countries affect developing
countries as well. Quite often, however, the resources are markedly
different. Agricultural land and water are the two resources that most
affect food security and the human condition. The political system
of a developing country must meet the demands placed on it by the
population, which is often driven by human security priorities of
freedom from want and freedom from fear. In a milieu increasingly
affected by climate change, the inability of developing countries to
successfully implement adaptation measures calls into question the
food security and governmental legitimacy of those countries. As
was demonstrated by the recent Arab Spring phenomenon, rising
food costs or inadequate supplies can easily exacerbate previous
tensions and rapidly erode the legitimacy of the government. The
resulting instability can threaten U.S. security interests by bringing to
power a government dedicated to extremist ideology, or creating a

PRESIDENT’S MATERIALS POLICY COMMISSION, RESOURCES FOR
FREEDOM: FOUNDATIONS FOR GROWTH AND SECURITY 148 (1952) (referred to as
the “Paley Report”).
23 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, Oil Embargo,
1973-1974 (Oct. 31, 2013), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oilembargo.
24 Henry Kissinger, Former U.S. Sec’y of State, Address for the 35th
Anniversary of the International Energy Agency: The Future Role of the IEA (Oct.
14, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/101409.html).
22
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power vacuum and large areas of ungoverned land in which terrorist
training may occur.

CONCLUSION
Regardless of its level of development, resource scarcity and
the imbalance of resource supply and demand are concepts with
which the national security community of a state must be intimately
aware. For non-autarkic states, resource imports may be existential.
As the global population rises from seven billion to nine billion
people over the next thirty-five years, resource demand will rise
dramatically and necessitate the development of resource driven
geopolitical strategies to ensure resource efficiency. It is quite likely
that there will be heightened competition for these resources and
increased tensions between consuming nations. Avoiding resource
conflict can best be achieved by promoting conservation measures,
proactively developing alternative products, and moving aggressively
to mitigate climate change and help developing countries build their
capacity to adapt to its effects. The geopolitical importance of
resource scarcity will continue to evolve and give heightened
importance to planning and international cooperation.
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FROM SCARCITY TO ABUNDANCE: THE
CHANGING DYNAMICS OF ENERGY
CONFLICT
Michael T. Klare*

INTRODUCTION
In November 2012, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
triggered headlines around the world when it announced that the
United States, by dint of its success in utilizing new extractive
technologies, would likely overtake Saudi Arabia to become the
world’s leading oil producer by 2020.1 At a time in which many
analysts had come to believe that the world was facing an impending
“peak” in global oil output followed by an irreversible decline,2 the
IEA’s report was said to herald a new and unexpected era of
hydrocarbon plenty. In commenting on the report, many analysts
spoke in particular about the purported economic benefits of energy
abundance, notably the prospect of new jobs and manufacturing
activities.3 As the IEA indicated, however, the new energy bounty
* Michael T. Klare, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security
Studies, and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security
Studies (PAWSS) at Hampshire College.
1 International Energy Agency (IEA), WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012
52, 157 (2012),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_free.pd
f.
2 See, e.g., KENNETH S. DEFFEYES, HUBBERT’S PEAK: THE IMPENDING
WORLD OIL SHORTAGE (2001); Robert L. Hirsch, The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil
Production, 26 BULL. ATL. COUNCIL U.S. 1-9 (Oct. 2005).
3
See, e.g., Saudi America, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2012,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873238947045781145911744
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has political and military implications. “This energy renaissance,” it
declared, “has far-reaching consequences for energy markets, trade,
and, potentially, even for energy security, geopolitics, and the global
economy.”4
Energy security and geopolitics have, of course, played a
pivotal role in international affairs for a very long time, ever since the
development of oil-powered vehicles and weapons of war. As the
demand for petroleum exploded, especially in the years during and
after World War I, the major military and industrial powers fought
with one another for control over the world’s handful of oilproducing areas. Gaining access to foreign oil supplies was also a
major war aim of Germany and Japan during World II and a major
concern of the United States during the Cold War era. After the
Cold War, the United States continued to place a high priority on
ensuring its access to foreign oil supplies, employing military force on
several occasions to protect the oil flow from the Persian Gulf.5 The
2012 IEA statement suggested, however, that the well-established
relationship between energy and geopolitics would be profoundly
altered as a result of the current “energy renaissance.”
As an energy-specific organization, the IEA did not offer its
own prognosis on the geopolitical implications of its suggestive
comment, except to note that we should expect a shift in the center
of gravity of world oil and natural gas production from the Middle
East to North America.6 Nevertheless, it is obvious from its analysis
that this shift and other consequences of the “renaissance” will have
profound implications for the foreign and security policies of both
energy importing and exporting nations and for the prospects for
53074; Ed Crooks, U.S. Shale Gas Sparks a Chemical Revolution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2012,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d1a183d2-40a3-11e2-aafa00144feabdc0.html#axzz3B4D6zQZy; Jim Motavalli, Natural Gas Signals a
‘Manufacturing
Renaissance,’
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
10,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/business/energy-environment/wideravailability-expands-uses-for-natural-gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4 IEA, supra note 1, at 74.
5 See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL 26-55 (2004).
6 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 74-80.
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conflict over oil and gas. In particular, policies aimed at securing the
safe flow of oil from the Middle East to markets in the West—a
source of repeated crisis and conflict in the past—are now being
called into question, while disputes over new sources of energy, such
as those in offshore areas and the Arctic, have gained fresh attention.
More importantly, the very basis for energy-driven security policies—
an expectation of perpetually inadequate supplies of hydrocarbons—
appears to have been rendered invalid by the dramatic rise in global
output, raising doubts about the future likelihood of wars over oil.7
Will conflict over energy supplies disappear in an era of oil
and gas abundance? Or will it take new forms, governed by the
changing geography of global supply and demand? Although it is still
too early to provide a definitive answer to these questions, it is
possible to detect several significant trends in energy geopolitics—all
suggesting that the risk of conflict over oil and natural gas supplies
will not disappear in an era of hydrocarbon abundance. This essay
will trace the origins of energy geopolitics and attempt to show how
it is being affected by the development of new production
technologies.

I. THE GEOPOLITICS OF SCARCITY
The relationship between oil and geopolitics first arose during
World War I when oil-powered weapons—tanks, planes, and
submarines—first made their appearance on the battlefield and the
major powers scoured the world for reliable sources of supply. With
reserves limited and only a few major deposits then in production—
mostly in the United States, Romania, Iran (then Persia), and Baku in
the Czarist empire—the principal belligerents sought to control these
7 See generally Ed Crooks & Geoff Dyer, Energy Security: Strength in Reserve,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/916a6744-0f14-11e38e58-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BMCFD8uY; Daniel Yergin, America’s New Energy
Security,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Dec.
12,
2011,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702044498045770689320269
51376.
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areas or deny their opponents access to them. After the war, the
surviving great powers engaged in a competitive struggle to extend
their sway in the major oil-producing areas, especially in the Persian
Gulf area and the Caucasus.8
Many scholars believe that it was Winston Churchill who first
grasped the geopolitical significance of oil and its association with the
Persian Gulf. In 1912, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill
ordered the conversion of British warships from coal to oil
propulsion in the belief that this would give them an advantage over
Germany’s coal-powered ships in the event of war.9 Because Great
Britain at that time did not possess domestic oil reserves of its own
(the North Sea fields were not discovered until much later), Churchill
determined that London must obtain a secure overseas source of oil
under direct British authority. The most propitious option, he
concluded, was to impose government control over the AngloPersian Oil Company (APOC, the forerunner of British Petroleum),
which had secured a concession to promising reserves in
southwestern Persia. As a result of his prodding, Parliament voted in
1914 to nationalize APOC and bring its Persian concession under
London’s control. From that point onward, the protection of
APOC’s concession area, and of British supply lines to the Persian
Gulf (especially the Suez Canal), were viewed as matters of vital
national security by the British government.10
The strategic aspect of the international competition for oil
reserves continued to play a significant role in international relations
after World War I and in the years leading up to the Second World
War. The major European powers, possessing few domestic oil
reserves of their own, focused much of their efforts on acquiring a
foothold in the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East. This was the
era of the San Remo Agreement of 1920, under which Britain
obtained control over Iraq through a mandate from the League of
8 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY
& POWER 184-206 (2001) [hereinafter THE PRIZE].
9 See generally GEOFFREY JONES, THE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE BRITISH OIL INDUSTRY 9–31 (1981).
10 Id. at 129–76; see also THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 153–64.
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Nations.11 Meanwhile, Japan—a rising industrial power with a similar
paucity of oil—harbored imperial ambitions over the Dutch East
Indies, then the major producer in Asia.
The need to secure overseas sources of oil played a significant
role in the strategic planning of Germany and Japan, both of which
sought to invade and conquer foreign producing areas in order to
fuel their military forces and industrial systems. In 1941, when fullscale combat broke out, both undertook military strikes with this
purpose in mind: Germany invaded the Soviet Union, with Baku as
one of its primary objectives; Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies.
With Washington becoming increasingly alarmed by Japan’s
aggressive moves in Asia, Japanese leaders concluded that its invasion
of the Dutch East Indies would provoke a U.S. military response of
some sort. Japan simultaneously attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii, thus ensuring American entry into the war.12
Until this point, the United States had not participated in the
strategic—as distinct from the commercial—pursuit of overseas oil,
as it possessed sufficient domestic reserves to satisfy its wartime
military requirements and those of its principal allies. As World War
II progressed, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his
senior advisers became worried that the heavy wartime extraction of
domestic oil was rapidly depleting U.S. reserves, thereby eroding
America’s capacity to sustain another full-scale war on the magnitude
of World War II.13 Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered the State and
Commerce Departments to seek a reliable foreign source of oil to

11
See generally JOHN KEAY, SOWING THE WIND: THE SEEDS OF
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 124-29 (2003).
12 See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 328-67.
13 At this time, American geologists were unaware of major deposits in
Alaska and the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico, making it appear that U.S.
reserves were shrinking faster than later proved to be the case.
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supplement American reserves in the event of a major future
conflict.14
After considering the various possibilities, government
experts became convinced that Saudi Arabia constituted the best
candidate to serve in this capacity. Whereas most of the rest of the
Persian Gulf area was controlled by Great Britain, Saudi Arabia had
largely escaped British control. In addition, the Saudi monarch, King
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, had granted a substantial concession to an
American oil firm, Standard Oil of California (Socal, later Chevron),
giving the United States a significant presence in the country. On
this basis, Roosevelt decided in 1943 to anoint Saudi Arabia as
America’s preferred foreign supplier of oil and to bring the Kingdom
under American military protection. Saudi Arabia was made eligible
for U.S. aid under the Lend-Lease Act and consideration was given to
the construction of a U.S. air base there. To bolster these efforts,
Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz on February 14, 1945, and forged an
agreement with him under which the United States received
privileged access to Saudi oil in return for a United States pledge to
protect the monarchy against its assorted enemies.15
With the Roosevelt-Abdul Aziz agreement in place, the
United States began to insert a permanent military presence in the
Gulf region. This led, in 1946-47, to the establishment of an air base
at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and a naval base at Bahrain.16 For the
most part, however, American policymakers relied on Great Britain
to maintain stability in the Gulf at this time. But, when London
announced that it would withdraw most British forces from “East of
Suez” by the end of 1971, Washington was forced to find another
friendly power to carry the burden of regional security. The United
14 See generally AARON DEAN MILLER, SEARCH FOR SECURITY 54–57, 62–
63, 74–77 (1980); DAVID S. PAINTER, OIL AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 11–31,
34–35 (1986).
15 See generally MILLER, supra note 14, at 19–20, 49, 54–57, 62–63, 74–77,
128–31; PAINTER, supra note 14, at 32–95; MICHAEL B. STOFF, OIL, WAR AND
AMERICAN SECURITY 18–21, 35–39, 48–51, 57–88 (1980).
16 See generally DAVID E. LONG, THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI
ARABIA: AMBIVALENT ALLIES (1985).
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States chose to rely on the Iranian regime of Shah Reza Mohammed
Pahlavi (whom the Americans and British had helped install as
absolute monarch through a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1954).17 From
1970 to 1979, the United States provided Iran with vast supplies of
modern arms, helping to transform the Iranian military into a potent
regional force. 18 Not surprisingly, then, the fall of the Shah in
January 1979 produced great consternation in Washington, as there
was no obvious alternative to assume Iran’s role as a “surrogate
gendarme.” Eleven months later, Washington received another
shock when the Soviet Union commenced its invasion of
Afghanistan, putting Soviet troops within a few hundred miles of the
Persian Gulf and its vital energy supplies.

II. THE “CARTER DOCTRINE” AND BEYOND
The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet takeover of
Afghanistan triggered a thorough review of U.S. policy toward the
Gulf. This review coincided with significant shifts in U.S. energy
trends. Until the early 1970s, the United States was largely able to
satisfy its petroleum requirements with crude from domestic reserves.
After 1972, however, domestic production went into decline and,
with consumption experiencing steady growth, the country was
forced to increase its reliance on imported oil. In 1970, imports
accounted for twenty-one percent of total U.S. oil consumption; by
1979, they accounted for forty-three percent of consumption.19 As
the United States was becoming more dependent on imports, the
major oil-producing countries were banding together to exact higher
prices for their products and, in some cases, to use their newfound
economic clout to extract political concessions from the major oil
consumers. This was especially evident in 1973-74, when members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
17
18

See STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN (2003).
See MICHAEL T. KLARE, AMERICAN ARMS SUPERMARKET 127–26

(1984).
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2000 123, Table
5.1 (2001), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038400.pdf.
19
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quadrupled the price of crude and the Arab OPEC members
imposed an embargo on sales to the United States, producing
widespread shortages and a global economic recession.20
With these developments in mind, then President Jimmy
Carter and his top advisers concluded that U.S. interests in the
Persian Gulf were too great to be entrusted into the hands of
surrogates and must instead come under the direct protection of
American forces. This proposition, ever since known as the “Carter
Doctrine,” was spelled out in the President’s State of the Union
address of January 23, 1980: “The region which is now threatened by
Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance.”21 By
occupying Afghanistan, President Carter explained that the Soviets
are “now attempting to consolidate a strategic position . . . that poses
a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”22 Given the
importance of that oil to the United States and the world economy,
the United States had to be ready to take decisive action: “Let our
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”23
Because the United States did not, at that time, possess any
forces earmarked specifically for operations in the Arabian Gulf area,
President Carter established a new military organization to implement
this policy: the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). He
also announced plans to deploy additional warships in the Gulf
proper and to acquire new bases in the surrounding region. These
measures received strong support from his successor, Ronald Reagan,

20
21

See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 588–632.
Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 23, 1980) (transcript

available at
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml).
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also MICHAEL A. PALMER, GUARDIANS OF THE GULF: A
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1883–1992
101–11 (1999).
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who elevated the RDJTF into a full-scale regional combat
organization, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).24
President Reagan was also the first American leader to invoke
Carter’s pledge to use force when needed to safeguard the flow of oil.
When Iranian forces attacked Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88, Reagan determined that such action constituted a
severe threat to the free flow of Persian Gulf oil and authorized the
“reflagging” of those tankers with the American ensign, thereby
allowing their protection by the U.S. Navy.25 On May 19, 1987,
President Reagan stated: “Mark this point well: The use of the sea
lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.”26 The
protection of Persian Gulf oil was also cited by Reagan’s successor,
President George H.W. Bush, as the justification for U.S. efforts to
protect Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it
consumes and could face a major threat to its economic
independence,” Bush declared on August 8th. 27 Hence, “the
sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the
United States.”28
Today, the relationship between oil, security, and the Persian
Gulf remains as strong as ever. This is evident in the recurring
statements by American leaders that the United States will use force
if necessary to ensure the safe flow of Persian Gulf oil through the
Strait of Hormuz in response to any effort by Iran to impede such
shipping. While the Persian Gulf has remained the principal focus of
U.S. efforts to safeguard the global flow of oil, Washington has

24
25
26

PALMER, supra note 23, at 112–17.
Id. at 122–49.
Id. at 124 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Presidential Statement, (May 19,

1987)).
George H.W. Bush, Television Address, (Aug 8, 1990) (transcript
available at N.Y. TIMES, Aug 9, 1990).
28 Id.
27
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extended its protective shield to other oil-producing areas, especially
the Caspian Sea basin and West Africa.29
This drive to secure new sources of energy began under
President Clinton, who placed particular emphasis on the Caspian Sea
region. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
independent states in the Caspian basin, Clinton viewed this area as a
promising new source of energy as well as a strategic alternative to
reliance on the Persian Gulf. While eager to tap into the newlyaccessible oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian area, Clinton
understood that any drive to direct Caspian Sea energy to the West
would require a substantial reorganization of the region’s energy
transportation system, as all existing export conduits dated from the
Soviet era and traveled through Russia before reaching Western
markets—a form of dependence on Moscow that Washington sought
to escape.30 To establish an alternative export route to the West,
Clinton lobbied for construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline, connecting Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea to
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast via Georgia. Because this conduit
passed through or near several areas of ethnic unrest, including
Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, Clinton also
promised to bolster the military forces of the transit countries. In
this manner, the safe flow of Caspian oil to the West became a matter
of U.S. national security, as was the flow of Persian Gulf oil under
the Carter Doctrine.31
Just as President Clinton had extended the Carter Doctrine to
the Caspian Sea basin, President Bush extended it to West Africa.
Like the Caspian region, West Africa was said to be of strategic
importance to the United States both because of its prolific energy
supplies and as an alternative to reliance on the Middle East.32 As
29 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION:
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2004 322-23 (Feb. 2003),
http://fas.org/asmp/resources/110th/CBJ08.pdf.
30 The Caspian Sea itself is land-bound, so any oil or natural gas exiting
the region for markets elsewhere must travel by pipeline or rail cars.
31 See generally BLOOD AND OIL, supra note 5, at 132–39.
32 See id. at 142–45.
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Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner observed in 2002,
“African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase
and become more important as we go forward.”33 On this basis, the
United States has provided favored African governments with
various forms of military assistance, just as it has those in the Caspian
Sea region.34 In further recognition of the area’s growing strategic
importance, President Bush established a new military organization
for the region, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Although
the establishment of AFRICOM was not explicitly tied to the
protection of oil—as was the case for CENTCOM—it is evident
from the historical record that concern over instability in the oilproducing areas of Africa was one of the motivating factors.35

III. THE END OF SCARCITY
Even today, the United States is pursuing a strategy driven in
large part by concern over the safety of foreign oil supplies. In the
Persian Gulf, U.S. forces are poised to counter any effort by Iran to
block oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz; likewise, American
forces are involved in efforts to help protect oil pipelines in the
Caspian Sea basin and offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea.36
While the safety of foreign oil supplies remains a major responsibility
of the U.S. military, the economic and strategic underpinnings of
these activities have shifted. Because of a sudden and significant
increase in domestic energy production, the United States needs far
Mike Crawley, With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR,
May
23,
2002,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html.
34 Annual appropriations for military aid to Africa are tabulated in the
U.S. Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, discussed in Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African ‘Oil Rush’ and
US National Security, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 609–28 (Aug. 22, 2006).
35 See LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34003, AFRICA
COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN
AFRICA 15–16 (July 22, 2011), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.
36 See, e.g., MICHAEL T. KLARE, RISING POWERS, SHRINKING PLANET
115–209 (2008).
33
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less imported oil than it did before; at the same time, U.S. oil
consumption has leveled off in response to the global economic
downturn and increases in the fuel efficiency of American vehicles.
In place of scarcity, pundits and policymakers are now speaking of
energy abundance as the determining factor in U.S. strategic planning.
“Instead of facing an Era of Scarcity,” observed Rex Tillerson, the
chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, “we are now witnessing the
transition to a new Era of Abundance.”37 This transition, he said in
2013, will “spur economic growth, create jobs, and strengthen energy
security.”38
The shift from scarcity to abundance has been both
extraordinary and unexpected. In 2005, when U.S. leaders were still
warning of increased dependence on unreliable foreign suppliers,
innovators in the oil and gas industry were already deploying new
technologies with explosive potential. These included, most of all,
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or fracking—techniques
that permit the exploitation of previously inaccessible oil and natural
gas reserves in shale and other impermeable rock formations. Other
innovations allow for the extraction of oil and gas in Arctic and deepoffshore waters, and for the conversion of bitumen and other heavy
oils, such as Canadian tar sands (also called “oil sands”) into usable
products.39 Together, these technologies have allowed for a dramatic
turnaround in North American oil and gas output. Oil production in
the United States jumped from 7.6 million barrels per day in 2010 to
10.0 million barrels in 2013, an increase of thirty-two percent in just
three years. If current estimates by the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) prove accurate, domestic output will jump to
12.8 million barrels per day in 2020, the highest it has been since
1972.40 Natural gas production in the United States is also predicted
37 Rex Tillerson, Capitalizing on the Coming Era of Energy Abundance,
Address to Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, (Apr. 2, 2013) (transcript available
at
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-andupdates/speeches/capitalizing-on-coming-era-of-energy-abundance).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., MICHAEL LEVI, THE POWER SURGE: ENERGY, OPPORTUNITY,
AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2013).
40 See Table 1, infra.
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to see a sharp increase, with output climbing from 21.3 trillion cubic
feet in 2010 to an estimated 31.4 trillion in 2035. 41 Canada,
meanwhile, is expected to see its oil output jump from 3.6 million
barrels per day in 2010 to 6.1 million barrels in 2035, with most of
this increase coming from Alberta’s tar sands.42
Not only is the United States enjoying an increase in domestic
energy output, but it is also using less oil. Total consumption
dropped from a high of 20.7 million barrels per day in 2007 to 18.6
million barrels in 2012, and is expected to remain at that level for the
indefinite future.43 When combined with rising domestic oil output,
this decline has resulted in a significantly reduced need for imported
oil. From a peak of 13.8 million barrels per day in 2007 (or sixtyseven percent of total U.S. consumption), U.S. oil imports fell to 8.9
million barrels in 2013 (forty-seven percent of consumption).
According to the most recent EIA projections, U.S. oil imports will
decline even further in the years ahead to 6.7 million barrels per day
in 2020 (thirty-four percent of consumption).44 Of this 6.7 million
barrels, moreover, approximately half is expected to come from
Canada (mostly in the form of diluted bitumen), reducing U.S.
reliance on imports from extra-hemispheric sources even further.
Although the United States and Canada are, at present, the
principal beneficiaries of the revolution in energy technology, they
are not expected to remain the sole proprietors of these new
techniques. Many other countries possess large deposits of shale oil
and gas and are beginning to employ hydraulic fracturing in a drive to
exploit these reserves. China and Russia, for example, have
announced ambitious plans to develop their extensive shale deposits,
as have Argentina, Poland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and South
41 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH
PROJECTIONS
TO
2040
A-28,
Table
A14
(2014),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282014%29.pdf.
42 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013
247,
Table
G1
(2013),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484%282013%29.pdf.
43 Id. at 184, Table A5.
44 Id. at 247, Table G.
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Africa. 45 Similarly, nations with significant offshore and Arctic
reserves, including Canada, China, Norway, Russia, and Vietnam,
have marshaled advanced technologies to develop these resources.
As a result, global supplies of oil and natural gas are expected to
remain relatively robust for years to come.46
As suggested by the IEA in its 2012 report, these
developments are bound to affect energy geopolitics in many ways.
Some of these effects are not likely to be evident for many years, but
some are already being felt. In particular, the new energy abundance
appears to be altering U.S. relations with the Persian Gulf, Russia,
and Europe. At the same time, new forms of energy-related
competition and conflict are emerging in other areas, including
Eurasia, the Arctic, and the deep oceans.

IV. AMERICA’S “ENDURING POSTURE” IN THE PERSIAN GULF
For some analysts, the natural response to diminished U.S.
reliance on Middle Eastern oil would be the withdrawal of American
forces from the Gulf and their deployment elsewhere to areas of
greater strategic significance. As paraphrased by The Economist, these
analysts argue that “if America can produce its own oil . . . why waste
so much blood and treasure policing the Middle East?”47 On the
surface, this outlook seems to make eminent sense, especially given
the high cost of maintaining a substantial military presence in the
Gulf at a time of diminished budget allocations. However, most
senior policymakers reject this option, saying the Gulf area remains
See Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (last updated June 13, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ (assessing global shale oil and
gas reserves); see INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 50-56
(discussing plans for the exploitation of shale gas reserves).
46 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 81–154.
47
The Petrostate of America, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596521-energy-boom-good-americaand-world-it-would-be-nice-if-barack-obama-helped.
45
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vital to U.S. security.48 Because the continued flow of Middle Eastern
oil is considered essential to world economic vigor—whether or not
that oil flows to U.S. markets—any significant U.S. military
withdrawal could lead to increased regional instability, disruptions in
the oil flow, and global economic chaos. As noted by Rex Tillerson
of Exxon, the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil is essential “to
global economic stability,” and thus to U.S. security.49 Even if “we’re
no longer getting any oil from the Middle East because we’re secure
here,” he explained, “a disruption of oil supplies from that region will
have devastating impacts on global economies,” ours included.50
This logic appears to have persuaded President Obama, who
has pledged to retain a strong military presence in the Gulf. “The
United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our
power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the
region,” he told the U.N. General Assembly on September 24,
2013.51 “We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to
the world.” 52 Even though America is steadily reducing its
dependence on imported oil, he explained, “the world still depends
on the region’s energy supply, and a severe disruption could
destabilize the entire global economy.”53

48 See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in
Gulf
after
Exit
from
Iraq,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
29,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/united-states-planspost-iraq-troop-increase-in-persian-gulf.html?_r=1&.
49 Rex Tillerson, “The New North American Energy Paradigm,” Address
at the Council of Foreign Relations (June 27, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/north-america/new-north-american-energy-paradigmreshaping-future/p28630).
50 Id.
51 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Address to
the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-presidentobama-address-united-nations-general-assembly) [hereinafter Obama to U.N.
General Assembly].
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Obama has also indicated that there will be a major shift in
U.S. strategy in the region. Instead of employing troops on the
ground to affect the outcome of regional power struggles as it has in
the past, the United States will rely on air and naval forces to ensure
the uninterrupted transportation of oil. This requires maintaining
sufficient forces in the area to prevent any attempt by Iran to block
the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial waterway connecting the Gulf to the
Indian Ocean. According to the New York Times, President Obama,
through intermediaries, has told Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, that closing the Strait of Hormuz is a “red line” that
would provoke an automatic U.S. military response.54 To ensure that
this is not an empty threat, Obama has ordered the Pentagon to
deploy sufficient air and naval strength in the area to overcome any
move by Iran to block the Strait. In the event Iran attempted such a
move, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said the United States will “take action and reopen the Strait.”55
It is evident, however, that U.S. policy extends beyond simply
keeping the Strait open. As suggested by Obama in his 2013 speech
to the United Nations, the United States intends to remain the
dominant military power in the region and exercise ultimate control
over the global flow of oil—and this, in fact, remains one of the
principal missions of the U.S. Central Command.56 “The U.S. fully
intends to maintain a strong and enduring military posture in the
[Gulf] region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression
and assure our allies,” declared CENTCOM commander General
Lloyd J. Austin III in his March 2014 testimony before Congress.57
This “enduring posture” is intended to overcome any threats to
Elisabeth Bumiller, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Sends Top
Iranian Leader a Warning on Strait Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/us-warns-top-iranleader-not-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
55 Id.
56 Obama to U.N. General Assembly, supra note 51.
57 General Lloyd J.Austin III, Statement before the House Armed
Services
Committee
(Mar.
5,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statementen).
54
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regional security and the safety of oil exports, but also to deter any
other power from assuming such a role.
This posture was on clear display in the spring of 2014, when
Islamic militants invaded Iraq from their strongholds in Syria and
captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. With these militants—
largely Sunnis under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS)—in control of major population centers and key energy
infrastructure, President Obama decided to send hundreds of U.S.
military advisers to Iraq to help the beleaguered forces of Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi fend off the threat to Baghdad and Shiitepopulated areas in the south. “We will be helping Iraqis as they take
the fight to terrorists who threaten the Iraqi people, the region and
American interests as well,” Obama told reporters on June 19. 58
How this initiative will evolve in the months ahead cannot be
foreseen, but it starkly testifies to Washington’s enduring interest in
the stability of the Persian Gulf area.

V. INCREASED UNITED STATES PRESSURE ON RUSSIA
If increased North American energy output has failed to
produce a dramatic shift in U.S. ties with the Persian Gulf area, it is
having a significant impact on U.S. relations with Europe and
Russia—particularly in response to the Ukraine crisis of 2013-14.
Even before Russia seized Crimea and began its meddling in eastern
Ukraine, U.S. pundits and policymakers were calling on the Obama
administration to facilitate the export of U.S. natural gas to Europe as
a way of reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas—and thus, it was
claimed, Europe’s excessive deference to Moscow’s political
preferences.59 Once the crisis broke out, these calls became even
58 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Situation in
Iraq (June 19, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq).
59 See Coral Davenport & Steven Erlanger, U.S. Hopes Boom in Natural Gas
Can
Curb
Putin,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
5,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/europe/us-seeks-to-reduceukraines-reliance-on-russia-for-natural-gas.html.
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more strident, with Republicans in Congress introducing legislation
to eliminate regulatory barriers to such exports.
At present, Europe relies on natural gas for about one-fourth
of its total energy consumption, with about thirty percent of that gas
coming from Russia. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is a
product of several factors, including proximity, prolific Russian gas
deposits, limited European reserves, and an elaborate system of
pipelines connecting Russian fields to European markets. 60 To
further cement these ties, Gazprom—the Russian state-controlled gas
behemoth—has established partnerships with many of the leading
European gas-distribution companies, including Eni of Italy and
E.ON of Germany.61 Ukraine occupies a particularly significant role
in this elaborate system, as more than half of all the gas supplied to
Europe by Russia in 2013 was carried through pipelines crossing that
country.62
Because so much of Europe’s gas is obtained from pipelines
that pass through Ukraine, European consumers have periodically
suffered from shortages resulting from Moscow’s efforts to
intimidate Ukrainian officials by halting or reducing the inflow of gas
into those conduits, usually during negotiations over the price
Ukraine pays for its imports of Russian gas. Initially, when Ukraine
first separated from the former Soviet Union in 1991, Gazprom
provided it with gas at a discounted rate compared to what the same
gas sold for in Western Europe. As Ukraine moved closer to the
West, however, Moscow raised the price it charged Ukraine for gas.
When Ukrainian officials refused to pay the higher amount, Moscow
cut off supplies—thereby reducing or eliminating the flow to

60
See generally Russia, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Russia/russia.pdf;
see
also
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 45, 51, 58.
61 See 16% of Natural Gas Consumed in Europe Flows through Ukraine,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Mar.
14,
2014),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411.
62 Id.
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European recipients further along the pipelines’ path.63 In response,
individual European countries and the European Union have
adopted a series of measures intended to reduce their reliance on
Russian gas and/or their exposure to political strife in Ukraine.
These have included the construction of Nordstream, a RussianGerman pipeline that bypasses Ukraine, and plans for additional
pipelines that rely on non-Russian sources in the Middle East and
Africa.64
American officials have long urged Europeans to further
reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas, saying such reliance
undermines Euro-Atlantic solidarity and, accordingly, NATO’s ability
to confront Moscow in a crisis. In particular, Washington has sought
to persuade European leaders to accelerate the construction of
pipelines that would bypass Russia and to increase their reliance on
imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped from
numerous suppliers, including the United States. The Obama
administration has also encouraged Europeans to develop their
domestic reserves of shale gas, further diminishing their reliance on
Russian supplies.65
Not surprisingly, these efforts received a substantial boost
when the Ukraine crisis erupted in the fall of 2013. This crisis had
many roots, including anger over widespread governmental
corruption and a desire on the part of many Ukrainians to reduce
their economic ties to Moscow, but also revolved to a considerable
degree around energy issues. As part of the “association agreement”
Kiev was planning to sign with the European Union prior to the
onset of the crisis, Ukraine’s energy systems would come under
See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 239–41 (2011).
64 Id. at 241-43; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM
THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL:
EUROPEAN
ENERGY
SECURITY
STRATEGY
(May
28,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf.
65 See Conal Walsh, Gas on High Heat as Western Power Takes on Russia’s
Energy
Giant,
GUARDIAN,
July
8,
2006,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jul/09/russia.g8.
63
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European Union rules and regulations on competition and
transparency,66 thereby precluding secret deals of the sort previously
concluded between Ukraine’s natural gas oligarchs and their
counterparts in Russia. Under pressure from Russian President
Vladimir Putin, the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych,
scrapped the European Union deal and opted instead for closer ties
with Moscow—thereby triggering the mass protests that eventually
led to his flight and the establishment of a new government in Kiev.67
Russia, fearing the loss of its influence in the region and key strategic
assets, seized Crimea and instigated an anti-government insurgency in
eastern Ukraine. Although driven in part by nationalistic impulses,
Putin’s seizure of Crimea gave Russia control over a significant swath
of the Black Sea thought to house substantial reserves of oil and
natural gas.68
To discourage further adventurism by Moscow, the United
States has imposed tough sanctions on key members of Putin’s inner
circle and warned of further such measures if Moscow does not
exercise restraint. Recognizing that U.S. efforts alone are insufficient
to deter Moscow, American leaders have also sought to stiffen
Europe’s resistance to Russian provocations by helping to reduce its
reliance on Russian natural gas.69 As suggested by House Speaker
John A. Boehner, European reliance on Russian energy “has
diplomatic repercussions, making them more reluctant to challenge
some of Mr. Putin’s arrogant actions.” The answer to this dilemma,

EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION
AGREEMENT
–
THE
COMPLETE
TEXTS,
http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm.
67
See Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
68 See William J. Broad, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
17,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putingains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html.
69 See Davenport & Erlanger, supra note 59.
66
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he suggested, is to provide Europe with gas from America’s “vast
supplies of natural energy.”70
Before the United States can act on this strategy, however,
the White House must facilitate the construction of new facilities for
converting domestic gas supplies into LNG, thereby enabling its
shipment to Europe by sea. At present, only one such facility, at
Sabine Pass, Louisiana, has received the necessary permits and is
actually under construction. Plans for another half-dozen such
facilities have received preliminary clearance and are expected to
proceed into development, but will not commence operations for
several years; applications for another twenty-four LNG terminals are
under evaluation by the Department of Energy.71 Part of the holdup
is existing U.S. legislation, which requires a comprehensive
assessment of each facility’s contribution to the national interest. In
response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, however, American
politicians are calling for the adoption of new rules allowing a more
rapid approval process.
In March, Boehner declared that
“[e]xpediting approval of natural gas exports is one clear step the U.S.
can take to stand by our allies and stand up to Russian aggression.”72
Although calls for quicker approval of LNG export facilities
enjoy strong support in Washington and are likely to result in new
rules and regulations, some analysts question whether such actions
will have any significant impact on Putin’s strategic calculations. For
one thing, the earliest U.S. shipments of LNG to Europe will not
occur until late 2015 or early 2016, by which time the political
situation in Ukraine will, presumably, be resolved. Furthermore, the
John Boehner, Counter Putin by Liberating U.S. Natural Gas, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038242045794210241725
46260.
71 See Project Sponsors Are Seeking Federal Approval to Export Domestic Natural
Gas,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
24,
2012)
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5970.
72 Boehner: Stand Up to Putin by Ending De Facto Ban on U.S. Natural Gas
Exports, press release, Speaker Beohner’s Press Office (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-stand-putin-ending-de-facto-banus-natural-gas-exports.
70
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added cost of liquefying the gas, shipping it across the Atlantic, and
turning it back into gas at the other end will make U.S. gas as
expensive as Russian gas, eliminating some of the incentive to switch.
On top of this, LNG prices in Asia are significantly higher than those
in Europe, so future U.S. exports are likely to cross the Pacific, not
the Atlantic.73
Despite these doubts, U.S. leaders are likely to continue
advocating the shipment of U.S. gas to Europe as a way of exploiting
growing U.S. energy abundance for political advantage. “Moscow is
not immune from pressure,” former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice wrote in March.74 The Putin regime relies on oil and gas exports
for its economic survival, she noted. But soon, “North America’s
bounty of oil and gas will swamp Moscow’s capacity,” deterring
Russian adventurism.75

VI. NEW SITES OF CONTENTION
The introduction of new modes of extraction is altering the
global geopolitical equation in other significant ways. Among many
noteworthy effects, new modes of extraction enable the exploitation
of once-inaccessible oil and gas reserves in the Arctic and the deep
oceans. In some cases, however, the ownership of these reserves is
in dispute, as they lie in areas with unresolved boundaries. This is
producing new sources of friction and conflict, as nations fight for
control over these promising resources.

See, e.g., Stephen Munson, Can U.S. Natural Gas Rescue Ukraine from
Russia?
WASH.
POST
WONKBLOG,
Mar.
25,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/03/25/can-u-snatural-gas-rescue-ukraine-from-russia/.
74 Condolezza Rice, Will America Heed the Wake-Up Call of Ukraine?,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
7,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/condoleezza-rice-will-america-heedthe-wake-up-call-of-ukraine/2014/03/07/cf087f74-a630-11e3-84d4e59b1709222c_story.html.
75 Id.
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Energy companies have, of course, long drilled for oil and
natural gas in shallow coastal areas adjacent to their onshore deposits,
for example, in waters of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana and in the
Caspian Sea off Baku in what is now Azerbaijan. The development
of deepwater drilling, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
2005, Chevron set a record by drilling in 3,500 feet of water in the
Gulf of Mexico, a major site for deepwater innovation. Just one year
later, Chevron doubled that depth at its Jack No. 2 well at another
Gulf location.76 Shell was the next to break records, announcing in
2010 that it had drilled 8,000 feet beneath sea level at its Perdido
field, 200 miles east of the Texas coastline. 77 Brazilians are also
beginning to reach extreme depths in their efforts to exploit newly
discovered undersea reservoirs in the South Atlantic, called “pre-salt”
fields because they lie below a thick layer of salt.78 Record-breaking
depths have also been reached in waters off India and Angola.
The introduction of deep-sea drilling technologies is expected
to result in a substantial increase in hydrocarbon output from
offshore fields. “In deepwater around the world, our industry’s
technologies will allow production to more than double over the next
30 years,” Exxon’s Tillerson affirmed in 2013.79 At the same time,
however, the onset of drilling in some offshore areas is generating
new sources of conflict, as countries fight over the possession of
undersea reserves in disputed maritime areas. While some offshore
fields lie in areas that are under the undisputed jurisdiction of
adjacent countries, such as Shell’s and Chevron’s operations in the
U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico, others lie in areas that are
disputed by two or more countries, as is the case of promising
reserves in the East and South China Seas.80

See, e.g., Michael T. Klare, THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT 41–49 (2012).
Id.
78 For more information on Brazil’s “pre-salt” development plans, see
Brazil,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Oct.
1,
2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=BR.
79 Tillerson, supra note 37.
80 For background on this issue, see THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT, supra
note 76, at 63; Tillerson, supra note 37.
76
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The East and South China Seas are semi-enclosed extensions
of the western Pacific Ocean that harbor a number of small
uninhabited islands and are bordered by China and a number of
other states: the East China Sea by Japan and Taiwan; the South
China Sea by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam.81 In both cases, the bordering countries have laid claim to
significant swaths of these waters, citing historical ownership of
assorted islands as well as development rights provided under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
UNCLOS treaty, first approved in 1982, grants signatory powers an
“exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles
from their coastline. In the case of continental states, such as China,
the UNCLOS treaty also allows them to exploit their outer
continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200 miles. Given the
relatively small size of these two seas, this has led to a welter of
overlapping claims to the waters involved, with China claiming the
lion’s share of both areas and the other states contending with both
China and their immediate neighbors.82 To demonstrate their resolve
to protect their claims, most of these countries have deployed naval
or coast guard vessels in their respective EEZs. On some occasions,
this has resulted in maritime clashes between the contending forces.83
Energy analysts are divided over the energy potential of the
East and South China Seas, but both are believed to harbor
significant reserves of oil and natural gas. According to the EIA, the
81 On disputes in the East China Sea, see East China Sea, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.
(Sept.
25,
2012),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics.cfm?fips=ECS; for more information on disputes in the South China Sea,
see South China Sea, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.
pdf.
82 See id.; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), part
V,
arts.
55–60,
available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOSTOC.htm.
83 For a timeline of these clashes, see Timeline: Disputes in the South China
Sea, WASH. POST, June 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/special/south-china-sea-timeline/.
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East China Sea holds between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and
between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Chinese experts,
however, see a much larger potential: as much as 70 to 160 billion
barrels of oil and 250 to 300 trillion cubic feet of gas.84 A similar
mismatch prevails in estimates of reserves in the South China Sea: the
EIA sees only 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of
gas, while Chinese experts see as much as 125 billion barrels of oil
and up to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas.85 Very little systematic testing
has been conducted in these areas, so it is impossible to verify these
estimates. Nevertheless, it is evident that both bodies of water
possess oil and gas reserves on a scale sufficient to attract the interest
of all surrounding countries.
Until now, most of the drilling in the East and South China
Seas has occurred at sites in the undisputed EEZs of one or another
of the states involved. Recently, however, China has begun drilling in
parts of the South China Sea claimed by Vietnam, provoking naval
clashes and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnamese cities. The most serious
episode erupted in May 2014, when the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) deployed its largest deepwater drilling rig, the
HD-981, in waters off the northern coast of Vietnam. 86 Once
emplaced in the drilling area, the Chinese surrounded the HD-981
with a large flotilla of naval and coast guard ships; and when
Vietnamese coast guard vessels attempted to penetrate this defensive
ring in an effort to drive off the rig, they were rammed by Chinese
ships and pummeled by water cannon. No lives were lost in those

East China Sea, supra note 81.
South China Sea, supra note 81.
86 See Jane Perlez & Keith Bradsher, In High Seas, China Moves Unilaterally,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/10/world/asia/inhigh-seas-china-moves-unilaterally.html?_r=0; Keith Bradsher, China and Vietnam at
Impasse Over Rig in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/asia/china-and-vietnam-at-impasseover-drilling-rig-in-south-china-sea.html.
84
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encounters, but anti-Chinese rioting in Vietnam proper led to several
deaths and scores of injuries.87
As noted in most press accounts of these events, the naval
clashes and rioting sparked by the deployment of HD-981 in
Vietnamese-claimed waters were driven in large part by nationalism
and resentment over past humiliations. The Chinese, insisting that
the islands in the South China Sea were once ruled by China, are
seeking to overcome the territorial losses they suffered under the
sway of the Western imperial powers and Imperial Japan. Similarly,
the Vietnamese, long accustomed to Chinese invasions, seek to
protect what they view as their sovereign territory. Despite the sociopolitical implications, the energy dimensions of the conflict should
not be minimized. Both China and Vietnam are determined to
exploit the oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea, and neither
shows any inclination to compromise on their respective claims.88
The same can be said of the Philippines with respect to its swath of
that sea, and of Japan with respect to contested areas of the East
China Sea. So long as these bodies of water are viewed as a valuable
source of energy, the parties to these disputes are likely to persist in
their efforts to exploit what they view as their rightful resources—
even if this means risking armed conflict with their neighbors.

See Chris Buckley, Chau Doan & Thomas Fuller, China Targeted by
Vietnamese
in
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Riots,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
14,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/world/asia/foreign-factories-in-vietnamweigh-damage-in-anti-china-riots.html; Jane Perlez, Vietnam Issues Stern Warning on
Protest Violence Amid Standoff with China, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at A10; Jane
Perlez, China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/vietnam.html?gwh=831C4FA
C884E04DEB4AA14093F61C971&gwt=pay&assetType=nyt_now.
88 See, e.g., Stirring Up the South China Sea, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Apr. 23,
2012),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.aspx.
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THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC

The development of new drilling technologies is also leading
to increased oil and gas drilling in the Arctic region—and here, too,
disputes have arisen over the ownership of valuable reserves.
The Arctic region, encompassing the northern reaches of
Alaska, Canada, Norway, and Russia, plus the Arctic Ocean itself,
occupies only six percent of the Earth’s surface yet is believed to
house approximately thirty percent of the world’s undiscovered
natural gas and thirteen percent of its undiscovered oil. 89 Until
recently, the Arctic’s harsh weather conditions and year-round ice
cover made it highly unattractive as a site for oil and gas drilling;
however, as a result of climate change and the introduction of icehardened drilling rigs, energy companies are finding it easier to
operate in the region. With sea ice now vastly reduced in summer
months, the drilling season has been extended and drilling platforms
can operate further north. To take advantage of these conditions, oil
companies are stepping up their efforts to exploit the Arctic’s energy
resources.90 Royal Dutch Shell, for example, is attempting to drill in
areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska, while Statoil is
extracting gas from Norway’s sector of the Barents Sea, and
Gazprom is preparing to drill in the Pechora Sea off northern Siberia.
Many other such endeavors, including a collaborative effort between
Exxon and Rosneft to exploit oil reserves in the Kara Sea, are likely
to get under way in the years ahead.91
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL:
ESTIMATED OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE
(2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
90 See, e.g., RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153,
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 4,
2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf; see also Philip Budzik, Arctic Oil
and Natural Gas Potential, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INTEGRATED
ANALYSIS
AND
FORECASTING
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf.
91 For background on these endeavors, see THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT,
supra note 76, at 70–93; see also Clifford Krauss, Exxon and Russia’s Oil Company in
Deal
for
Joint
Projects,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
16,
2012,
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Although promising as a fresh source of energy, the
development of the Arctic’s oil and gas reserves is likely to spark new
geopolitical tensions. This is due to the region’s immense resource
potential and the fact that disputes have arisen over the location of
offshore boundaries in the Arctic Ocean—and thus over the
ownership of certain promising energy reserves. The United States,
for example, has a boundary dispute with Russia in the Bering Sea
and with Canada in the Beaufort Sea; Canada has a dispute of its own
with Greenland over their mutual boundary; and Greenland has one
with Iceland.92 All of these countries, moreover, are vying for control
over the outer Arctic, beyond their respective 200-nautical-mile
EEZs. These disputes would not provoke much concern in the
absence of major energy deposits, but take on increased significance
when the countries involved hope to procure significant economic
benefits from the disputed areas. As noted by Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel in November 2013, “a flood of interest in energy
exploration [in the Arctic] has the potential to heighten tensions over
other issues.”93
The risk of tension and conflict in the Arctic is further
exacerbated by the determination of key regional policymakers to rely
on military power to reinforce their claims to contested territories.
Although the Arctic states have pledged to refrain from the use of
force in asserting their claims, most have taken steps to enhance their
capacity to engage in combat operations in the area.94 Russia, for
example, has announced plans to establish new bases in the Arctic
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/business/energy-environment/exxon-andrussian-oil-company-agree-to-jointprojects.html?_r=1&&gwh=D4243D6AF66DF59057355FEED9D935F8&gwt=pa
y.
92 For background on Arctic boundary disputes, see Reginald R. Smith,
The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm of the Next “Cold War”? 63 JOINT FORCES
Q.,117–24 (2011); see also Changes in the Arctic, supra note 90, at 15–16.
93 Chuck Hagel, Speech at the Halifax International Security Forum
(Nov.
22,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1821).
94 See, e.g., Heather Conley & Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the
Arctic: An Assessment of the Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 2010); Smith, supra note 92, at 124.
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and to deploy specially equipped combat forces there. This buildup,
said President Putin, “will make it possible to substantially strengthen
our military and border security and also to increase the effectiveness
of the protection of natural resources.”95 Canada has also taken steps
to bolster its presence in the Arctic, establishing a new base at
Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and ordering a new fleet of icehardened patrol ships.96 Norway, which shares a border with Russia
in its far north, has relocated its combined military headquarters to
Boda, above the Arctic Circle, and has taken other steps to bolster its
Arctic combat capabilities.97
The potential for friction and conflict arising from the
contention over prime Arctic real estate is further exacerbated by the
lack of a clear legal regime and adjudicative system for the resolution
of Arctic boundary disputes.
UNCLOS provides conflicting
guidance on the determination of offshore territories, awarding
coastal states a 200-mile EEZ but also allowing them to claim control
over their outer continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200
nautical miles. The Convention also provides for the adjudication of
offshore boundary disputes by the newly-established International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but few states have been willing to
bring their disputes to this body, which only examines cases brought
on a voluntary basis.98 The only other international organization with
jurisdiction in the region, the Arctic Council, is not empowered to
address territorial disputes.99 It is likely, then, that these disputes will
95 Jacob Kipp, Russian Strategic Interests Expand in the Arctic, 8 EURASIA
DAILY
MONITOR
173
(Sept.
21,
2011),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38430&no_cach
e=1#.VNfS5HacMU1; for background on Russian military initiatives in the Arctic,
see Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 23–25.
96 See Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 17–18.
97 Id. at 21–23.
98 See generally RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784,
MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES
INVOLVING
CHINA:
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
(Aug.
5,
2014),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf; see also International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, The Tribunal, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0.
99
See
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U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
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continue to fester as the drive to exploit the Arctic’s energy riches
gains momentum.

VIII.

THE ROAD AHEAD

As this brief survey suggests, the geopolitics of energy was
long governed by expectations of scarcity—the presumption that oil
and natural gas reserves are limited in extent, and that, as global
demand increased, the competition for what remained would become
increasingly intense and fractious. In fact, significant shortages and
supply disruptions have occurred in past decades, lending credibility
to this presumption. However, earlier predictions that the world of
2014 would be facing a downward curve in the global supply of
hydrocarbons have been replaced by expectations of energy
abundance, stretching out for decades to come. Indeed, many
analysts now suggest that the global demand for fossil fuels like oil
and natural gas will begin to contract long before supplies disappear,
as countries around the world institute measures to reduce emissions
of climate-altering greenhouse gases.100 Under these circumstances,
we might reasonably expect a dramatic shift in the character of
energy geopolitics, with considerably less emphasis on the use of
force to secure overseas sources of supply. Yet, while there has been
some alteration in the global policy landscape, conflict over energy
continues to convulse international affairs.
Several factors can be identified to explain the persistence of
energy competition and conflict. To begin with, the expectations of
abundance expressed in the United States, Canada, and some other
countries are not shared by all major energy consumers. The leaders
of China and Japan, for example, continue to worry about their
ability to procure sufficient oil and gas supplies from foreign
suppliers to meet their long-term requirements. And while the new
See Brad Plumer, Is Peak Oil Demand Just Around the Corner? WASH.
POST
WONKBLOG,
Aug.
9,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/09/is-peak-oildemand-just-around-the-corner/.
100
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extractive technologies are expected to permit the exploitation of vast
hydrocarbon reserves in such locales as Argentina, Brazil, China,
Russia, and Saudi Arabia, it is still not known whether they will
perform as well in these places as they have in the United States and
Canada.101 Under these circumstances, many countries will continue
to view energy through the lens of potential scarcity, as they have in
the past.
Even if oil and natural gas prove to be more abundant than
originally assumed, these products continue to be viewed as vital
materials whose possession, in adequate amounts, is essential for the
well-being and security of the nation. As noted by Robert E. Ebel of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in a 2002 address at
the State Department, “[o]il fuels much more than automobiles and
airplanes.
Oil fuels military power, national treasuries, and
international politics.” 102 Far more than an ordinary trade
commodity, “it is a determinant of well-being, of national security,
and international power for those who possess this vital resource and
the converse for those who do not.” 103 This assessment has
governed international policymaking for over a century, and while the
widespread introduction of renewable energy may, in time, render it
moot, it will continue to shape the foreign and security policies of
nation-states for some time to come.
The struggle for control over key deposits of energy has been
a significant source of conflict in the past, and is likely to remain so
for some time into the future. The nature, locale, and dynamics of
such conflict may well experience change in the years ahead, but the
underlying motive—to ensure adequate supplies to satisfy critical
national requirements—will not.

101

See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 51–

55.

Robert E. Ebel, Geopolitics of Energy Into the 21st Century, Remarks to the
Open Forum, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 30, 2002) (transcript available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10187.htm).
103 Id.
102

40

2015

Klare

3:2

Table 1: U.S. Oil Production, Consumption, and Imports, Actual
2005-2013 and Projected 2015-2040 (in million barrels per day)

2005
Actual (A)
2010 A
2013 A*
2015
Projected
(P)
2020 P
2025 P
2030 P
2035 P
2040 P

Oil
Consumption

Oil
Production

Oil
Imports

20.8

6.9

13.9

Imports as %
of
consumption
66.8

19.1
18.9
19.1

7.6
10.0
12.2

11.6
8.9
6.9

60.5
47.0
36.1

19.5
19.2
18.7
18.6
18.6

12.8
12.1
11.5
11.6
11.7

6.7
6.9
7.2
7.0
6.9

34.4
35.9
38.5
37.6
37.1

Source for Actual data: BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD
ENERGY JUNE 2013 8, 9 (2013),
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statisticalreview/statistic
al_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf.
Source for Projected data: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at Tables A5, G1.
Source for 2013: Petroleum and Other Liquids Supply and
Disposition,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(2013),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbblpd_a_cur.
htm.
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FOOD AS A KEY RESOURCE FOR
SECURITY AND STABILITY:
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN THE
GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 1950-2000
Bryan L. McDonald, PhD*
INTRODUCTION1
When world leaders gathered in 2009 at the G-8 Summit in
L’Aquila, Italy, food was a major topic of concern. The assembled
leaders pledged to “act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve
sustainable global food security.”2 There was good reason for their
focus. By the early twenty-first century, food, long a subject of
concern for the security, stability and prosperity of societies, had reemerged as a topic of broad interest in the U.S. and around the
world. This attention was driven by a number of trends, including:
far-ranging and high-profile food safety episodes; record high rates of
chronic hunger and obesity; outbreaks of violence and unrest fueled
in part by high food prices and high price volatility; and concern
about impacts on food systems from changing trends in weather and

* Bryan McDonald, Assistant Professor of History at the Pennsylvania
State University.
1 This article updates and extends arguments and material first presented
in BRYAN L. MCDONALD, FOOD SECURITY (2010).
2 G8 Summit Statement on Food Security, “L’Aquila” Joint Statement on
Global Food Security: L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) 1 (July 10, 2009),
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Glo
bal_Food_Security%5B1%5D,0.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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climate.3 Events of the early twenty-first century demonstrate that
ensuring food security remains an urgent problem that affects the
security and national interests of states, as well as the human security
of people and communities around the world. For example, in its
2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the U.S. Intelligence
Community recognized competition for secure access to food as a
growing security threat.4 This article examines how the landscape of
food security threats and vulnerabilities is changing and identifies
three sets of concerns that are converging to amplify, disrupt, and
transform efforts to ensure that all people are food secure: nutrition,
food safety, and global environmental change.

I. FOOD SECURITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL CHANGE
While many definitions of food security exist, the most
commonly used definition holds that food security “exists when all
people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life.” 5 The key
components of food security are: availability, access, utilization, and
stability. 6 Globalization and global environmental change have
significantly impacted the ways people get food and have given rise to
a complex, transnational network of food systems that includes a
range of activities and processes related to food.7

3 Ban Ki-moon, The New Face of Hunger, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/03/11/AR2008031102462.html.
4 James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the US Intelligence Community, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE 9-10 (Jan.
29, 2014), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf.
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., The State of Food
Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises 8 (2010),
www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf.
6
Feed the Future, Feed the Future Guide, at iv (May 2010),
http://feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/FTF_Guide.pdf.
7 See FOOD SECURITY, supra note 1.
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The global food network brings new opportunities—ranging
from a greater variety of foods to improved economic development
options—but also new threats and vulnerabilities. 8 Without a full
understanding of the risks and opportunities posed by such networks
they cannot be used to their full potential to address pressing global
problems such as enhancing security, ensuring prosperity, alleviating
poverty, and improving the status of women. Concurrently, the
emerging structure of the pattern of relations involved in connecting
places and people through food highlights the challenge of governing
complex, networked systems that are becoming increasingly common
and impactful in global affairs.
Globalization is a primary driver of changes occurring in food
systems and has brought increased interconnectedness, mobility, and
access for transnational flows of goods, people, and information.9
Globalization can be understood as a set of processes involving
increasing speed and scale of interactions that operate through
networks and are transforming many aspects of daily life. 10
Collectively, globalization is a long-running series of processes of
increased integration.11 For the most part, these changes in economic,
political, social, technological, and environmental domains are leading
toward real material improvements in everyday life for many people
in many parts of the world. Acknowledging that globalization is a
long-term phenomenon, however, should not deter recognition that
there is something distinctive about contemporary changes based on
the speed, scale, and networked form of contemporary globalization
processes.
The concept of networks is integral to understanding the
emerging global food system, in part because we live in a time of
networks such as the Internet, electrical power grids, and the air
transit system. Networks, at the most general level, are an
8
9

Id.
Id.

10
DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT &
JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
CULTURE 16 (1999).
11 William H. McNeill, Globalization: Long Term Process or New Era in
Human Affairs? 2 NEW GLOBAL STUDIES 11 (Jan. 2008).
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interconnection of systems that allow sharing between systems and
contain regularized interactions between nodes of activity.12 One of
the key features of networks is that they collapse distances, though
not in a traditional, geometric sense. In networks, the shortest
distance between two points often involves traveling through a hub,
rather than directly from node to node. While networks can continue
to function with the loss of some or many nodes, disruption of a hub
can have a significant impact on the overall network and cascading
impacts on other networks.13 Working through networks of trade,
information, and travel, globalization is impacting many aspects of
daily life in many parts of the world.
In recent decades, local, regional, and national food systems
have become linked in an emerging global food network. This
complex web of relations is often referred to as the food system and
it includes the production, gathering, harvesting, processing,
transporting, preparing, and consuming of food.14 However, it is vital
to recognize that while food systems are increasingly interconnected,
they are not a fully incorporated system in the sense of being an
integrated whole. As the U.K. Government’s long range planning
group, Foresight, recognizes, this food network is “not a single entity,
but rather a partially self-organised collection of interacting parts.”15
The networked form of global food relations is deeply significant to
contemporary challenges related to the production, governance, and
security of food.16
The emerging geography of world food problems is deeply
uneven, and the global food network is filled with pockets of both
abundance and scarcity. Yet, the terrain of this landscape does not
ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS
CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS,
SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 1-8 (2003).
13 THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE UPSIDE OF DOWN: CATASTROPHE,
CREATIVITY, AND THE RENEWAL OF CIVILIZATION 116-22 (2006).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE (2010).
15 Foresight, The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global
Sustainability THE GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI. 10 (Jan. 2011).
16 Id. at 13-15.
12
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map evenly or cleanly onto any traditional models of the world such
as North/South or Developed/Developing. 17 The creation of this
global food network has happened as the result of many decisions in
a wide variety of locations including farm fields, scientific and
commercial laboratories, governmental agencies, and international
negotiations. 18 Food insecurity is driven by a complex mix of
economic, environmental, political, and social factors including:
population growth, increased purchasing power and changing dietary
preferences, variability and severe weather events, conflict and
instability, and further integration of food systems into global
financial systems.19
The global food network operates through a vast web of
goods and services to link people and places across the globe. Given
this, it is a useful lens to use in examining one of the key questions in
global relations at this moment: how and to what extent can ways be
found to govern networks and harness them to enhance national
security and advance vital national interests? Although this global
food network is influenced by the actions of states, it is also
transnational in the sense that it spans state borders and involves a
range of actors at the state level as well as actors in international,
private, and non-state sectors.20 Recent events and global trends have
combined to create what Laurie Garrett recognizes as a “destabilizing
moment in terms of global governance and any ability to come up
with reasonable, rational ways to globalize the food supply.”21
Examinations of food security highlight how the networks
which are empowering people and bringing prosperity and
improvements in health and welfare are also amplifying traditional
security challenges, such as hunger and malnutrition, as well as giving
FOOD SECURITY, supra note 1.
Id.
19 Id.
20 Richard A. Matthew & George E. Shambaugh. Sex, Drugs, and Heavy
Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities, 29 SEC. DIALOGUE, 163-75
(1998).
21 Interview by Toni Johnson with Laure Garrett, Senior Fellow for
Global Health, CFR (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/food-security/food-pricesglobal-instability/p24018.
17
18
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rise to new vulnerabilities and new kinds of threats, such as largescale, transnational food safety episodes.
To understand food security, it is necessary to ask not just
how global change is shifting the landscape of food security threats
and vulnerabilities, but also to consider how world food problems are
emerging as questions that are key to global governance, prosperity,
and security.
In the increasingly globalized food network, fewer people and
nations produce for themselves the food they require and are
increasingly dependent on the global network of food systems. Even
as human societies become more urban and industrialized, agriculture
and food production remain key components of local, state, national,
and global economies. Recent events have resulted in a greater
amount of attention being paid to food security concerns.22 There is
good reason for a renewed focus on food security as lack of food
security impacts billions of people on a daily basis and contributes to
significant human insecurity. This section describes three sets of
challenges that are converging to amplify, disrupt, and transform
food security.

II. ENSURING NUTRITION
Improvements in food production and global health during
the twentieth century allowed human societies to flourish through
dramatic increases in global population size, life expectancy, and
reductions in infant and child mortality rates. Despite these advances,
malnutrition remains a widespread form of food insecurity that
affects billions of people on a daily basis. Malnutrition is the
collective term applied to a variety of forms of poor nutrition.23 A
full discussion of malnutrition encompasses not just the classical food
See, e.g., Ban, supra note 3.
See Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Agricultural Research and Policy for Better Health
and Nutrition in Developing Countries: A Food Systems Approach, 37 AGRIC. ECON. 187,
190-92 (2007).
22
23
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security problem of chronic hunger (people who do not receive
sufficient energy from their diets), but also must consider problems
related to people who do not receive an adequate supply of vitamins,
minerals, and nutrients from their diets (micronutrient deficiencies)
as well as people who have excessive net energy intake (also called
overweight or obesity depending upon the severity of the
condition).24 Collectively, this set of problems is often referred to as
the triple burden of malnutrition.
The most commonly recognized form of malnutrition is
energy deficiency or chronic hunger. 25 Around the world, many
people are chronically hungry because their diets do not provide
enough energy for them to lead active and healthy lives.26 Events in
the past few years, including a rise in global food prices and the
global economic crisis, have led to dramatic increases in the number
of hungry people in the world. 27 The Food and Agriculture
Organization of the U.N. estimates that for 2011-13 period there
were 842 million people who were not getting enough food to lead
active and healthy lives. 28 The recent food price crisis has been
especially impactful, as it has effected all parts of the world at once
and thus reduced the effectiveness of international, national, and
subnational aid systems and coping mechanisms.
The challenge of malnutrition also includes significant
numbers of people who experience micronutrient deficiencies in their
diets from a lack of key vitamins and minerals such as vitamin A,
iodine, iron, zinc, and folic acid. For example, fifteen percent of
people in the world lack adequate iodine, more than forty percent of
children under five in the developing world have compromised
immune systems as a result of a deficiency of vitamin A, and iron
deficiency reduces the health and productivity of forty percent of

Id. at 187-98.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., The State of Food
Insecurity in the World: The Multiple Dimensions of Food Security 15 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 8.
24
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people in the developing world.29 Less a problem of food availability,
micronutrient deficiency is a problem of diet. “Throughout the
developing world, the poor live mostly on a monotonous regime of
starchy staples to which small quantities of more nutritious foods are
added as money and availability allow.”30 While staple foods such as
wheat, rice, corn, or millet provide energy (calories), they do not on
their own provide enough vitamins and minerals for a healthy diet.31
Finally, malnutrition also involves excessive net-energy intake.
More and more people are consuming diets composed of energydense, nutrient-poor foods while also transitioning to lifestyles that
involve lower levels of physical activity than in the past. This global
“nutrition transition” means that many nations are now not only
confronted by undernutrition, but also by rising rates of overweight
and obesity. 32 In the United States, obesity rates have increased
significantly over a relatively brief period of time. In 1990, no U.S.
state had a prevalence of obesity in the adult population greater than
fifteen percent.33 By 2012, no state had a prevalence of obesity less
than twenty percent, while thirteen states had a prevalence of obesity
equal to or greater than thirty percent.34 Overweight and obesity are
not just problems impacting developed countries. For example, a
2014 report from the Overseas Development Institute found that
prevalence of overweight and obesity in developing countries has
increased more than threefold since 1980, from 250 million to more

29 The World Bank, Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development: A
Strategy for Large-Scale Action (2006),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/%20NUTRITION/Resources/2818461131636806329/NutritionStrategy.pdf.
30 UNICEF, Vitamin & Mineral Deficiency: A Global ProgressReport 4 (2004),
http://www.micronutrient.org/CMFiles/PubLib/Report-67-VMD-A-GlobalDamage-Assessment-Report1KSB-3242008-9634.pdf.
31 Id. at 4-5; See also Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development, supra
note 29.
32 Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development, supra note 29, at 24.
33 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Adult Obesity Facts
(Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html.
34 Id.
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than 900 million people.35 Overweight and obesity have a number of
health consequences, including increased incidences of chronic
diseases such as type-2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and
hypertension. 36 Discussions about overweight and obesity may be
difficult, as they touch on deeply personal issues such as diet, family
eating patterns, exercise, and genetic predispositions. However, such
discussions, as well as structural changes to improve access and
information about food, are vitally important to the health and
security of states and people.

III. OPTIMIZING FOOD SAFETY
Concerns about food safety, like many other challenges to
global health and security, have become more complex as a result of
globalization. The establishment of interconnected food systems that
link many people and places began long ago as desire for spices,
foods, and goods encouraged the establishment of trade routes. In
recent decades, however, advances in transportation and
communication have enhanced the speed and scale of global
interactions. Like many global systems, from the air transit system to
mail and cargo systems, the food system has been transformed by
globalization. The modern global food network is designed to move
perishable goods rapidly from producers to consumers. Linking local,
national, and global food systems has provided tremendous benefits
to consumers in terms of availability, variety, and pricing of food.
The results of greater connectivity, however, have not been entirely
positive.
While the global food network largely provides safe and
healthful food, it can also be a means for transmitting threats to
human health. The challenge of optimizing food safety involves
ensuring that food supplies remain free from threats to human
35 Sharada Keats & Steve Wiggins, Future Diets: Implications for Agriculture
and Food Prices (Jan. 2014), http://www.odi.org/future-diets.
36 Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity, Smoking, and Drinking On Medical
Problems and Costs, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 245 (2002), available at
http://www.glahder.dk/engelsk/obesity/obesity%20Roland%20Sturm.pdf.
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health—whether from natural or accidental contamination, such as
incidents of contaminated spinach, pet food, milk, peanut butter, and
eggs—and also in preventing actors with nefarious intent from using
networked food systems to intentionally cause harm (a set of
concerns often discussed as food defense). Contamination of food
supplies by infectious diseases or chemical hazards can have
significant health impacts. Illness and contamination of crops,
livestock, and food supplies can also have a significant impact on the
cost and availability of food.37
There are multiple ways that food can be impacted by health
threats or contamination: crops or animals can be sickened by
viruses, fungi, or other microbial threats (such as wheat stem rust or
potato blight); food can carry a disease from sick animals to human
consumers (such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy/Mad Cow
Disease); food may be accidentally contaminated (such as E. coli
infections in spinach and ice cream); humans can infect a food supply
by moving into marginal areas or eating marginal foods (such as the
believed transmission pathway of the SARS coronavirus passing from
bats to civets to humans); or food can be intentionally contaminated
with diseases or toxins (such as the 1984 contamination of salad bars
in The Dalles, Oregon).38
Despite national and international efforts to improve food
safety, foodborne illness remains a significant area of concern. The
globalization of food systems, along with the intensification and
increased centralization of agriculture and food industries, has created
conditions favorable to the spread of contaminants and known
diseases as well as the emergence of new forms of diseases. For
example, a 2010 U.S. Government Accountability Office review
found that while sixty percent of fresh fruits and vegetables and
eighty percent of seafood come from outside U.S. borders, the Food
and Drug Administration is able to physically inspect only one

37
38

FOOD SECURITY, supra note 1.
Id.
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percent of imported food. 39 The increasing speed and scale of
connections between nodes in the global food network means that
when problems do develop, they are often widespread and cause
illness or death in large numbers of people. In part, food safety
threats have such large potential impacts because they can be so
rapidly and efficiently diffused via the normal operation of the global
food network.

IV. MANAGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
The ways in which people satisfy their need for food—such
as gathering, hunting, farming, fishing, and raising livestock—are
significant contributors to the impacts that human populations have
on the environment. Agriculture and food production are significant
drivers of environmental impacts on land and soil, water use and
water quality, and components of large-scale environmental changes
such as climate change. Production of food and fiber accounts for
seventy percent of water withdrawals and is responsible for thirty
percent of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.40 Globally, agriculture
consumes more water (including virtual water that is transported in
food) than any other industry and is also the primary source of nitrate
and ammonia pollution.41 Agricultural practices drive environmental
changes such as land clearance, land degradation, increased
salinization of soils, stresses on water resources, impacts on water
quality from agricultural runoff, and the development of antibioticresistant microbes.42 In seeking to understand the dynamics of global
39 Government Accountability Office, Food Safety: FDA Has Begun to Take
Action to Address Weaknesses in Food Safety Research, but Gaps Remain 10 (Apr. 23,
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10182r.pdf.
40 World Economic Forum, Realizing a New Vision for Agriculture: A
Roadmap
for
Stakeholders
4
(2010),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_IP_NVA_Roadmap_Report.pdf.
41 Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., World Agriculture:
Towards 2015/2030 (2003),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/Y3557E/%20y3557%20e03.htm#c.
42 U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Outlook 4:
Environment
for
Development
(2008)
available
at
http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO4/%20report%20/GEO-4_Report_Full_en.pdf.
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change, it is vital to recognize that agricultural and food production
systems are linked in a series of feedback loops wherein food systems
drive environmental changes which in turn impact food systems and
leads to further environmental changes and so on.
Collectively, food production activities have had significant,
though often unintentional, impacts on the global environment.
Environmental changes are often localized, such as cutting down or
burning forests to create croplands. The impacts of such changes are
often local as well, such as increased erosion of topsoil, loss of soil
nutrients, and reducing water quality when siltation and agricultural
runoff enter waterways. However, local changes can aggregate to
have regional and national impacts that contribute to problems such
as toxic dead zones in rivers and oceans, desertification, and global
climate change. During the twentieth century, agricultural production
came to increasingly rely on mechanization and synthetic chemical
inputs including fertilizers, insecticides, and pesticides, as well as
scientific techniques to measure soil fertility, acidity, and aid in
making adjustments to the nutrition and care of livestock.43 These
developments led to significant increases in productivity, but also
resulted in a number of unintended consequences such as pests
developing resistance to pesticides and herbicides, and negative
impacts on land, water, habitat, and biodiversity.
In response to the negative unintended consequences of
agricultural intensification—as well as concerns about reductions in
productivity gains and rising demands for food—a number of efforts
have recognized the need to amplify the positive benefits of
intensified agricultural production while minimizing its negative
environmental effects.44 Managing environmental change in food and
agricultural production involves a number of efforts to shift from a
vicious cycle of food system-induced environmental degradation by
harmonizing food and agricultural production with the imperatives of
sustainable development to create a virtuous cycle that enhances
43
GIOVANNI FEDERICO, FEEDING THE WORLD: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE, 1800–2000 (2005).
44 H. Charles J. Godfray et al., Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion
People, 327 SCIENCE 812 (Feb. 2010).
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environmental quality and ensures food security. A global food
network optimized around the goal of sustainability could help boost
soil fertility and reduce erosion, improve local water quality, reduce
runoff, and aid in efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change by
providing buffer zones, sinks to remove greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere, and energy from current biological sources to reduce
GHG emissions.

V. SUSTAINABILITY, RESILIENCE AND WORLD FOOD PROBLEMS
This article provided an overview of the ways that processes
of global change have problematized efforts to ensure that all people
have the food they need to live active and healthy lives. A key insight
that emerges from this analysis is that food security issues—such as
malnutrition, food safety, and global environmental change—must be
understood as multi-causal and multidisciplinary challenges. It is also
vital to underscore that these core challenges are not separate
domains of concerns, but rather are interactive areas of operations.
Environmental degradation from climate change, for instance, may
increasingly cause humans to seek food sources in marginal areas,
thus bringing them into contact with new diseases and increasing
their impacts on habitats and species. In addition, widespread
malnutrition may weaken a population’s resistances to disease, thus
making them more vulnerable to the impacts of food-borne illness.
Understanding the complex, multi-causal, and interactive nature of
these food security challenges identifies important solution sets and
reveals the need for better coordination between often-disparate
efforts to address core drivers that contribute to food insecurity.
Gaining a better sense of the causes of food insecurity opens
up a range of solutions that encompass far more actions than just
efforts to intensify agricultural productivity. Ensuring food security
will require improving the productivity and efficiency of global
agriculture while also reducing the environmental impacts of food
production. 45 Yet, food security also involves confronting social,
H. Charles J. Godfray et al., Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion
People, 327 Science 812–18 (Feb. 12, 2010).
45
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ethical, economic, and political questions about how food is grown,
produced, and consumed. Taking a broad view of the changing food
security landscape reveals how each of the sets of concerns discussed
here are components of a fundamental question: how do we grow a
global food network that is ethically, economically and
environmentally sustainable, but is also sensitive to and resilient
against converging security threats and vulnerabilities?
In the coming decades, efforts to ensure food security will
need to utilize the full range of national capabilities from the state,
private, and non-state sectors to confront world food problems.
Solutions to food insecurity must come through strategies that are
sustainable both for human societies and for the environment on
which they rely. A second key goal for food systems is to develop
resilience: the ability to absorb and recover from adverse events,
whether such events are economic, political, or environmental (or
perhaps even a convergence of crises that cascade to have amplified
negative effects). As discussed above, while food security is an
increasingly global issue, perhaps the key defining feature of the
emerging network of global food systems is the lack of a centralized
governing authority to systematically govern activities. Growing a
sustainable and resilient global food network will also require
improving understandings of the changing role of authority and
actors in global governance. 46 Significant amounts of energy,
ingenuity, and effort have been applied to global efforts to ensure
food security. 47 Moving forward, there is a need to find ways to
enhance efforts in order to effectively address the interactive sets of
threats and vulnerabilities that impact the well-being, prosperity, and
security of people and nations.
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(Sept.
_2025.pdf.

E.U. Inst. for Sec. Studies, Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture
2010),
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global__Governance

See, e.g., U.S Gov’t Feed the Future Initiative, Partnership Updates,
http://feedthefuture.gov/news-and-events/researchers.
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WORLD POVERTY AND FOOD
INSECURITY
Carmen G. Gonzalez*
Our present global economic order produces a stable pattern of
widespread malnutrition and starvation among the poor, with
some eighteen million persons dying each year from povertyrelated causes, and there are likely to be feasible alternative
regimes that will not produce similarly severe deprivations. If
this is so, the victims of avoidable deprivations are not merely
poor and starving, but impoverished and starved through an
institutional order coercively imposed upon them. There is an
injustice to this economic order, which it would be wrong for its
more affluent participants to perpetuate.1

INTRODUCTION
The suffering of the world’s poor and undernourished is due
not simply to the failure of Western liberal democracies to provide
sufficient economic aid, but to international political and economic
arrangements that systematically benefit the wealthy and
disenfranchise the poor. As Yale philosopher Thomas Pogge
acknowledges in his ground-breaking book on world poverty, the

* Carmen C. Gonzalez, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of
Law. This essay is based on the author’s remarks at the symposium on global
resource scarcity organized by the Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs.
The author would like to thank the organizers of the symposium for facilitating
thought-provoking dialogue on this important topic among legal scholars,
practitioners, government officials, and representatives of industry.
1 THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 182 (2nd ed.
2008).
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deprivation suffered by the world’s most vulnerable populations is
often the direct and foreseeable consequence of an unjust global
institutional order maintained by affluent countries in collusion with
the ruling elites of poor countries.2 We can end poverty and hunger,
Pogge maintains, not simply by financial transfers to poor countries,
but by restructuring the global economic order to “lighten the huge
burdens we impose on the people of those countries.”3
This article examines some of the laws, policies and practices
that perpetuate chronic undernourishment in developing countries
and sets forth key reforms that wealthy countries could enact to
ameliorate global inequities and enhance food security. Consistent
with Pogge’s insights, the objective is to lay bare the underlying
structural causes of food insecurity in order to address the root
causes of the problem and not merely the immediate manifestations.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I defines food security and
identifies the world’s food insecure populations. Part II discusses the
role of aid, trade, and financial institutions in perpetuating chronic
undernourishment in developing countries. Part III discusses the
challenges to food security posed by climate change, financial
speculation in agricultural commodity markets, biofuels production,
and large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land in developing
countries. Part IV sets forth concrete measures that wealthy
countries can take to reduce poverty and food insecurity.

I. THE CONTOURS OF GLOBAL FOOD INSECURITY
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) defines food security as “physical and economic access to
sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets . . . dietary needs and

See id. at 7-32; see generally Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of
Negative Duties, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 55 (2005).
3 WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 9.
2
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food preferences for an active and healthy life.”4 According to the
FAO’s most recent estimates, 842 million people did not consume
enough calories to meet their dietary energy requirements in 20112013—a figure that represents one out of eight of the world’s
people.5 In addition, an estimated two billion people suffer from
deficiencies of one or more essential micronutrient, and twenty-six
percent of the world’s children are stunted (fail to attain normal
height and weight) as a consequence of undernourishment. 6
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, the world’s population (which is currently 7.2 billion7)
is expected to reach 9.6 billion in 2050 and 10.9 million in 2100.8
However, we currently produce sufficient food to feed a global
population of twelve to fourteen billion people.9 Enough food is
available to supply every person on the planet with approximately
2700 calories per day.10

4 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
BASIC
CONCEPTS
OF
FOOD
SECURITY
1
(2008),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf.
5
FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD
INSECURITY 8 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf.
6 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2013: FOOD SYSTEMS FOR BETTER NUTRITION ix, 3 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3300e/i3300e.pdf.
7
Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS: REAL TIME WORLD
STATISTICS, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited Apr.
18, 2014).
8
U.N. DEPT. OF SOC. AND ECON. AFF., WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2012 REVISION, KEY FINDINGS AND ADVANCE TABLES 1 (2013),
http://esa.un.org/wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_%20KEY%20FINDING
S.pdf.
9 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT REVIEW 2013, WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE: MAKE
AGRICULTURE TRULY SUSTAINABLE NOW FOR FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE
2
(2013),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf
[hereinafter
WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE].
10 See JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD:
LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2011).
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Food insecurity is caused by poverty rather than food
scarcity.
As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has compellingly
demonstrated, food insecurity is a function of food distribution, not
food production. 11 Nearly one billion people experience chronic
undernourishment because they lack the purchasing power to obtain
food on the market, or the land and agricultural inputs to grow the
food they need. 12 Thus, contrary to popular misconception,
increasing food production through technological innovation is not
sufficient to address food insecurity. We will not end hunger unless
we redouble our efforts to reduce social and economic inequality.13
In order to properly target policies and programs designed to
combat undernourishment, it is essential to keep in mind that the
planet’s food insecure populations are overwhelmingly rural.
Approximately eighty percent of the world’s chronically
undernourished people are rural dwellers in developing countries
who cultivate at least seventy percent of the world’s food.14 The vast
majority are small farmers who are net food purchasers because they
have been relegated to plots of land that are too small, arid, hilly, or
inadequately irrigated due, in part, to competition for land and water
from large-scale agricultural producers. 15 The ranks of the rural

See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON
ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1990).
12
See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO,
Agriculture and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 431, 466-70 (2002)
[hereinafter Institutionalizing Inequality] (using Amartya Sen’s framework to explain
household food insecurity).
13 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Food, Technology and Hunger, 8 L. CULTURE &
THE HUMAN. 1, 9-13 (2012) (dispelling the myth that “heroic technological
interventions” are necessary to increase food production and end world hunger).
14 INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2011
16 (2011); ACTION GROUP ON EROSION, TECHNOLOGY, AND CONCENTRATION
(ETC GROUP), WHO WILL FEED US? QUESTIONS FOR THE FOOD AND CLIMATE
CRISES 1 (2009),
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/ETC_Who_Will_Feed_U
s.pdf.
15 See Olivier de Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three
Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland, 38(2) J. PEASANT STUDIES 249, 256
(2011)
11
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malnourished also include pastoralists, fisherfolk, and landless
workers (including children) who earn less than subsistence wages.16
The livelihoods of these rural dwellers have been and
continue to be undermined by misguided aid, trade and development
policies, and by large-scale land acquisitions that benefit wealthy
nations and transnational corporations at the expense of the poor.17
They are also threatened by climate change, which will depress food
production in major agricultural regions, increase food prices, and
reduce the productivity of the world’s fisheries.18 Indeed, the most
recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) paints a grim picture of the future, warning that climate
change could result in the breakdown of food systems unless the
world’s governments rapidly end their dependence on fossil fuels.19
The following sections examine the underlying causes of global food
insecurity with an emphasis on their impact on small farmers in
developing countries.

See id. at 256-57.
See Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the
Elusive Quest for Justice, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 462, 468-73 (2010)
[hereinafter The Global Food Crisis]; see generally Olivier de Schutter, The Green Rush:
The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 504
(2011) [hereinafter The Green Rush].
18 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS 7-8, 16-18 (2014),
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
19 Id. at 12; see generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY
FOR POLICY-MAKERS (2014),
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-forpolicymakers_approved.pdf (discussing the pressing need for climate change
mitigation); Damian Carrington, IPCC Report: World Must Urgently Switch to Clean
Sources
of
Energy,
GUARDIAN,
Apr.
11,
2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/12/ipcc-report-worldmust-switch-clean-sources-energy.
16
17
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II. THE ROLE OF AID, TRADE, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In the decades following the Second World War, the United
States and nations of Western Europe provided generous subsidies to
their agricultural producers, and imposed both tariff and non-tariff
import barriers to protect these producers from foreign
competition. 20 By contrast, most developing countries taxed the
agricultural sector to finance industrialization. 21 The U.S. and
European subsidies and import barriers were generally permissible
under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which generally exempted agriculture from the GATT’s trade
liberalization obligations.22
The agricultural subsidies, along with mechanization and the
application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, resulted in
overproduction and declining food prices in wealthy countries.23 The
United States responded to this crisis of overproduction by disposing
of its surplus food overseas at reduced prices or free of charge as
food aid. Ironically, the sale or delivery of cheap food as aid to
developing countries exacerbated food insecurity by depressing local
food prices and undermining the livelihoods of small farmers.24
Until the debt crisis of the 1980s, developing countries could
insulate their farmers from unfair competition with highly subsidized
food products from the United States and Europe by imposing tariffs
on these products. This policy space was quickly eroded by the loan
conditions imposed by the World Bank and the International
20 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (19861992) 125, 141, 155-56 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND]; M. Ataman Aksoy, Global Agricultural Trade Policies, in GLOBAL
AGRIC. TRADE POLICIES 37 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, eds. 2004).
21 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 20, at 154-57; Aksoy,
supra note 20, at 37.
22 See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 440-46.
23 See generally THE OVERPRODUCTION TRAP IN U.S. AGRICULTURE
(Glenn Johnson & C. Leroy Quance eds., 2011).
24 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition:
Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
345, 361 (2006) [hereinafter Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition].
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Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the inability of many
developing countries to service the foreign debt. Lured into
borrowing money from commercial banks to finance often ill-advised
development projects, many developing countries found themselves
unable to pay their debts when the oil price shocks of 1973 and 19791980 increased energy costs and sent interest rates skyrocketing.25 To
secure debt relief from the IMF and World Bank, three quarters of
Latin American countries and two-thirds of African countries
acceded to loan conditions that required them to adopt structural
adjustment programs overseen by the IMF and World Bank to
guarantee debt repayment.26
The structural adjustment programs mandated by the IMF
and World Bank created double standards that afflict international
agricultural trade to this day: protectionism in wealthy countries and
open markets in poor countries. 27 These structural adjustment
programs required developing countries to adopt a standard package
of neoliberal economic reforms, including lowering tariffs,
eliminating non-tariff import barriers, and slashing government
subsidies to the agricultural sector (such as input subsidies, marketing
assistance, social safety nets, and agricultural research and
education). 28 U.S. and European agricultural producers, however,
continued to receive lavish agricultural subsidies from their
governments and benefitted handsomely from the structural
adjustment-induced opening of additional export markets in
developing countries.29
The reduction of support to small farmers in developing
countries, coupled with the elimination of import barriers,

See RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD
BANK AND WTO 71-75 (2003); SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT:
THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE POOR 28-29 (1990)
26 See PEET, supra note 25, at 75.
27 See Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition, supra note 24, at 8.
28 See MICHAEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY:
IMPACTS OF THE IMF & WORLD BANK REFORMS 62-63 (1997); JOHN MADELEY,
HUNGRY FOR TRADE: HOW THE POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE 77 (2000).
29 See The Global Food Crisis, supra note 17, at 469.
25
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bankrupted small farmers and increased food insecurity by putting
resource-poor local farmers in direct competition with highly
subsidized agricultural producers from Europe and the United
States. 30 The influx of cheap imported U.S. and European food
devastated rural livelihoods, depressed food production in developing
countries, and generated a wave of migration to urban slums.31 To
make matters worse, the IMF and World Bank required developing
countries to increase agricultural exports to generate revenue to
service the foreign debt. 32 The diversion of land from food
production to cash crop production reduced food self-sufficiency in
developing countries and increased their dependence on food
imports. Far from enhancing foreign exchange earnings with which
to purchase these food imports, the drive to increase cash crop
production “depressed the export earnings of developing countries
by glutting world markets with competing export commodities from
multiple debtor nations.”33
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) professed to ameliorate the double standards in
global agricultural trade and to “establish a fair and market-oriented
agricultural trading system.”34 The AoA required WTO members to
reduce trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, convert all import
barriers to tariffs (a process known as “tariffication”), and to reduce
these tariffs over time.35
The AoA, however, was riddled with ambiguities that enabled
wealthy countries to continue to subsidize their agricultural producers
while requiring market openness in developing countries. 36 Since
most developing countries had already liberalized their markets
pursuant to structural adjustment programs, the impact of the AoA
See id.
See id. at 469-70.
32 See id. at 469.
33 Id. at 469.
34 AoA pmbl. ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf.
35 See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 450-56.
36 See id. at 459-68.
30
31
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was to preclude these countries from adopting these subsidies in the
future beyond de minimis levels.37 Agricultural subsidies in the United
States and European Union, however, actually increased in the
aftermath of the AoA.38 First, the baseline against which domestic
subsidy reduction commitments was measured was a period of very
high agricultural subsidies in the United States and Europe, thereby
enabling the United States and the European Union to maintain their
subsidies without running afoul of the AoA.39 Second, the United
States and European Union evaded their subsidy reduction
obligations by re-classifying trade-distorting subsidies (so-called
“amber box” subsidies, which were subject to reduction) as subsidies
that were authorized by the agreement (so-called “blue box” and
“green box” subsidies).40 Finally, export subsidies remained high in
the United States and European Union because these countries
simply used devices not expressly prohibited by the AoA (such as
subsidized credit) to promote export production.41
The AoA requirement with respect to tariffication did not
open up U.S. and E.U. markets for the benefit of developing country
exporters, but did succeed in restricting the ability of developing
countries to raise tariffs when confronted with surges of cheap,
subsidized agricultural products.42 Because the AoA did not specify
how to convert non-tariff import barriers into tariffs, most developed
countries adopted tariffs that were far more import-restrictive than
the non-tariff barriers they replaced—thereby maintaining their
markets relatively closed to developing country exporters. 43 By
contrast, most developing countries did not engage in tariffication at
all because they had already eliminated their non-tariff barriers (and
reduced their tariffs) pursuant to IMF/World Bank-mandated
structural adjustment programs.44 While the AoA gave WTO

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

See id. at 479.
See Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition, supra note 24, at 366.
See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 463-64.
See id. at 463-65.
See id. at 462-63.
See id. at 458-61, 476-77.
See id. at 458.
See id. at 476.

64

2015

Gonzalez

3:2

members the right to impose additional tariffs to protect domestic
farmers from unusually low import prices or surges in the volume of
imports (known as “special safeguard measures” or “SSG”), the SSG
was only available to countries that had engaged in tariffication.45
Thus, most developing countries were deprived of an essential tool to
protect food security and rural livelihoods against ruinous surges in
cheap, subsidized food from the United States and European Union.
In sum, while the AoA did not create the double standards in
international agricultural trade that systematically disfavor small
farmers in developing countries, it did reinforce these inequities by
permitting protectionism in wealthy countries while promoting
market openness in poor countries. These double standards have
enabled agricultural producers in the United States and European
Union to destroy the livelihoods of small farmers in developing
countries by dumping agricultural products on world markets at
prices that are lower than the local cost of production.46 Over the
course of a few decades, developing countries that were once net
food exporters have been transformed into net food importers47 and
are now being devastated by soaring food prices.48

See id. at 477.
See Sophia Murphy et al., WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A Decade of
Dumping, INST. FOR AGRIC. TRADE & POL’Y 1 (2005), http://www.unngls.org/orf/cso/cso7/library.pdf.
47
See ACTIONAID, THE IMPACT OF AGRO-EXPORT SURGES IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
8
(2008),
http://geoinovace.data.quonia.cz/materialy/ZX501_Globalni_problemy_svetove_
ekonomiky/Setkani_c_2/ActionAid_2008_agro_import.pdf.
48 See generally Naomi Hossain, Richard King & Alexandra Kelbert,
Squeezed: Highlights from Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility, Year 1 Results, INST. OF
DEV. STUDIES & OXFAM (2013), http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/rr-squeezedfood-price-volatility-year-one-230513-summ-en.pdf.
45
46
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III. CLIMATE CHANGE, FINANCIAL SPECULATION, BIOFUELS, AND
THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH
Small farmers in developing countries are currently facing
additional challenges to food security stemming from climate change,
financial speculation in agricultural commodity markets, biofuels
production, and large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land. The
collapse of the housing market in the United States in 2007 resulted
in a shift of speculative investment into agricultural commodities, and
contributed significantly to the 2008 global surge in food prices.49
This influx of speculative investment was set in motion by the
deregulation of Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives following the
passage of the U.S. Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000.50
This statute and the subsequent decisions of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission exempted OTC derivatives (including
commodity index funds) from regulatory oversight.51 The failure of
governments to curb speculation in agricultural commodity markets
increases market volatility and poses serious risks to food security.52
Food security is also imperiled by climate change, which will
depress global food production by increasing the severity and
frequency of storms, droughts, and floods; reduce the productivity of

49 See Peter Wahl, The Role of Speculation in the 2008 Food Price Bubble, in
THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO
TRADE
AND
INVESTMENT
POLICIES
68,
70-71
(2009),
http://in.boell.org/2008/11/28/global-food-challenge-towards-human-right-sapproach-trade-and-investment-policies; see also Federick Kaufman, How Goldman
Sachs Created the Food Crisis, FOREIGN POLICY, Apr. 27, 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/27/how-goldman-sachs-created-the-foodcrisis/.
50 See Olivier de Schutter, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises:
Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price Volatility 5 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Food
Commodities Speculation],
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_02_September
_2010_EN.pdf.
51 See id. at 5-6.
52 See Wahl, supra note 49, at 75-76.
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global fisheries; and exacerbate water scarcity.53 Climate change is
projected to diminish agricultural yields by as much as nineteen
percent in Asia, twenty-four percent in Latin America, and twentyeight percent in Africa by 2080.54 Climate change will also hasten the
worldwide loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services vital to food
production.55
Despite their negligible greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the
world’s poorest countries will be disproportionately affected by
climate change as a consequence of their vulnerable geographic
locations, agriculture-based economies, and limited resources for
adaptation and disaster response.56 Poor farmers with limited access
to water and productive land will likely suffer the most severe
consequences.57
Ironically, agriculture is also one of the primary contributors
to climate change—responsible for one third of global anthropogenic
GHG emissions. 58 The Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a consortium of fifteen agricultural

See Anthony Nyong, Climate Change Impacts in the Developing World:
Implications for Sustainable Development, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POVERTY:
A BILLION LIVES IN THE BALANCE? 47-51 (Lael Brainard et al. eds., 2009).
54 See WILLIAM R. CLINE, GLOBAL WARMING AND AGRICULTURE:
ESTIMATES BY COUNTRY 79 (2007).
55 See Nyong, supra note 53, at 50-51.
56 See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION 35-41 (2004).
57 See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE,
WATER,
AND
FOOD
SECURITY
16
(2011),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2096e/i2096e.pdf.
58 See Natasha Gilbert, One Third of Our Greenhouse Gas Emissions Come from
Agriculture, NATURE, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/one-third-ofour-greenhouse-gas-emissions-come-from-agriculture-1.11708; Jessica Bellarby et
al., Cool Farming: Climate Impact of Agriculture and Mitigation Potential, GREENPEACE 16
(2008),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet2/report/2008/1/cool-farming-full-report.pdf.
53
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research centers across the world, has urged policy-makers to reduce
agriculture’s carbon footprint in order to mitigate climate change.59
Although industrial agriculture is one of the most significant
contributors to climate change, small-scale sustainable agriculture can
enhance climate change mitigation and adaptation. 60 Sustainable
agriculture or agroecology incorporates natural pest, nutrient, soil,
and water management technologies into the production process
while reducing reliance on synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.61 It
contributes to climate change mitigation by minimizing fossil fuelbased agricultural inputs and increasing carbon sequestration in
soils.62 It also plays a significant role in climate change adaptation
because it enhances resilience to drought, floods, and pests by
diversifying the variety of crops cultivated and by increasing the soil’s
organic matter and water retention ability.63
There is a growing consensus among scientists and policymakers that a transition to sustainable agriculture is essential if we are
to address the climate crisis and the lack of access to sufficient,
affordable food in developing countries. 64 In 2013, the U.N.

59 See generally Sonja J. Vermeulen, Bruce M. Campbell & John S.I.
Ingram, Climate Change and Food Systems, 37 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RES. 195 (2012).
60 See WORKING GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEV., OTHER
WORDS ARE POSSIBLE: HUMAN PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 40-42
(Nov. 2009), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10022IIED.pdf; INT’L TRADE CENTRE
(UNCAT, WTO), ORGANIC FARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2007),
https://www.fibl.org/fileadmin/documents/shop/1500-climate-change.pdf.
61 See JULES N. PRETTY, REGENERATING AGRICULTURE: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND SELF-RELIANCE 8-13 (1995).
62 See INT’L TRADE CENTRE, supra note 60, at 7-8.
63 See id.
64 See generally INT’L ASSESSMENT OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH.
FOR DEV. (IAASTD), AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS: SYNTHESIS REPORT
(2009),
http://www.unep.org/dewa/agassessment/reports/IAASTD/EN/Agriculture%2
0at%20a%20Crossroads_Synthesis%20Report%20%28English%29.pdf;
U.N.
ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS: THE
ENVIRONMENT’S ROLE IN AVERTING FUTURE FOOD CRISES (Christian Nellemann
et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS],
http://www.grida.no/files/publications/FoodCrisis_lores.pdf;
UNCTAD
&
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published a
major report urging a paradigm shift in agriculture—away from
industrial agriculture and toward sustainable, regenerative production
systems that enhance the productivity of small-scale farmers.65 This
report echoes the conclusions of an earlier interdisciplinary
assessment of agriculture conducted by the United Kingdom
Government Office for Science with the participation of scientists
and stakeholders from all over the world. 66 The assessment’s
conclusion—simply put—is as follows: “Addressing climate change
and achieving sustainability in the global food system need to be
recognized as dual imperatives. Nothing less is required than a
redesign of the whole global food system to bring sustainability to the
fore.”67
Sustainable agriculture can increase agricultural productivity
in precisely those countries and regions where it has lagged while
protecting the environment and enhancing the livelihoods of small,
resource-poor farmers. 68 Sustainable agriculture has produced
significant increases in agricultural yields in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America while enhancing environmental quality, reducing
dependence on external inputs, and protecting the traditional
agroecological knowledge of small farmers and indigenous
communities.69
UNEP, ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA (2008),
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted200715_en.pdf.
65 See WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9.
66 See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF FOOD AND FARMING:
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FOR GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY (2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/288329/11-546-future-of-food-and-farming-report.pdf.
67 Id. at 12 (Box 1.3, no. 2).
68 See WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9, at 34.
69 See generally Olivier de Schutter, U.N. General Assembly Report
Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/49
(Dec.
20,
2010),
available
at
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20110308_a-hrc-1649_agroecology_en.pdf; ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA,
supra note 64; Catherine Badgley et al., Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply,
22 RENEWABLE AGRIC. AN FOOD SYS. 86 (2007); Jules Pretty et al., Resource
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Regrettably, policy-makers in the United States and European
Union have exacerbated global food insecurity by embracing biofuels
to address climate change rather than promoting the transition to
sustainable agriculture—a policy that has driven up food prices and
reduced production of other food crops. 70 In addition to
undermining food security, the production of certain biofuels may
result in greater greenhouse emissions than conventional fossil fuels.
Most scientific studies question the net carbon benefits of the vast
majority of biofuels.71 Corn-based ethanol is a particularly egregious
example. In the United States, the GHG emissions required to
produce corn ethanol (including the emissions resulting from

Conserving Agriculture Increases Yields in Developing Countries, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
1114 (2006); INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), THE ADOPTION OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE AMONG SMALL FARMERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(2003),
http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/thematic/pl/organic.pdf
; Nicholas Parrott & Terry Marsden, The New Green Revolution: Organic and
Agroecological
Farming
in
the
South,
GREENPEACE
(2002),
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/4526.pdf; Jules
N. Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by Increasing Sustainability in Developing Countries, 95
AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 217 (2003); Jules N. Pretty & Rachel Hine, The
Promising Spread of Sustainable Agriculture in Asia, 24 NAT. RESOURCES F. 107 (2000);
Jules N. Pretty, Can Sustainable Agriculture Feed Africa? New Evidence on Progress,
Processes and Impacts, 1 ENV’T, DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY 253 (1999).
70 See Philip C. Abbott et al., What’s Driving Food Prices in 2011?, FARM
FOUND.
(2011),
http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/105FoodPrices_web.pdf; Marco Lagi et al., The Food Crises: A Quantitative Model of Food
Prices
Including
Speculators
and
Ethanol
Conversion
(2011),
http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf; FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N., THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 19-21 (2009),
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/i0854e/i0854e.pdf;
Anuradha
Mittal,
UNCTAD, The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies, G-24 Discussion
Paper No.29, at 6-8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS.MDP/G2A/2009/3 (June 2009).
71 See, e.g., Ralph Sims et al., From 1st to 2nd Generation Biofuel Technologies: An
Overview of Current Industry and R&D Activities, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2008),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2nd_Biofuel_Gen.
pdf.
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cultivating corn and processing it into corn starch) actually exceed
fossil fuel emissions by more than ten percent.72
Climate change, the biofuels boom, and rising food prices
have given rise to yet another threat to food security: an explosion of
large-scale land leases or purchases in developing countries on terms
that are generally not beneficial to those who currently live on or use
the land.73 Despite the lack of systemic data regarding these land
transactions, a report by the International Land Coalition, a
consortium of forty grassroots and civil society organizations,
estimates that an area eight times the size of the United Kingdom or
nearly the size of Western Europe was transferred between January
2000 and November 2011.74 Africa appears to be the primary target
of these land acquisitions.
These so-called land grabs have been driven by three primary
actors: 1) corporate investors eager to capitalize on the growing
demand for biofuels; 2) foreign investors speculating on the value of
the land; and 3) middle-income developing countries (such as Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, China, India, and South Korea) seeking to produce
72 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION
USE OF RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS
67-68
(2009),
http://www.unep.fr/scp/rpanel/pdf/Assessing_Biofuels_Full_Report.pdf.
73 See generally Ward Answeeuw et al., Land Rights and the Rush for Land:
Findings of the Global Commercial Pressure on Land Research Project (2012),
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ILC%20GSR
%20report_ENG.pdf; Lorenzo Cotula et al., Land Grab or Development Opportunity?
Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa (2009),
http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land_grab.pdf; Alexandra Spieldoch & Sophia
Murphy, Agricultural Land Acquisitions: Implications for Food Security and Poverty
Alleviation, in LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND 39, 39
(Michael
Kugelman
&
Susan
L.
Levenstein
eds.,
2009),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090629_Land%20Grab_r
pt.pdf [hereinafter LAND GRAB?].
74 See Answeeuw, supra note 73, at 23; The International Land Coalition
(ILC) has since revised this figure. According to the ILC’s database, the amount of
land transferred or under negotiation is approximately fifty-one million hectares—
far less than the original estimate, but nevertheless significant. See The Online Public
Database on Land Deals, LAND MATRIX, http://landmatrix.org/en/ (last accessed
June 13, 2014).
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food abroad to safeguard access to food supplies in light of food
price volatility on international markets and domestic shortages of
arable land and irrigation water.75
These transactions pose serious risks to resource-poor
farmers in the targeted developing countries, including interference
with local food production; contamination, depletion, or diversion of
local water supplies; and eviction of those whose livelihoods depend
on access to these lands and resources.76 For example, small farmers,
pastoralists, and fisherfolk whose property rights are not recognized
by government officials may be dispossessed by foreign investors or
by local elites eager to sell or lease these lands to foreign investors.77
The displacement of labor-intensive subsistence farming by exportoriented chemical-intensive industrial agriculture may reduce food
availability in the local market, intensify poverty by eliminating rural
jobs, contaminate the local water supply with pesticide and fertilizer
runoff, deplete the land through intensive cultivation, and divert or
exhaust water resources needed by local communities.78
International investment law is deeply implicated in the
threats to food security posed by the global land rush. Absent any
international contracts or treaties, foreign investors would generally
be treated like domestic investors under national law.79 However,
host state government agreements (HGAs) (i.e. contracts between
the foreign investor and the host state) as well as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the host state and the foreign investor will
typically give the foreign investor additional rights and benefits not

75 See Kugelman, LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 2; Spieldoch & Murphy,
supra note 73, at 41-42; Answeeuw, supra note 73, at 21.
76 See Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 73, at 43-48.
77 See Raul Q. Montemayor, Overseas Farmland Investments- Boon or Bane for
Farmers in Asia? in LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 101-02; The Green Rush, supra note
17, at 537.
78 See Ruth Meinzen & Helena Markelova, LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at
74; Montemayor, supra note 77, at 102-05; Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 73, at
46-47.
79 See generally Carin Smaller & Howard Mann, A Thirst for Distant Lands:
Foreign Investment in Agricultural Land and Water, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 14
(2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst_for_distant_lands.pdf.
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guaranteed to the local population, including land and water rights,
tax incentives, and the right to export the agricultural commodities
produced.80 As the World Bank has recognized, deficiencies in the
domestic legislation of many developing countries, combined with
limited enforcement capacity, may jeopardize the rights of local
communities.81 In the absence of strong domestic legislation, the
rights of the foreign investor under the HGAs and BITs will likely
trump those of local stakeholders.82
The HGA will generally establish the legal framework for the
investment, including the price, amount and location of the land,
duration of the purchase or lease, law applicable to the investment,
and dispute resolution mechanism.83 Many HGAs also contain socalled “stabilization” clauses that obligate the host state to
compensate the foreign investor for any economic losses incurred
due to the host state’s modification of the regulatory framework
applicable to the investment.84 This provision essentially “freezes”
the law applicable to the investment, and may discourage host states
from adopting measures to protect human rights and the
environment, such as reallocating water rights to ensure that local
communities have sufficient water for drinking, cooking, bathing,
sanitation and irrigation; restricting food exports at times of critical

See id.
See Klaus Deininger & Derek Byerlee, Rising Global Interest in Farmland:
Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?, THE WORLD BANK 97-98 (2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/ESW_Sept7_final_final.
pdf.
82 See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, FOREIGN LAND
PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE: WHAT IMPACT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
2 (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE],
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/ib/no8.pdf.
83 See id. at 4.
84 See generally Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and
Sustainable Development, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV. (Mar. 27-28, 2008),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf.
80
81
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food shortages; and enhancing labor and environmental standards as
the country’s regulatory framework evolves.85
BITs between the host state and the investor’s home state
provide additional protections to the foreign investor beyond those
contained in the HGA. Standard BIT requirements include national
treatment; the prohibition against expropriation without
compensation; fair and equitable treatment (also known as
international minimum standards of treatment); the right to export
the products produced; and the investor-state arbitration mechanism,
which authorizes the foreign investor to commence arbitration
against the host state in the event of a breach of the BIT.86 These
provisions may impair the ability of the host state to protect the
human rights of its citizens. For example, the national treatment
requirement obligates the host state to provide no less favorable
treatment to foreign investors than domestic investors “in like
circumstances.”87 If an arbitration tribunal concludes that large-scale
foreign-owned commercial farming operations and small-scale
subsistence farmers are “in like circumstances,” then the host state
may be precluded from providing subsidies or tax preferences to
small-scale producers without making these available to all
agricultural enterprises. 88 Furthermore, the fair and equitable
treatment requirement obligates the host state to honor the
“legitimate expectations” that may arise from the HGA or other
government commitments.89 If the HGA is silent on the issue of
water rights, an arbitration tribunal might determine that the
investor’s “legitimate expectation” of water for irrigation overrides
the current or future needs of the local community for potable water,
small-scale farming, and other uses.90 If the host state reallocates
water rights to fulfill the needs of its citizens, the foreign investor

85

See FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 82, at

86

See Smaller & Mann, supra note 79, at 11-13.
See id. at 11.
See id.
See id. at 12.
See FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 87, at

3-4.
87
88
89
90
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may be entitled to compensation. 91 Finally, the right to export
agricultural products could likewise require the host state to
compensate the foreign investor if the host state imposes export
restrictions to address domestic food shortages—even if these export
restrictions are otherwise permissible under international trade law.92
In short, industrialized countries have reinforced the
structural inequities in the global economic order that produce food
insecurity by failing to curb speculation in agricultural commodity
markets, adopting misguided biofuels policy, and imposing
investment agreements that benefit the foreign investor at the
expense of the local population in developing countries. The final
section of this article discusses several steps that the United States
and European Union might take to address these inequities.

IV. RESTRUCTURING AN UNJUST GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER
While a complete list of measures to eliminate food insecurity
in developing countries is beyond the scope of this paper, there are
six key steps that affluent countries can take to relieve the misery that
the global economic order has inflicted on small farmers in
developing countries.
A.

Policy Space for Development in the Agricultural Trade
Regime

Eliminating trade-distorting agricultural subsidies is a
necessary first step toward addressing the double standards in
international agricultural trade that perpetuate food security in
developing countries, but it is not sufficient. Even if the agricultural
subsidies in the United States and European Union are eliminated,
small farmers in developing countries will not be able to compete
with agricultural producers in wealthy and middle-income countries
91
92

See Smaller & Mann, supra note 79, at 16-17.
See FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 87, at

4.
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whose yields per hectare are higher due to better infrastructure,
mechanization, economies of scale, and access to credit and
technology. In addition, market prices will continue to favor largescale industrial agriculture because markets fail to internalize the
environmental consequences of chemical-intensive, fossil fueldependent agriculture or take into account the environmental
benefits of small-scale sustainable agriculture.
Trade agreements and the policies and programs of the IMF
and World Bank should give developing countries the “policy space”
necessary to re-invest in the agricultural sector after decades of
destruction and neglect. Developing countries should be permitted
to utilize an appropriate combination of subsidies and import barriers
to protect the livelihoods of small farmers, restore and revitalize
domestic food production, and promote sustainable agricultural
practices.
Historically, countries in the early stages of industrialization
have protected their agricultural sectors by using a wide array of
instruments, including non-tariff barriers, subsidies for agricultural
inputs, rural infrastructure projects, subsidized credit, governmentfinanced agricultural research, and state marketing boards to stabilize
prices for both producers and consumers.93 Yet the AoA currently
prohibits most of these policies.
Public food reserves, for example, are an important
mechanism to reduce food price volatility and ensure a secure supply
of food in the event of price shocks or shortages.94 The existing
WTO rules, however, treat the acquisition of food reserves as part of

See Michael Stockbridge, Agricultural Trade Policy in Developing Countries
During
Take-Off,
OXFAM
INT’L
7,
10
(2006),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/agriculturalpolicy.pdf.
94 See generally Sophia Murphy, Trade and Food Reserves: What role does the
WTO Play?, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY (Sept. 2010),
http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_107697.pdf; Oxfam, Preparing for Thin Cows: Why
the G20 Should Keep Buffer Stocks on the Agenda (Oxfam Briefing Note, June 21, 2011),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-preparing-thin-cows-foodreserves-210611-en.pdf.
93
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trade-distorting domestic support.95 In November 2012, India led an
effort by forty-six developing countries to ease restrictions on public
food reserves under the AoA.96 India’s food reserve program became
the subject of a tense standoff between developed and developing
countries at the December 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali.
In the end, the WTO negotiators resolved the problem by agreeing to
a four-year “Peace Clause” for existing public stockholding (food
reserve) programs and agreeing to resolve the matter within that
time.97
Instead of resisting the efforts of developing countries to
protect food security, the United States and European Union should
reverse the harm that trade liberalization has wrought by eliminating
the double standards in global agricultural trade and creating a more
enabling institutional environment for the achievement of food
security.
B.

Investment in Sustainable Agriculture in Developing
Countries

Beyond creating policy space for development, it is essential
that industrialized country governments, private philanthropies,
international institutions, and developing country governments redirect resources to the agricultural sector, prioritize domestic food
production, and encourage a transition to sustainable agriculture.
The global food price spike of 2008 did result in greater investment
in agriculture in developing countries, but much of that investment
95 Olivier de Schutter, The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food
Crisis Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System 9 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/deschutter_2011_e.pdf;
WTO
Ministerial Conference, Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes
(Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013), WT/MIN(13)/38.
96 See Sophia Murphy, Land Grabs and Fragile Food Systems: The Role of
Globalization, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY 9 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.iatp.org/files/2013_02_14_LandGrabsFoodSystem_SM_0.pdf.
97 See Timothy Wise, Battle Won, the War Goes On, BUSINESSWORLD, Jan.
7, 2014, http://www.businessworld.in/news/economy/battle-won-the-war-goeson/1208970/page-1.html; WTO Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Public
Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, WT/MIN(13)/38 (December 11, 2013).
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was designed to increase agricultural productivity based on
conventional fossil-fuel dependent industrial production. This
emphasis on additional production is misguided in light of the fact
that one-third of the food produced for human consumption is lost
due to inadequate rural infrastructure and access to markets
(primarily in poor countries), or is discarded due to oversupply or
consumer over-reaction to “best-before dates” (primarily in affluent
countries). 98 Investments in rural infrastructure in developing
countries (such as roads and storage facilities) could significantly
reduce post-harvest food losses and reduce the pressure that
agricultural production places on land, water, climate and
biodiversity. However, such investments will only improve food
security if they enhance local access to food by boosting the income
and strengthening the livelihoods of small farmers.
As Olivier de Schutter, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food observes:
[I]nvestments that increase food production will not
make significant progress in combating hunger and
malnutrition if they do not lead to higher incomes and
improved livelihoods for the poorest—particularly
small-scale farmers in developing countries. And
short-term gains will be offset by long-term losses if
they cause further degradation of ecosystems, thus
threatening the ability to maintain current levels of
production in the future . . . . Pouring money into
agriculture will not be sufficient; the imperative today
is to take steps that facilitate the transition towards a
low-carbon, nature-conserving type of agriculture that
benefits the poorest farmers.99
If we are to address the converging climate and food crises, a
shift to sustainable agroecological practices is indispensable.

98 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., FOOD WASTAGE FOOTPRINT:
IMPACTS
ON
NATURAL
RESOURCES
8-14
(2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3347e/i3347e.pdf.
99 WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9, at 34.
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Restriction of Biofuels Expansion

The growing demand for biofuels is one of the primary
drivers of food price increases and rising demand for crops, land, and
water. In addition, most studies conclude that the net carbon
benefits of biofuels are suspect.100 The United States and European
Union have encouraged the development of biofuels industry
through their renewable fuels mandates, and through policies that
subsidize or protect the biofuels industry. It is essential to phase out
the programs that support biofuels expansion. In the United States,
for example, the tax credit for corn-based ethanol expired in 2011,
but the renewable fuels mandate remains in place despite calls from
both industry and environmentalists to modify or repeal it.101 The
European Union attempted to mitigate the negative effects of its
renewable fuels mandate by establishing sustainability criteria for
biofuels that encourage the use of second-generation biofuels, i.e.,
those produced from non-food or waste products. 102 This
requirement, however, applies only to transport biofuels (and not
bioliquids for heating and electricity)103 and the verification system to
ensure compliance remains weak.104 In lieu of tinkering with the
details of a failed program, the United States and European Union
should modify their renewable fuels mandates to exclude first
generation biofuels and aggressively promote other forms of
renewable energy.

See Sims et al., supra note 71.
See Robert Pear, After Three Decades, Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energyenvironment/after-three-decades-federal-tax-credit-for-ethanolexpires.html?_r=0&gwh=E51BAEB769468B1B1821D45EC599F04E&gwt=pay;
Evan Halper, A Clash Over Renewable-Fuel Policies, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/27/business/la-fi-biofuels-20130827.
102 See E.U. Renewable Energy Directive (2009), Directive 2009/28/EC,
art. 3 (providing that biofuels produced from wastes and non-food materials shall
count two times for purposes of fulfilling the 2020 E.U. transport target).
103 See id. at art. 21(2).
104 See id. at art. 18 (relying on self-reporting by biofuels producers to
verify compliance, supplemented by independent auditing of the information these
producers submit).
100
101
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Regulation of Agricultural Commodity Markets to Restrict
Speculation

Despite the mounting evidence that financial speculation on
agricultural commodity markets is exacerbating food price volatility,
the United States has been slow to regulate the financial services
industry.105 The European Union, by contrast, approved a Financial
Transaction Tax in eleven countries to discourage speculative trading
by taxing stock, bond, and derivative trading, but implementation has
been delayed due to conflicts over major issues (including the scope
of the tax and the distribution of revenues).106
The United States and the European Union should consider
several policy reforms recommended by UNCTAD in a recent
report. These include enhancing transparency in commodity futures
exchanges and over-the-counter markets, taxing financial market
activities
(particularly
high-frequency
trading),
adopting
internationally coordinated measures to restrict or prohibit
commodity trading by financial institutions engaged in hedging their
clients’ transactions, and intervening in commodity markets to
address speculative bubbles.107
E.

Reforming BITs and HGAs

International investment law has facilitated the land grabs
that currently threaten small farmers in the developing world. The
BITs and HGAs among the foreign investor, the host state, and the

105 See Timothy A. Wise & Sophia Murphy, Resolving the Food Crisis:
Assessing Global Policy Reforms Since 2007, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY 301-31
(Jan. 2012), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/ResolvingFoodCrisis.pdf.
106 See Tom Fairless, EU Financial-Transactions Tax Faces More Delays,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Dec.
1,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023045794045792317303430
28774.
107 UNCTAD, Don’t Blame the Physical Markets: Financialization is the Root
Cause of Oil and Commodity Price Volatility 4 (Policy Brief. No. 25, Sept. 2012),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/presspb2012d1_en.pdf. For additional
proposals on strategies to curb speculation in agricultural commodity markets, see
Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 50, at 6-8.
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home state typically restrict the regulatory authority of host states to
protect the rights and livelihoods of their citizens. As one observer
explains:
These agreements include no obligations for investors
to comply with human rights standards and there are
no mechanisms to regulate investor behavior, nor are
there any means for host states to counterclaim in any
arbitral proceedings brought against them where the
investor has committed, or been complicit in, grave
violations of human rights.108
The United States and European Union can take a leadership
role in addressing these inequities by including in BITs and HGAs
legally binding human rights obligations for investors (enforceable in
both the home state and the host state) as well as targeted provisions
that address the host state’s food security and sustainable
development objectives. An excellent starting point is the Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Developed
created by the International Institute for Sustainable Development.109
F.

Moratorium on Land Grabbing

Governments, civil society organizations, and international
institutions such as the World Bank and FAO have proposed a
variety of instruments and approaches to address land grabbing. In
general, these approaches can be grouped into three categories.110
The first approach, favored by the World Bank, seeks to facilitate
these transactions by strengthening property rights, enhancing
transparency and community consultation, and increasing the role of
Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. OF HUM. RTS. & THE ENV’T
5, 18 (2012).
109 See Howard Mann et al., Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2005),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf.
110 See generally Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer Franco & Chunyu Wang,
The Challenge of Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural
Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies, 10 GLOBALIZATION 161 (2013).
108
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the state in identifying “idle” or “underutilized” land. The second
approach, favored by many non-governmental organizations,
international development agencies, and community organizations,
sees the land deals as inevitable and favors the development of global
standards and best practices to mitigate the risks and take advantage
of the opportunities. The third approach seeks to stop and roll back
land grabbing on the ground that the large-scale fossil fuel based
industrial agricultural model dispossesses small farmers, degrades the
environment, and exacerbates food insecurity.111 The former U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has argued that:
[L]arge-scale investments in farmland should only
occur as part of a broad strategy of rural development
aimed at reducing rural poverty, and therefore hunger
and malnutrition. But the ad hoc, case-by-case
examination of various investment projects is not
sufficient to ensure this. . . . Before approving any
such project, a more comprehensive mapping of
existing needs should be undertaken.112
Unfortunately, governments in developing countries are
competing for foreign investment and are often unwilling or unable
to conduct these assessments or to impose restrictions on investors
to generate local employment, protect the environment, and promote
food security. In addition, the land grabs are proceeding rapidly and
with minimal oversight.
Developed and developing countries should collaborate to
impose a moratorium on these land grabs to allow host governments,
home governments, civil society, and international institutions to
develop more effective norms and oversight.

111
112

See id. (describing and analyzing the three approaches).
The Green Rush, supra note 17, at 557.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons described in this article, food insecurity is not
a function of food scarcity, bad weather, or simply bad luck. Food
insecurity is a function of global economic order that systematically
disadvantages poor farmers in developing countries. If we are to
address food insecurity, then we must redouble our efforts to
eliminate poverty. As Thomas Pogge reminds us, many of these
measures do not require significant financial outlays or massive
transfers of resources.113 They simply require that we reform the
laws, practices, and policies that inflict unspeakable suffering on the
world’s most vulnerable populations.

113

WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 9.
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THE FUTURE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Erin Lentz∗
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen a radical remaking of direct food
security interventions and an expanded understanding of preventing
undernutrition. Previously, in the United States, transoceanic food
aid was the standard, de-facto approach. Today, there are more food
assistance choices—agencies can deliver cash, vouchers, or food
procured locally, regionally, or transoceanically.
Further,
nutritionists, economists, and others have identified the first 1000
days as a critical window for life-long cognitive development and
health outcomes. Relatedly, our understanding of the value of more
tailored, nutritionally-specific interventions to reach nutritionally
vulnerable groups has expanded.
As a result of this research on the causes and consequences
of undernutrition and on different forms of food assistance, at least
three programmatic changes may be on the horizon. First, an
implication of the first 1000 days is arguably the need for a refocusing
on how food assistance programs operate and whom they target.
Second, and relatedly, renewed attention on the nutritional quality of
food assistance means that future food aid baskets could rely more
on micro-nutrient rich foods rather than on basic grains and pulses.
Third, increased flexibility among food assistance tools means that by
selecting the most appropriate tool, agencies can potentially meet a

∗ Erin Lentz, Assistant Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of
Public Affairs at University of Texas at Austin.

2015

Lentz

3:2

variety of objectives, including faster delivery, lower-cost delivery,
and delivery of more nutritious foods.
Yet, several challenges remain. First, while the number of
food insecure individuals remains high, food aid funding levels have
stagnated. Second, new knowledge and practices mean that business
as usual will not be adequate. Agencies, donors, and local partners
need to clarify and prioritize their objectives, recognizing that some
forms of food assistance are better suited for some contexts and
populations than others. Nutritional interventions, for example, need
careful programming to reflect the heterogeneity of recipient groups.
Third, food assistance is, just as food aid has been, a political issue,
particularly in the United States.
One follow-on question is how policymakers, practitioners,
and researchers can best incorporate this information into food
assistance practice? In the remainder of this piece, I will first provide
an overview of food aid and assistance and discuss some of the
challenges facing the future of food assistance. Second, I will detail
the evidence behind these three factors that can contribute to the
future of food assistance. In conclusion, I will argue that
opportunities resulting from these findings can generate more
effective programs. However, the benefits of new forms of food
assistance and improved nutritional practice will only be achieved if
policymakers and practitioners clarify and prioritize among objectives
and seek ways to build greater programming flexibility into the
current system.
I. CHALLENGES
In 2012, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimated that the number of food insecure individuals was 868
million. 1 The number of individuals affected by (non-complex)
1 Global Hunger Down, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/198105/icode/.
Numerous
definitions of food security exist. Here, I use the definition agreed upon during the
1996 World Food Summit, which defines food security as “a situation that exists
when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient,
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disasters has nearly doubled in the past thirty years (see Figure 1);
however, disasters are a relatively small driver of food insecurity.2
Food security is most often an issue of lack of access (i.e., the
demand-side of food security, commonly manifested in an inability to
afford food), as Amartya Sen noted in 1981.3 In fact, most food
security is chronic or periodic (i.e., seasonal or predictably occurring).
Poverty is the main driver of lack of access; indeed, the relationship
between poverty and food security tends to be bidirectional, with one
resulting in the other, and vice versa.4 Thus, while an increase in
emergencies means that more individuals will require some form of
food assistance, the majority of food insecure individuals and
households face long-term structural (e.g., lack of employment with
adequate purchasing power) or idiosyncratic (e.g., ill health or
disability) challenges to achieving food security.5 Food assistance can
rarely—if ever—resolve structural causes of food insecurity.

safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life.” Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food
Summit Plan of Action, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., ROME DECLARATION
ON
WORLD
FOOD
SECURITY
(Nov.
13-17,
1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm#PoA.
2 Christopher Barrett, Measuring Food Insecurity, 327 SCIENCE 825, 827
(2010).
3 AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT
AND DEPRIVATION 47 (1981).
4 Erin Lentz & Christopher Barrett, The Economics and Nutritional Impacts of
Food Assistance Policies and Programs, 42 FOOD POLICY 151, 153-54 (2013).
5 Id. at 154.
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Figure 1: The Number of People Affected by Disasters (5-year lagged
moving average)
The nature of transoceanic and Local and Regional
Procurement Project (LRP) food aid flows is also changing. Figure 2
presents a graph of global food aid volumes over the past thirty years.
The graph includes both transoceanic food aid, which is purchased in
the donor country and shipped to the recipient country, and locally
and regionally procured food, which uses donor funding to purchase
food for delivery either locally from the destination country or
regionally from a neighboring or nearby country.
Most noticeable in Figure 2 is the decline in overall volumes.
There is much less food aid available for delivery than there once
was. Now, more donors provide food-security funding in the form
of cash assistance and vouchers. Further, there has been rapid
growth in LRP, which has shifted the source of in-kind food aid
delivered from predominantly transoceanic locations to local and
regional ones. For example, in the face of evidence-based research
and civil society advocacy that food aid fails to be an effective surplus
disposal mechanism, the European Union and Canada shifted their
food aid policy away from transoceanic food aid toward funding for
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cash-based transfers and local and regional procurement.6 In 199495, thirteen percent of all food aid by value was LRP. Yet, by 2010,
sixty-seven percent of all food aid was LRP.7
Second, the graph splits food aid flows into three categories.
Emergency food aid is deliveries of in-kind aid to people
experiencing short-term periods of food insecurity, perhaps due to a
natural disaster or complex emergency. Program food aid is
concessional sales to governments, and it is now a small portion of
the overall total of food aid. Project food aid includes aid for
development projects and for monetization, which is food aid sold in
the recipient country to generate funds for development projects.
Monetization is rarely cost-effective, often earning returns of only
fifty to seventy cents locally per dollar spent.8 Over the past decade,
funding for program and project food aid has declined, and most
food aid now delivered is emergency-based.
Lastly, food aid flows are volatile, as indicated by the spikes in
donations in 1992 and 1999. In both of those years, large U.S.
donations to Russia contributed to the spike. U.S. food aid deliveries
responded to a poor harvest and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1992 and the collapse of the Russian banking system and currency
in 1999.9 Yet, these donations also reflect bumper harvests in the
United States when food prices were low, making food aid relatively
cheap. Further, some argue that delivering food aid to Russia was a

6 See JENNIFER CLAPP, HUNGER IN THE
OF INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID 46-68 (2012).

BALANCE: THE NEW POLITICS

7
International Food Aid Information System Database, WORLD FOOD
PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/fais/reports/quantities-delivered-twodimensionalreport/run/year/All/cat/All/recipient/All/donor/All/code/All/mode/All/basis/
0/order/0.
8
Christopher Barrett & Erin Lentz, U.S. Monetization Policy:
Recommendations
for
Improvement
7
(2009),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GVY1JiT9f4cJ:dyson.co
rnell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/files/papers/ChicagoCouncilPolicyDevelopmentStud
yonMonetizationDecember2009.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
9 See CHRISTOPHER BARRETT & DANIEL MAXWELL, FOOD AID AFTER
FIFTY YEARS: RECASTING ITS ROLE 38-49 (2005).
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low-cost political win for the United States.10 Unfortunately, these
procyclical donations, providing more food aid when prices are low,
often do not coincide when needs are greater, such as during the
food price crisis of 2007-08.

Figure 2: Global Food Aid Flows by Category (1981-2010)
The United States has been slower to fund new forms of
food assistance than counterpart donors. Further, it remains the
dominant actor in transoceanic food aid deliveries. In 2011, eightynine percent of all transoceanic food aid deliveries originated from
the United States.11 One reason for the slowness of the United States
to change its approach is that large agro-processors, the U.S. shipping
industry, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—labeled as
the “iron triangle”—have little interest in losing food aid related
payments and funding.12 While many NGOs today embrace greater
flexibility, and notably some large agro-processors as well, lobbying
efforts by some members of the iron triangle to maintain the status
quo should not be underestimated. 13 In particular, U.S. flagged
Id. at 26-30.
International Food Aid Information System Database, supra note 7.
12 BARRETT & MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 87.
13 NGOs, including CARE, which stated in 2006 that it would limit its
monetization practices, have distanced themselves from the iron triangle. CARE
10
11

89

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

vessels receive priority bidding on some food aid cargo under the
Agricultural Cargo Preference Act.14 As a result, members of the
U.S. maritime industry have often lobbied to maintain the status quo
of high food aid volumes and less funding for cash, vouchers, and
local procurement. 15 Balancing these domestic demands with
recipient needs can hinder effective programming for recipients.
Thus, food aid, perhaps especially in the United States, is political.

II. OPPORTUNITIES
A.

New Forms of Food Assistance

Deliveries of cash, vouchers, and locally and regionally
procured (LRP) food are now commonplace, while traditional,
transoceanic food aid deliveries are declining. Some of the
prospective benefits of moving away from food aid as de facto
response include faster deliveries, lower costs, local foods are more
acceptable to respondents, supporting local markets, and improving
nutritional outcomes. These new forms of food assistance are not
without potential risks: traders may default during local procurement;
local foods may not meet similar quality and safety standards as
transoceanic food aid; resources may be inequitably shared within
households; and local foods may be less fortified or nutritious. Any
form of food assistance can potentially have an adverse impact,
depending on the local context. For example, large injections of cash

USA, WHITE PAPER ON FOOD AID POLICY 4 (June 6, 2006),
http://www.care.org/sites/default/files/documents/CARE%20monetization%20f
arm%20bill%20white%20paper%5B3%5D.pdf.
Agro-processors are also
changing. Cargill, for example, in May 2013 argued “it is time we reassess the [food
aid] program . . . and allow for some flexibility in the delivery of a portion of food
aid assistance so that food can get more quickly to people on the brink of
starvation.” Cargill Lends Support to Food Aid Reform, AGRIPULSE, May 23, 2013,
http://www.agri-pulse.com/Cargill-lends-support-to-food-aid-reform05232013.asp.
14 Elizabeth Bageant et al., Food Aid and Agricultural Cargo Preference, 32
APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES & POLICY 624 (2010).
15 Id. at 626-28.
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could potentially adversely affect prices and/or disrupt local
markets.16
Our understanding of the tradeoffs among and impacts of
food assistance instruments has not always kept pace with these
changes, in part due to a lack of comparable data. Recently, several
new studies more clearly identify the possible benefits and drawbacks
of the various forms of food assistance.
Two recent randomized trials compare cash and in-kind
distributions, equalizing the magnitude of transfer, program design,
and frequency of transfer across the different food assistance forms.17
In Niger, researchers found that recipients of food baskets had
higher dietary quality and consumption than recipients of cash. 18
Those receiving cash chose to spend some of their funds on
improving their dwellings prior to the rainy season or purchasing
agricultural inputs. 19 Food deliveries were fifteen percent more
expensive than cash deliveries.20 In Ecuador, researchers found that
relative to cash transfers, food transfers result in recipients
consuming significantly greater calories while food vouchers resulted
in significantly greater dietary diversity.21 Thus, the nutritional impact
varies not only by the form of transfer, but also by nutritional
measure used.22

16 Christopher Barrett et al., Market Information and Food Insecurity Response
Analysis, 1 FOOD SECURITY 151, 155-57 (2009).
17 John Hoddinott et al., The Impact of Cash and Food Transfers: Evidence from
a Randomized Intervention in Niger 1-16, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01341, INT’L FOOD
POLICY
RESEARCH
INST.
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01341.pdf.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 6.
21 See generally Melissa Hidrobo et al., Cash, Food, or Vouchers?: Evidence from
a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01234, INT’L
FOOD
POLICY
RESEARCH
INST.
(Mar.
2014),
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01234.pdf.
22 Id.
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A nine-country evaluation undertaken by the LRP Learning
Alliance compared LRP, cash, and voucher projects with matched
transoceanic food aid provided at similar locations during similar
timeframes in the fiscal year 2011. The focus areas of the evaluation
included timeliness, costliness, impacts on price levels and volatility,
impacts on smallholder farmers, and recipient satisfaction.23 Because
cost savings and time are usually the driving sources of advocacy for
LRP, I limit discussion of the findings to these two areas.24
Regarding timeliness, cash, vouchers, and locally purchased
food arrived, on average, nearly fourteen weeks earlier than matched
deliveries of in-kind transoceanic food aid.25 In Figure 3, countries
are arranged by the number of weeks saved with the top-most
country program (i.e., Zambia) experiencing the most time saved.
The six programs that experienced the most time saved were located
in landlocked countries. One reason why timeliness matters is
because the first 1000 days (discussed below)—from conception until
a child turns age two—is the most critical window for nutrition
during a person’s life.26 A savings of fourteen weeks translates into
about ten percent of the first 1000 days. The timeliness of food
assistance delivered to pregnant and lactating women and children
could make the difference between a healthful, productive life, and
stunted growth and decreased human capital.

23 Erin Lentz et al., On the Choice and Impacts of Innovative International Food
Assistance Instruments, 49 WORLD DEV. 1, 3 (2013).
24
Erin Lentz et al., The Timeliness and Cost Effectiveness of the Local and
Regional Procurement of Food Aid, 49 WORLD DEV. 9 passim (2013).
25
Id. at 9.
26
Cesar Victora et al., Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Consequences for
Adult Health and Human Capital, 371 THE LANCET 340 passim (2008).
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Mean difference
for all deliveries:
13.8 weeks (62%)

Figure 3: Number of Weeks Saved Using Local and Regional
Procurement Project (LRP), Cash, or Vouchers Relative to
Transoceanic Food Aid
Compared to transoceanic shipments, the same nine-country
evaluation found that, compared to transoceanic shipments, local
purchases, cash, and vouchers of cereals and grains were over fifty
percent cheaper. The average savings associated with these new
forms relative to transoceanic food aid for beans and pulses was
twenty-five percent. Yet, there was often little or no cost-savings
associated with locally purchasing processed products, such as
vegetable oil and corn-soy blend. Further, oceanic shipping costs
drive the price differentials for grains and pulses.27
One finding to emerge from the nine LRP Learning Alliance
projects is that each form of food assistance does not necessarily
meet any single objective (the following objectives were evaluated:
timeliness, costliness, price and price volatility, impacts on
smallholder suppliers, and recipient satisfaction) in all locations or all
objectives in any one location. 28 Donors and agencies need to
27 See The Timeliness and Cost Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement
of Food Aid, supra note 24, at 9.
28 See On the Choice and Impacts of Innovative International Food Assistance
Instruments, supra note 23, at 1; see also Hidrobo et al., supra note 21, at 1; Hoddinott
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prioritize objectives, and recognize that there might be tradeoffs
among them. Such a prioritization will assist in choosing the most
suitable (combination of) food assistance tools. For example, certain
nutritional outcomes appear easier to achieve with in-kind food, such
as increased caloric consumption; while other measures, such as
dietary diversity, may be more achievable through voucher
distribution or cash. Similarly, not only do objectives matter, but so
does the context. What may be appropriate in one situation may not
work well in another. 29 As a result, agencies and donors need
context-specific response analysis that evaluates market conditions,
local preferences, security, and other concerns to identify what
form(s) of food assistance is appropriate.30
B.

Nutrition and Food Aid Quality

In a 2011 review on food aid quality and nutrition undertaken
at the request of USAID, Webb et al. argue that “[p]utting nutrition
at the heart of the food aid agenda will enhance the impact and
credibility of Title II programming,” which is USAID’s largest source
of food aid funding.31 Indeed, they argue that the nutritional needs
of the populations served by USAID are heterogeneous. For
example, nutritionally vulnerable populations, such as people living
with HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis, children who are wasted, or
children and mothers in the first 1000 days need different, nutrient
dense, specialized foods. The authors write, “[f]oods . . . should be
designed with the physiological demands of the target group in
mind.”32 Further, Webb et al. argue for greater choice among the
nutritional tools available, highlighting the promise of lipid-based

et al., supra note 17, at 1 (explaining that food aid is more expensive but results in
certain, better nutritional outcomes).
29 See id.
30 Id. at 16.
31 Patrick Webb et al., Improving the Nutritional Quality of U.S. Food Aid:
Recommendations for Changes to Products and Programs, USAID 8 (2011),
http://www.nutrition.tufts.edu/documents/ImprovingtheNutritionalQuality.pdf.
32 Id. at 10.
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products and advocating for better formulations of fortified blended
foods and premixes of micronutrients, vitamins, and minerals.33
Thus, while the LRP Learning Alliance findings show that the
objective and context matter, Webb et al. find that composition of
the nutritional basket matters as well, especially for nutritionally
vulnerable individuals. 34 No one type of food can meet all
programming goals, and no single programming approach is
appropriate for all populations. In other words, if the goal for food
assistance is to be something more than “the number of people
‘fed,’” practitioners and policymakers need to fine-tune food aid
baskets to meet the needs of the targeted population. 35 Yet,
identifying which nutritional tools to use, and when, is complex.
C.

The First 1000 Days

Mounting evidence indicates that the period from conception
to age two—the first 1000 days—is the most important window for
lifelong health and cognitive outcomes.36 Victora et al. find that poor
fetal growth or stunting before age two is associated with shorter
adult height, reduced economic productivity, less schooling, and, for
women, lower offspring birthweight. 37 Although there is more
evidence of the possibility of cognitive and socio-emotional skills
“catch-up” after the first 1000 days, the evidence of successful
“catch-up” growth for stunted after the first 1000 days has been
uneven. The authors argue that an implication of their findings is
that “the prevention of maternal and child undernutrition is a longterm investment that will benefit the present generation and their
children.”38 Furthermore, Ruel et al., found that in Haitian districts
with high rates of undernutrition, preventing undernutrition was
more effective and lower in cost than a recuperative approach

33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 2.
See id.
See Webb, supra note 31, at 6.
Victora, supra note 26.
See id. at 340.
Id.
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targeting already underweight children.39 The preventative approach
included food aid rations, as well as a range of health and behavior
change interventions.
Reaching mothers and their children during the first 1000
days appears to have greater longer-term health outcomes than
reaching other populations, including school-age children. 40 Yet,
food assistance programs often target school-aged children with
school meals and take-home rations because school-age children are
more easily reachable and food assistance can incentivize school
attendance. 41 While increasing school attendance and improving
nutritional status are both important priorities, it is worth considering
whether mechanisms other than food assistance would also be
effective for boosting enrollment, saving food assistance for
nutritional objectives.

CONCLUSION
More than ever before, there is an opportunity for food
assistance to be fit for purpose. Yet, how best to incorporate these
findings into future U.S. food assistance projects and programs is an
open question and several challenges remain. First, the evidence
briefly discussed above indicates that the most important window for
long-term nutritional outcomes is the first 1000 days. Targeting
mothers and their children during that window may be the most
efficient way to limit stunting. Nonetheless, efficiency is only one
consideration when determining who should receive food assistance.
Equity also matters. Expecting families to direct all food transfers to
certain members while others go without is unrealistic. Similarly,

39 Marie Ruel et al., Age-Based Targeting Of Food Assistance And Behaviour
Change And Communicated For Reduction Of Childhood Undernutrition In Haiti: A Cluster
Randomised Trial, 371 THE LANCET 588, 594 (2008)
40 Jennifer Bryce et al., Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Effective Action at
National Level, 371 THE LANCET 510, 510 (2008).
41 See The Economics and Nutritional Impacts of Food Assistance Policies and
Programs, supra note 4, at 156.
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targeting certain members of a community while ignoring others who
are arguably experiencing the same degree of food insecurity, such as
the elderly or infirm, can be disruptive within the community. Thus,
balancing efficiency and equity remains an important challenge,
particularly because funding for food assistance is limited.
Second, blanket prevention during the first 1000 days can be
more effective and cost efficient than recuperative treatment. Many
anthropomorphic indicators, such as wasting and stunting, are lagging
indicators. In other words, by the time they are identified, children
are already food insecure. 42 Therefore, a stronger focus on
preventing these conditions can be more effective than intervening
once emergencies have been declared. Yet, the bulk of current food
aid funding goes to emergencies. Inasmuch as possible, prioritizing
preventative food assistance programming in districts with high
undernutrition can get assistance to those who need it, but are not yet
showing the physical manifestations of undernutrition, faster. This
could include redirecting food assistance resources away from other
programs that can operate with alternative sources of funding.
Third, greater flexibility associated with the new forms of
food assistance brings opportunities to better meet a range of food
security and nutrition objectives. Prioritizing more explicitly among
objectives—and recognizing that there are tradeoffs—can assist in
identifying which type of transfer will be best suited to the local
context. Nonetheless, greater flexibility also requires more effort to
identify which type of food assistance is appropriate for the
prioritized objective for a given context. Greater flexibility also
requires more effort to identify which type of food assistance is
appropriate for the prioritized objective (for a given context).43 A
corollary of greater flexibility is that donors and nongovernmental
agencies also need ways to build in greater programming flexibility so

See Measuring Food Insecurity, supra note 2, at 827.
See id. at 827; Joanna Upton & Erin Lentz, Expanding the Food Assistance
Toolbox, in UNITING ON FOOD ASSISTANCE: THE CASE FOR TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION 75, 76 (Christopher Barrett et al. eds., 2012); see also Webb, supra
note 31, at 10.
42
43
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that they can change their approach as context changes (e.g., as prices
increase, nutritional needs change, or markets recover).
Lastly, food assistance is political and will likely remain so.
Because the flexibility of U.S. food assistance is relatively new, and
our understanding about the long-term effects of undernutrition in
the first 1000 days is expanding, we are at a particular moment when
evidence helps to shape the debate about the future of food
assistance. Evidence helps to navigate political discussions and move
debates from the ideological to the concrete. Looking forward to the
next round of Farm Bill negotiations, we have an opportunity to
build the evidence base and clearly articulate how new innovations
and approaches can improve food assistance programming.
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U.S. AID TO AGRICULTURE: SHIFTING
FOCUS FROM PRODUCTION
TO SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY
Marc J. Cohen, Ph.D.*

INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, agriculture has waxed and waned as a key
theme of U.S. international development assistance. Periodic global
food crises, such as those in 1974 and 2008, have put agriculture,
food, and nutrition at the top of the U.S. development agenda.1 But
in more “normal” times, agriculture has had to compete for budget
resources with other priorities, such as global health, child survival,
environmental sustainability, and gender justice.2

* Marc J. Cohen, Senior Researcher, Oxfam America and Professorial
Lecturer in International Development, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, mcohen@oxfamamerica.org. The
author is grateful to Eric Muñoz of Oxfam America for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1 See Sue Horton, The 1974 and 2008 Food Price Crises: Déjà Vu?, in THE
GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, 29-41
(Jennifer Clapp and Marc J. Cohen eds., 2009); Emmy Simmons & Julie Howard,
Improving the Effectiveness of US Assistance in Transforming the Food Security Outlook in SubSaharan Africa, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES, 193-203 (Jennifer Clapp and Marc, J. Cohen eds., 2009).
2 WORLD BANK, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: FROM VISION TO ACTION, A
SECTOR STRATEGY (Oct. 1997), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/09/23
/000009265_3980319100022/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf; Measuring Aid to
Agriculture and Food Security: Losing the Plot?, Briefing Paper No. 72 ODI, OVERSEAS
DEV. INST. (2012), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/7588.pdf.
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Furthermore, the approach to agricultural development has
shifted considerably over time. In the 1960s and 1970s there was an
overwhelming emphasis on food production. Beginning in 2000,
U.S. development policy makers began focusing on more holistic
approaches that emphasize markets, consumption, nutrition,
sustainable natural resource management, and empowering women,
in addition to a continued focus on food production. The
Presidential Feed the Future (FtF) initiative, launched after the 2009
L’Aquila G8 Summit, incorporates such a holistic approach to
agricultural assistance. This paper explores the evolution of U.S.
agricultural aid by examining shifts in funding and policy, and the
implementation of FtF. The extent to which U.S. assistance supports
agricultural and related rural development matters greatly, because
the overwhelming majority of the world’s poor people live in rural
areas and depend on agriculture and related activities for their
livelihoods.3

I. MALTHUS V. BOSERUP
Concern about the balance between the growing number of
humans and scarce natural resources have long shaped debates about
global agricultural development. Indeed, these concerns were the
overarching framework for the Penn State Journal of Law and
International Affairs Symposium from which the papers in this volume
are drawn. The classic approach of the English Economist and
Cleric Thomas R. Malthus remains influential today: “The power of
population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to
produce subsistence for man.”4 Writing more than a century and a

3 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE
FOR DEVELOPMENT (2007),

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/4773651327599046334/8394679-1327614067045/WDROver2008-ENG.pdf.
4 THOMAS R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION
4 (Electronic Scholarly Publishing Project, 1998) (1798), available at
http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf.
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half later, Danish Economist Ester Boserup stood Malthus on his
head, arguing that population pressure tends to induce innovations in
markets, institutions, and technology.5 This debate is more than an
interesting academic exercise. If policy makers conclude that Malthus
was right, they are likely to support efforts to limit population growth
(family planning). Officials who adopt Boserup’s view (which has
influenced the agricultural economics profession and development
agencies) will channel resources to technological and institutional
development.

II. THE GREEN REVOLUTION
In the 1960s, Malthusian pessimism about rapid population
growth held sway, 6 but this gradually gave way to technological
optimism in the 1970s. Based on experience with hybrid cereal
varieties used in developed countries, agricultural development
experts sought to promote adaptation and adoption of high-yielding
varieties in developing countries. The goal of this Green Revolution
was to “grow the pile of food.”7 Experts anticipated that increases in
agricultural production would ensure an adequate food supply to
meet the growing demand stemming from population growth. This
strategy relied on the use of high-yielding cereal crop varieties, which
in the 1960s and 1970s usually required the application of mineral
fertilizers and synthetic pesticides for optimal results.

See generally ESTER BOSERUP, THE CONDITIONS OF AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE UNDER POPULATION
PRESSURE (1965), available at http://allotmentresources.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/BOSERUP_1965_THE-CONDITIONS-OFAGRICULTURAL-GROWTH.pdf.
6 See, e.g., WILLIAM PADDOCK & PAUL PADDOCK, FAMINE 1975!
AMERICA’S DECISION: WHO WILL SURVIVE? (1967).
7 I am indebted to Curtis Farrar, former Executive Secretary of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, for identifying this
phrase.
5
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The results on the supply-side were phenomenal. As Figure 1
indicates, world cereal yields rose dramatically between 1961 and
2009, with little or no increase in the land area harvested. Asia and
Latin America experienced big jumps in productivity. Notably,
increased production was seen in areas with a high percentage of
food-insecure people, such as the Indian Subcontinent.

Figure 1. World cereals, average yield and harvested area, 1961-2009
and projections to 20508
The benefits of using high-yield crops were not limited to the
supply side. Where the Green Revolution took hold, higher
productivity meant higher farm incomes due to the decrease in unit
cost of production. 9 More abundant harvests created on-farm
employment opportunities and lowered food prices for consumers.10
Indeed, Green Revolution related production increases were a major

Nicos Alexandratos & Jelle Bruinsma, World Agriculture Towards
2030/2050: The 2012 Revision 15 Figure 1.9 (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the U.N., ESA Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap106e/ap106e.pdf.
9 John W. Mellor, Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization, in
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 136-54 (Carl K. Eicher & John
M. Staatz eds., 3d ed. 1998).
10 Id.
8
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factor in the long-term decline in real world food prices between
1961 and 2006 (see Figure 2). Increased rural prosperity stimulated
demand for goods and services throughout the economy, spurring
generalized economic growth.11

Figure 2. FAO Food Price Index in Nominal and Real Terms, 1961201412
Boserupian triumphs, however, had a dark side.
•

In many instances, the need for purchased farm inputs
(fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds) meant better-off farmers
tended to adopt new technology earlier and reap most of the
benefits. Poor farmers frequently lacked necessary capital to
purchase external inputs.
Without adequate financial
resources, lower-income farmers relied on saved seeds and
used organic material from the farm for fertilizer.

•

Agricultural development program designs did not always
ensure women benefitted along with men.
In many
developing countries, women farmers have less access to
land, inputs, education, training, advisory services, and credit
than men. In addition, women farmers have demands on
their time related to child care and household tasks.

Id.
World Food Situation: FAO Food Price Index, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/.
11
12
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•

Misuse of farm chemicals necessary to produce high yields led
to environmental and human health problems.

•

Monocropping of high yielding cereal varieties led to loss of
genetic diversity. Without genetic diversity, future plant
breeding and food security are threatened.

•

Productivity gains in cereals sometimes came at the expense
of other important food crops. For example, in South Asia
farmers abandoned lentils in favor of wheat and rice.

•

Green Revolution technology had less promising results in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Lackluster results were linked to the
high cost of adaptation across extraordinarily diverse
agroecologies; low investment in agricultural research and
development; lack of infrastructure, markets, and supporting
institutions; differences from other regions in the gender
division of labor and in women’s access to assets; and, in
some countries, severe disruptions as a result of protracted
violent conflict.13

III. WAXING AND WANING INTEREST IN AGRICULTURE
In the mid-1970s there was concern about widespread food
shortages. Food prices rose rapidly, and Bangladesh and several
countries in Africa experienced severe food emergencies. In
response to these concerns, the international community held the
1974 World Food Conference in Rome where nations solemnly
pledged to eliminate hunger within a decade.14 Following the

13 See John Kerr & Shashi Kolavalli, Impact of Agricultural Research on Poverty
Alleviation: Conceptual Framework with Illustrations from the Literature, Environment and
Production Technology Division Discussion Paper No. 56, INT’L FOOD POL’Y
RES. INST., (1999),
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/eptdp56.pdf.
14 Horton, supra note 1, at 37-38.
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commitments made at the World Food Conference, aid to agriculture
rose rapidly until the mid-1980s. After the mid-1980s, agricultural
assistance declined sharply until the mid-2000s (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Trends in Aid to Agriculture and Rural Development,
1971-2010, in constant 2010 U.S. dollars15
A number of factors led to the steep and sustained decrease
in aid to agriculture. First and foremost, the donor community
declared victory when the Green Revolution led to higher cereal
output and lower food prices. 16 With a sense of victory came
complacency, as donors and developing-country governments alike
felt less urgency about investing in agriculture in light of the gains
achieved. 17
Second, donors increasingly focused on other
development priorities—such as gender, environmental sustainability,
global health, and child survival—and slashed overall aid budgets in
the 1990s, leaving little funding for farm-related assistance. 18
Moreover, because of sectoral siloing within aid programs, there was
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TRENDS IN AID TO
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/Trends%20in%20aid%20to%20Agriculture%20a
nd%20Rural%20Development.pdf.
16 RURAL DEVELOPMENT: FROM VISION TO ACTION, A SECTOR
STRATEGY, supra note 2.
17 Id.
18 Id.; WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 3.
15
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little effort to consider the intimate links between agriculture and
rural development and other priority concerns in rural areas of the
developing world. Third, many development experts consider
agriculture a “sunset activity” and favor greater emphasis on
manufacturing and services. 19 By focusing on manufacturing and
service industries, experts have missed an important reality of world
poverty. Concentration of poverty in rural areas means that
agriculture and related activities are likely to remain the main source
of livelihoods for poor people for some time to come.20 Finally,
donors’ and international financial institutions’ emphasis on reducing
the economic role of the state in favor of the market during the
1980s and much of the 1990s reduced the resources devoted to
agricultural public goods in developing countries, such as research
and extension. For their part, the governments of low-income
developing countries devoted less than five percent of their budgets
to agriculture in the early 2000s, even though for most such countries
agriculture represented the largest share of gross domestic product
and the main source of employment. These same governments
allocated an average of twelve percent of expenditures to the
military.21

IV. EVOLVING APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
The World Food Summit, held in Rome in 1996, issued an
impassioned appeal for renewed attention to food and agriculture,
calling the persistence of world hunger “unacceptable.”22 It set the

See, e.g., WILLIAM ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (2003).
20 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 3.
21 See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 27th Sess., Mobilizing the
Resources to Fight Hunger, U.N. Doc. CFS:2001/Inf.7 (June 1, 2001),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/003/Y0006E/Y0006E00.htm; World Bank,
World Development Indicators, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.7.
22 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., ROME DECLARATION ON
WORLD FOOD SECURITY (Nov. 13-17, 1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.HTM.
19
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goal of halving the number of people living in hunger as of 1990 by
2015, and also emphasized that food security is about much more
than “growing the pile of food,” as important as that remains; access
to food and good nutrition are also essential.23 Coming on the heels
of the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development and
the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the Summit also
placed considerable emphasis on sustainable natural resource
management and attention to gender issues. 24 Finally, it strongly
reaffirmed the right to adequate food. At least implicitly, delegates
acknowledged the need to address equity, ecological, and gender
issues, something that the Green Revolution did not do.25 But, the
Summit did not succeed in reversing the decline in public investment
in agricultural and rural development.

V. SOARING FOOD PRICES: A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM
In 2007, the long, steady decline in global food prices came to
an end. Prices shot up, and the increases accelerated during the first
half of 2008. Today, food prices remain above the levels of the mid2000s, and many analysts consider the era of low food prices to have
ended. By June 2008, world prices for beef and poultry had doubled
over the levels of January 2003; wheat, corn, and dairy had risen
threefold; and the price of rice, the most widely consumed staple, had
shot up fivefold.26 The causes of these increases were complex and
multiple, including both short-term and structural factors:
•

Higher fuel prices, which in turn raised the cost of
agricultural inputs, operating farm machinery, and
transportation;

Id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES (Jennifer Clapp & Marc J. Cohen eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE
GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS]; GLOBAL FOOD-PRICE SHOCKS AND POOR PEOPLE:
THEMES AND CASE STUDIES (Marc J. Cohen & Melinda Smale eds., 2011).
23
24

107

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

•

Diversion of food and feed to biofuel, such as corn ethanol in
the United States;

•

Speculation on commodities markets;

•

Environmental factors, such as prolonged drought in
Australia, a key agricultural exporter;

•

As prices rose, the imposition of export embargoes in key
supplier countries such as India, which in turn led to panic
buying by major importing countries, such as the Philippines,
leading to further price increases; and

•

The long-term decline in investment in agriculture.

Of course, global food prices do not necessarily determine
national and local prices, as these are influenced by a wide range of
government policies, how effectively local markets operate, the ability
of households to produce at least some of the food they consume,
etc. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the consequences of the price
hikes included:
•

Severe hardship for low-income net buyers of food, including
many small-scale farm families. For low-income people,
higher food prices frequently mean having to choose whether
to pay for food, health care, shelter, or education;

•

Less healthy diets, as families often gave up meat, fruit, and
vegetables in favor of maintaining calorie consumption from
cereals to keep working;

•

More poverty
controversial);

•

Protests in more than sixty countries, mostly in cities, where
people overwhelmingly depend on purchases to procure their

(but
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food. Some of these turned violent, e.g., in Haiti, where
rioting led to the collapse of the government.27
Protests and riots in urban areas—especially in capital
cities—are politically salient, and the escalation of food prices put
food and agriculture squarely on the global front policy burner once
more. In 2008, the United Nations issued a comprehensive action
plan, which emphasized increased investment in smallholder
agriculture as a means of producing more food, lowering prices, and
boosting poor people’s incomes. Many heads of state and
government attended a mini-summit on the food crisis in Rome. In
2009, the leaders of the wealthiest countries pledged $22 billion in
agriculture and food security aid to developing countries at the G-8
Summit in L’Aquila, Italy. According to the United Kingdom
government, as of mid-2013, donors had disbursed $16.4 billion, or
more than seventy percent of the sum pledged.28

VI. FEED THE FUTURE: A POST-GREEN REVOLUTION APPROACH TO
AGRICULTURE AID
To meet the U.S. share of the L’Aquila commitments, the
Obama Administration launched a new initiative called Feed the
Future (FtF).29 This $3.5 billion program directs its resources to a
limited number of countries that have developed a national
agricultural investment plan. 30 Rather than simply supporting
increased food production, FtF targets resources to inclusive
agricultural growth, empowerment of women, improved nutrition,
and sustainable and equitable management of land, water, and
For more details on the causes and consequences of rising food prices,
see THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS, supra note 26.
28 G8 UK, LOUGH ERNE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/205437/Lough-Erne-Accountability-Report.pdf.
29 For more details on Feed the Future, see FEED THE FUTURE,
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
30 About, FEED THE FUTURE, http://www.feedthefuture.gov/about (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014).
27
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fisheries in what the program calls “climate-smart agriculture.”31 In
effect, FtF has institutionalized the post-Green Revolution more
holistic approach to supporting agricultural and rural development,
although the program in many instances does continue to promote
high external input technologies.
Oxfam America has commissioned research in several
countries that have received FtF resources to assess program
implementation. The findings represent a mix of positive and
problematic elements:
•

In Senegal, the program supports substantial efforts to
manage natural resources sustainably. 32
Conservation
farming, which is an integral part of these efforts, has also
contributed to yield gains for participating farmers. 33
However, farmers who participate in FtF-supported activities
lack access to timely weather information, which hampers
agricultural adaptation to climate change.34

•

In Tanzania, farmers participating in FtF-supported activities
have likewise experienced productivity gains.35 However, the
benefits have mainly gone to producers with access to good
quality land and to water. In contrast to Senegal, the program
has paid insufficient attention to sustainability.36 Also, FtF
implementers engaged in little consultation with the
beneficiaries about the design of the program, even though

Id.
See Henri M. Lo & Emmanuel Tumusiime, The Influence of US
Development Assistance on Local Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change: Insights from Senegal,
OXFAM AMERICA (July 24, 2013),
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Senegal_Climate_Change_Rese
arch_Backgrounder_7_23_13.pdf.
33 Id. at 35.
34 Id. at 6.
35 See Emmanuel Tumusiime & Edmund Matotay Sustainable and Inclusive
Investments in Agriculture: Lessons on the Feed the Future Initiative in Tanzania, OXFAM
AMERICA (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/
Tanzania_Sustainable_and_Inclusive_Investments.pdf.
36 Id. at 25, 31.
31
32
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FtF places considerable emphasis on farmer empowerment
and engaging civil society in the development of national
agricultural investment plans.37
•

In Haiti, FtF-supported farmers have achieved impressive
yield gains, but it is unclear whether they can maintain them
in the absence of aid resources.38 The program emphasizes
rehabilitation of Haiti’s severely degraded watersheds and
promotes the system of rice intensification, an approach to
rice production that reduces the use of chemicals and
fertilizer, which seems well suited to resource-poor farmers
who cannot afford purchased inputs.39 But, it has provided
disproportionate training resources to men, notwithstanding
the empowerment of women mandate. As in Tanzania,
implementers did not consult beneficiaries about program
design.40 Also U.S. agricultural trade policy, which seeks to
maintain overwhelming dominance in Haiti’s rice market,
lacks coherence with FtF’s goal of supporting Haitian food
production.41

CONCLUSION
Research on implementation of FtF indicates that there are a
number of positive aspects to this new U.S. approach to aid to
agriculture. After a long period of resource limitations, it provides
substantial new funds in support of agriculture, bolstering food
production while also taking into account the environmental and
social context of agricultural and rural development. That said, a
Id. at 4-5.
Danielle Fuller-Wimbush & Cardyn Fils-Aimé, Feed the Future Investment
in Haiti: Implications for Sustainable Food Security and Poverty Reduction, OXFAM AMERICA
(May 1, 2014), http://policypractice.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Haiti_Feed_the_Future_RB.pdf.
39 Id. at 33-37.
40 Id. at 25-30.
41 Id. at 16; see also Marc J. Cohen, Diri Nasyonal Ou Diri Miami? Food,
Agriculture and US-Haiti Relations, 5 FOOD SEC. 4, at 597-606 (Aug. 2013).
37
38
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more consistent effort to draw on farmers’ own knowledge and
definitions of problems in FtF programming would improve the
initiative’s results. This is not just a matter of engaging in genuine
partnerships and encouraging beneficiary participation, as important
as those are. Decades of development experience also shows that
when people who are supposed to benefit from aid have a sense of
“buy-in,” they are much more likely to sustain the gains that they
achieved after aid resources are no longer available. In addition,
when U.S. trade policies work at cross-purposes with U.S. agricultural
assistance, it is difficult for the latter to achieve a long-lasting impact.
In low-income countries, U.S. efforts to promote agricultural
development and food self-reliance are the best way to achieve viable
and equitable trading relationships over the long term.

112

Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs
2015

VOLUME 3 NO. 2

GLOBAL HUNGER AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: HOW THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES
ADDRESS FOOD SECURITY
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INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) held in Bali, Indonesia in early December 2013
was the focus of much global attention, as many believed that the
inability of the Members to adopt an agreement could signal the end
of the WTO as a legislating forum. While a package was ultimately
adopted, negotiations almost unraveled at the eleventh hour when a
consensus could not be reached over part of the package relating to
public stockholding for food security in developing countries. The
public stockholding agreement, intended to serve as a temporary fix
until a permanent solution can be agreed upon, protects developing
Members from challenges through the WTO Dispute Settlement
system for measures taken relating to support provided for certain
foods in pursuit of public stockholding programs for food security
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purposes. While all WTO Members recognized the importance of
food security and agreed that countries should have the ability to
provide food to their most vulnerable populations, there were
concerns over the public stockholding agreement due to the lack of
disciplines in the agreement and the possible resulting tradedistorting practices that could harm other Members.
The concerns that were displayed during the negotiation of
this agreement highlight the interplay of global trade rules and the
pursuit of food security, as well as the challenges that can arise in
developing such rules. As the production, price, and movement of
food has obvious implications for addressing global hunger, the
international trade regime has played an influential role. While the
WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), have sought to promote liberalization, international
trade rules have also been developed with the recognition of, and in
support of, nations’ and the global community’s ability to address
food security issues. As the global community continues to fight
toward the eradication of hunger, the role of the international trade
regime as a catalyst for achieving food security must continue to be
pursued. The trading rules that have been developed, as well as
changes and new rules that can be implemented through further
negotiations, have been playing, and will continue to play, a role in
the fight to end world hunger and to establish a system in which
global food security is sustainable. This paper reviews the ways in
which the international trade regime has sought to address food
security issues, as well as additional developments that have been
discussed as part of further negotiations. The paper is being
published in conjunction with the 2014 Penn State Journal of Law and
International Affairs Symposium, titled “The 9 Billion People Question:
The Challenge of Global Resource Scarcity.”

I. GLOBAL HUNGER AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
During the period of 2011-2013, an estimated 842.3 million
people were undernourished, with the vast majority—826.6 million—
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living in developing regions. 1 Indeed, while developing regions
account for about eighty-two percent of the world’s population, they
account for ninety-eight percent of the world’s undernourished
peoples.2 The consistently large number of people facing hunger has
been and continues to be a major concern within and among
countries, inter- and intra-national organizations, and nongovernmental entities alike, with numerous national and multilateral
entities working individually and together to help eradicate hunger
across the globe. These entities have worked for decades to alleviate
hunger through programs such as growing small-scale agriculture,
providing food aid to vulnerable populations and during emergencies,
monitoring food prices, and developing infrastructure.
The factors contributing to global hunger and creating
barriers to achieving food security are numerous and complex. These
include issues affecting global and regional supply—such as weather,
trade policies, energy prices, and agricultural research and
development—and demand—such as consumption patterns,
financial markets, and biofuel policies.3 Not only do these issues
create difficulties in and of themselves, but they can also interact in
ways that exacerbate each other. For example, the decrease in funds
available for agricultural research and development over recent
decades has contributed to lower supplies, as it can stifle
development in areas like higher yields, more weather resistant crops,
and better storage techniques. At the same time, the effects of
climate change will have implications for when and where products
can be produced, leading to an even greater need for increased
financing of research and development and placing additional
pressures on already limited resources.
The State of Food Insecurity in the World, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE
U.N. (FAO), 8, Table 1 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf [hereinafter State of Food
Insecurity].
2 Food Security Indicators, FAO, Tables A_1 & A_2 (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.VNf0SnacM9d.
3 See generally Terence P. Stewart & Stephanie R. Manaker, 2010-2011
Return of High Food Prices: Implications for the Future and Steps That Are Being or Could Be
Taken to Reduce the Impact, 43 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 587, 597-612 (2011).
1
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These factors affect and interact with issues of availability,
access, and price to create complex challenges. For example, in terms
of the availability of food, the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) estimates that during the 2011-2013
period there was a sufficient supply of food worldwide to meet the
dietary needs of the world population; yet one in eight people on
earth is undernourished, and for a number of individual countries the
supply of food was not sufficient to meet the needs of that
population.4 Accordingly, although global supply is not the present
problem to solving global hunger, at a macro-level it clearly is part of
the problem on the undernourished country level (and, within
countries, in specific areas of those countries). Trade policy and rules
play a role in limiting the continued adverse effects that produce
hunger to such an extent.
In addition, as the population increases and demand for basic
foodstuffs grows, the growth in supply will have to keep pace—in
fact, an estimated sixty percent more food will be needed by 2050.5
Part of that can be addressed through a reduction in waste in all
countries. One report estimates that, if food loss and waste were cut
in half, the resulting food saved would account for twenty-two
percent of the increased amount of food needed in 2050.6 Trade
policy and rules can also play a role here, as they can help address
non-tariff barriers that create delays when goods are crossing borders.
One report highlights the immense impact that border delays can
have on food prices: “Border delays have significant impacts on the
movement of food, especially in developing countries. For example,
the Burundi-Rwanda border adds the equivalent of 174 kilometres

Food Security Indicators, supra note 2, at Table V_1.1.
See Feed the Future, The U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and Food
Security Initiative, Progress Report June 2013, Growing Innovation, Harvesting Results, 6
(June 2013), http://issuu.com/usaid/docs/feed_the_future_progress_report_201
[hereinafter Progress Report].
6 Enabling Trade: From Farm to Fork, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 11 (Jan.
2014), http://reports.weforum.org/enabling-trade-from-valuation-to-action/wpcontent/blogs.dir/38/mp/files/pages/files/2-enabling-trade-from-farm-tofork.pdf.
4
5
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(km) in terms of increasing food prices; the Democratic Republic of
Congo-Rwanda border adds a staggering 1,600 km.”7
A second complexity concerns access. The FAO estimates
that there is a sufficient supply of food available in a number of
developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) to meet
the dietary needs of the population; still, millions of people in these
countries suffer from hunger. Thus, access to food poses a
significant barrier to achieving food security. In other words, food
may be available to certain populations in theory, but a lack of
infrastructure and proper storage and transportation systems may
prevent those in need from actually being able to access what is
available. Access is also particularly problematic in countries
involved in conflict and among displaced and politically vulnerable
populations, where getting food to those in need is affected by
additional complications. Indeed, as shown in the table below, of the
forty-one developing countries with twenty percent or more of their
population undernourished in 2011-2013, twenty countries were
identified by the World Bank as fragile and conflicted areas within the
past five years, compared to eleven of the eighty-seven developing
countries with less than twenty percent of their population
undernourished.

7

Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
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Percent of Population Undernourished in Developing Countries (20112013)
>35%
20% - 34.9%
10% - 19.9% 5% - 9.9%
<5%
Antigua &
Burundi*
Angola*
Barbuda
Bahamas
Algeria
Comoros*
Bolivia
Bangladesh Belize
Argentina
Eritrea*
Botswana
Cambodia
Benin
Armenia
Ethiopia
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Brazil
Azerbaijan
Central
Haiti*
African Rep.* China
Cape Verde Barbados
Brunei
Mozambique Chad*
Colombia
Costa Rica
Darussalam
Sudan
Dominican
(former)*
Congo*
Rep.
Gabon
Chile
Swaziland
Côte d’Ivoire*
Ecuador
Guyana
Cuba
Timor
Dem. People’s
Leste*
Rep. of Korea
El Salvador
Honduras
Dominica
Zambia
Djibouti*
Gambia*
Indonesia
Egypt
Guatemala
Grenada
Jamaica
Fiji
French
Iraq*
Guinea*
Kiribati*
Polynesia
GuineaKenya
Bissau*
Kyrgyzstan
Ghana
Lao People’s
Dem. Rep.
India
Maldives
Iran
Liberia*
Lesotho
Mali*
Jordan
Madagascar*
Nepal*
Mauritania Kazakhstan
Malawi*
Niger
Mauritius
Kuwait
Mongolia
Pakistan
Morocco
Lebanon
Namibia
Peru
Nigeria
Libya*
Nicaragua
Philippines
Panama
Malaysia
Occupied
Saint Vincent
Palestinian
Saint Kitts
& the
Territories
& Nevis
Grenadines
Mexico
Sao Tome
&
New
Paraguay
Saint Lucia
Principe*
Caledonia
Solomon
Rep. of
Rwanda
Islands*
Seychelles
Korea
Syrian Arab
Senegal
Suriname
Rep.*
Samoa
Sierra Leone* Togo*
Taiwan
Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
South Africa
Trinidad &
Tajikistan*
Tobago
Tunisia
Tanzania
Uruguay
Turkey
Uganda
Uzbekistan
Turkmenista
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Vanuatu
Viet Nam

n
United Arab
Emirates
Venezuela

Countries listed in bold are those identified by the U.N. as LDCs;
countries listed in italics are those identified by the WTO as net foodimporting countries (other than LDCs); countries marked with “*”
have been identified as fragile and conflict-affected areas by the
World Bank within the last five years.
Source: Terence P. Stewart, Global Food Security & the World Trade
Organization, Slide 8 of PowerPoint presented at the 2014 Penn State
Journal of Law and International Affairs Symposium: The 9 Billion
People Question: The Challenge of Global Resource Scarcity (Feb. 7,
2014).
Another layer of complication arises where food may be
available (and accessible), but high and rising food prices have made
it increasingly difficult for populations in developing regions to
obtain sufficient food. High and volatile food prices are especially
problematic for poorer populations because they spend a larger
portion of their income on food. As highlighted by Professor
Carmen G. Gonzalez, food insecurity is a function of poverty: “The
problem is inequality and land ownership, lack of employment, lack
of income. To address food security, it’s necessary to address the
problem of poverty.” 8 The effect of food prices on hunger is
illustrated in part by the relative decrease in the percent of the
developing world population that lives in extreme poverty versus the
percent of the developing world population that is undernourished.
Between 1990-1992 and 2011-2013, the percent of the developing
world population that is undernourished decreased by about thirtynine percent; in comparison, during the same period, the percent of

8 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Remarks at the Penn State Journal of Law and
International Affairs Symposium: The 9 Billion People Question: The Challenge of
Global
Resource
Scarcity
(Feb.
7,
2014),
http://mediasite.dsl.psu.edu/Mediasite/Play/623941f54f854efaaa7bcd1a9805b0de
1d (starting at 04:14:25).
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the population living in extreme poverty decreased by about fiftythree percent.9 The relatively greater reduction in poverty suggests
that higher food prices have resulted in certain populations remaining
undernourished even though their incomes may have increased.
Moreover, food price volatility can create a ripple effect that
exacerbates its impact on hunger. Political instability often results as
a consequence of high food prices and food price volatility; where
there are political conflicts, however, it becomes increasingly difficult
to get food to populations in need. Thus, a reaction to an inability to
obtain food—political upheaval—can make it even more difficult to
remedy the underlying problems.
As there is no single factor causing global hunger, there is no
single solution. The multitude of causes interact to create significant
complexities, and the global community thus faces no shortage of
challenges in addressing global hunger. But as trade is certainly one
of the factors involved, trade policy and the WTO rules have worked
to facilitate the eradication of global hunger.
A.

Millennium Development Goals

In September 2000, heads of state and other high-ranking
officials from 189 countries gathered for the United Nations
Millennium Summit. During the summit, participating countries
unanimously adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
which identified a number of values and objectives that the
international community should seek to promote and achieve in the
twenty-first century. 10 The objectives identified related to peace,
security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication;
protecting our common environment; human rights, democracy, and
good governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special
needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations. 11 The
9
U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2013 U.N. Sales No. E.13.I.9, at 7, 10 (2013),
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/report-2013/mdg-report-2013english.pdf.
10 G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/L.2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
11 Id. Peace, security and disarmament (Id. ¶¶ 8-10); poverty eradication
(Id. ¶¶ 11-23); human rights, democracy, good governance (Id. ¶¶ 24-25); protecting
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identified goals were “derived from the global conferences of the
1990s and from the international norms and laws that had been
codified over the past half-century[]” and eventually became known
as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).12
There are eight MDGs, each of which includes specific
targets. The first MDG is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
One of the targets identified to achieve this goal is to halve, between
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.14
Considering that 23.3 percent of the population in developing
countries (approximately 995 million people) was undernourished in
the 1990-1992 period, meeting this goal would have a tremendous
impact on global hunger. Since the establishment of the MDGs,
substantial progress has been made, with the proportion of the
population in developing countries that is undernourished decreasing
to 14.3 percent (about 826 million people) by the 2011-2013 period.15
While a number of countries are not expected to meet the MDG
target if current trends continue or have shown no progress or
deterioration, the United Nations has reported that the MDG target
is still “within reach,” as a number of developing countries have
already met or are expected to meet or exceed this goal.16
13

the vulnerable (Id. ¶ 26); meeting the special needs of Africa (Id. ¶¶ 27-28);
strengthening the U.N. (Id. ¶¶ 29-32).
12 U.N. Secretary-General, Road Map Towards the Implementation of
the United Nations Millennium Declaration, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/56/326 (Sept. 6,
2001), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56326.pdf.
13 The eight MDGs are (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2)
achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower
women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability;
and (8) global partnership for development. See generally We Can End Poverty:
Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
14 The other targets identified for this goal are to halve, between 1990
and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1.25 a day and to
achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women
and young people.
15 State of Food Insecurity, supra note 1, at 8, Table 1.
16 Id. at 54, Table A1.1.
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Developments After the 2007-2008 Food Price Crisis

Following the food price crisis in the 1970s, the world
experienced more than three decades of relatively low and generally
declining food prices. During 2007 and 2008, however, food prices
jumped dramatically, creating another food price crisis. Estimates
suggest that the increase in food prices during this period contributed
to tens of millions additional individuals falling below the poverty
line and into chronic hunger.17 The food price crisis of 2007-2008
thrust global food insecurity back into the spotlight and reignited the
focus on food prices and the factors that affect prices in the context
of combating global hunger. In its wake was a renewed effort by the
international community to revisit and reconsider what was needed to
address global hunger, leading to a number of new international
initiatives focusing on the causes of, and possible solutions to, high
and volatile food prices.
Perhaps the most expansive of these new initiatives was the
United Nations’ High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security
Crisis (HLTF). The HLTF was established in April of 2008 as a
means for bringing together the heads of various United Nations
agencies and other international entities—twenty-two in all—
addressing global hunger and related issues to develop a unified
response by the international community. Since its inception, the
HLTF has developed a Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA)
(and an updated CFA) that lays out both short-term and long-term
needs. The updated CFA identifies ten principles as key to achieving
sustainable food security: (1) a “twin-track” approach of addressing
both immediate needs and long-term resilience, (2) a comprehensive
approach, (3) a focus on smallholders, (4) an increased focus on the
resilience of household livelihoods, (5) increased and better
investments in food and nutrition security, (6) open and wellfunctioning markets and trade, (7) multi-stakeholder and multisectoral partnerships, (8) sustained political commitment and good
governance, (9) country-led strategies with regional support, and (10)

17

See Stewart & Manaker, supra note 3, at 590.
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accountability for results. 18 The HLTF also conducts countryspecific work through which it reviews the needs and current
activities of individual countries and identifies areas for better
coordination and additional action.19
A few months after the establishment of the HLTF, the FAO
held the High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The
Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy. During this
conference, the attendees—including officials from 181 countries and
the European Community—adopted a declaration “calling on the
international community to increase assistance for developing
countries, in particular the least developed countries and those most
negatively affected by high food prices.”20 The declaration reaffirmed
the parties’ commitment to addressing global hunger—including
achieving the MDGs—and identified short- and long-term measures
to be undertaken, such as increased humanitarian and emergency
food assistance, balance of payment support, increased funding for
investment in agricultural science and technology, and further
liberalization of agricultural trade.21
The HLTF and the FAO’s high-level conference were far
from the only steps taken to address food prices following the 2007-

High-Level Task Force on Global Food Security, Food and Nutrition
Security: Comprehensive Framework for Action, Summary of the Updated
Comprehensive
Framework
for
Action
(Aug.
2011),
http://unfoodsecurity.org/sites/default/files/OUTLINE_Summary%20UCFA_EN.pdf.
19 See Secretariat of the U.N. System High-Level Task Force for the
Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF), In-Country Work of the High-Level Task
Force on Food Security (HLTF): intentions, actions and expected results (June 18,
2009), http://un-foodsecurity.org/sites/default/files/country_informationnote.pdf
(last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
20 High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate
Change and Bioenergy, FAO (June 3-5, 2008), http://www.fao.org/foodclimate/hlchome/en/.
21 Declaration of the High-Level Conference on World Food Security:
The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy (June 5, 2008),
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/foodclimate/HLCdocs/declarationE.pdf.
18
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2008 crisis.22 The multitude of efforts pursued by the international
community reflect not only the continued priority placed on
addressing food security, but also the ever-present challenges that
must be overcome to eradicate global hunger.
In addition to the efforts of the international community,
national governments have taken extensive steps as well. As
explained by Jonathan Shrier, Acting Special Representative for
Global Food Security at the United States Department of State, the
United States is:
leading a global effort along with multi-lateral
organizations, partner countries, other donors, the
private sector, and civil society to increase support for
food and nutrition security in the global policy agenda
and to work with our partners to end extreme poverty
in the next two decades, a target President Obama
identified in his State of the Union address [in 2013].23
Following the G8 summit in 2009, the United States
developed the Feed the Future initiative, stemming from the
commitment to pledge an additional $3.5 billion over three years to
combat poverty and hunger.24 Through the Feed the Future
program, nineteen “focus” countries have been selected thus far—
based on the level of need, opportunity of partnership, potential for
agricultural growth, opportunity for regional synergy, and resource
22 Other actions adopted after the 2007-2008 food price crisis include the
Statement on Food Security issued at the G8 leader’s summit in July 2008, the
“L’Aquila” Joint Statement on Global Food Security adopted at the G8 meeting in
July 2009, the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security issued in
November 2009, the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development endorsed by the
G20 at its November 2010 summit, and the launching of the Agricultural Market
Information System as part of the G20 leader’s summit in November 2011.
23 Jonathan Shrier, Acting Special Representative for Global Food
Security, U.S. Department of State, Keynote Address at the 2014 Penn State
Journal of Law and International Affairs Symposium: The 9 Billion People
Question: The Challenge of Global Resource Scarcity (Feb. 7, 2014),
http://mediasite.dsl.psu.edu/Mediasite/Play/623941f54f854efaaa7bcd1a9805b0de
1d (starting at 02:06:50).
24 See Progress Report, supra note 5, at 5.
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availability—for which country-led plans have been established. 25
The country plans focus on inclusive agricultural sector growth,
gender integration, improved nutrition, private sector engagement,
research and capacity building, and climate smart development.26 In
2012, Feed the Future launched the New Alliance for Food Security
and Nutrition, which is a joint partnership program focused on
investment in African agriculture through commitments by the
target-countries’ national governments, private sector companies, and
other donor partners, with a goal of lifting fifty million people out of
poverty by 2022.27
Similarly, the European Union has also undertaken significant
efforts to address global hunger. EuropeAid is the European
Commission’s body responsible for designing and implementing the
European Union’s development policies and aid programs.28 Under
EuropeAid, between 2007 and 2013, the European Union financed
global food security projects through three types of instruments:
national and regional development funds, such as the European
Development Fund and the Development Co-operation Instrument;
the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP), which addresses the
structural causes of continental and regional food security issues; and
the €1 billion Food Facility, which provides rapid assistance to
countries that are most affected by the crisis. 29 While the
development funds and the FSTP focus on longer-term goals, the
Food Facility was developed in response to the food crisis in 20072008. 30 The European Union established this fund primarily to
See id. at 8.
Approach, FEED THE FUTURE,
http://feedthefuture.gov/approach/Inclusive%E2%80%94Agriculture%E2%80%
94Sector%E2%80%94Growth (last visited Aug. 30, 2014).
27 The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, FEED THE FUTURE (May
19, 2014), http://feedthefuture.gov/lp/new-alliance-food-security-and-nutrition.
28
About Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/about-development-andcooperation-europeaid_en (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
29 Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/food-and-agriculture/food-and-nutritionsecurity/funding_en (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
30 Id.
25
26
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address the time-period between emergency aid and medium-to-long
term assistance, with a focus on “encourag[ing] a positive supply
response from the agricultural sector in target countries and regions,
mitigat[ing] the negative effects of volatile food prices . . . and[]
strengthen[ing] the productive capacities and the governance of the
agricultural sector to enhance the sustainability of interventions.”31
By May 2010, all funds had been committed, with 232 projects
executed in forty-nine countries.32
The above-described actions taken by the United States and
European Union in the wake of the 2007-2008 food price crisis
represent only some of the many steps that have been taken by these
governments as well as governments of numerous other countries
around the world.

II. FOOD SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME
Since the establishment of the GATT and the development
of the modern international trade regime, agriculture has been part of
the system, but for many years was not subject to meaningful
disciplines or broad liberalization requirements. With the start of the
WTO in 1995, Members adopted the first agricultural goods
agreement to discipline trade-distorting policies and begin trade
liberalization through tariff reductions. Due in part to food security
concerns, the GATT and the WTO have always had special carveouts to permit countries to limit exports to deal with food shortages.
In addition, in the Uruguay Round Agreements, the Agreement on
Agriculture acknowledges the special needs of developing
countries—particularly LDCs and net-food importing developing

31 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Final
Report on the Implementation of the EU Food Facility, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 3 (Apr.
11, 2013),
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0194:FIN:EN:PDF.
32 Id. at 4, 10.
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countries (NFIDCs). 33 Resulting provisions have been aimed at
ensuring that trade rules would not inhibit countries’ ability to obtain
food security and helping developing countries obtain the full benefit
of liberalized trade rules. Still, as barriers to agriculture tend to be
high compared to industrial goods, and because the GATT/WTO
negotiating process encourages progressive liberalization over time,
the reduction in barriers to agriculture lags compared to what has
been achieved in non-agricultural goods.
A.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

When the GATT was first implemented in 1947, it
encompassed agricultural goods. In reality, however, numerous
exceptions meant that few disciplines were actually put in place on
trade in agriculture:
In some cases, the GATT adopted special rules
with respect to agriculture; in other cases, nations
gained special treatment by explicit waivers,
reservations in accession agreements, or informal
‘grandfather’ agreements. Still other policies
[were] nominally addressed by the GATT, but in
practice the provisions [had] little or no effect.34
Differing treatment for agricultural goods with respect to
export subsidies and import restrictions, as well as limited disciplines
on state-trading enterprises and measures, such as voluntary export
restraints and variable import levies, allowed governments to
Net-food importing countries are least-developed countries as
identified by the U.N., plus additional countries designated as such by the WTO.
See Committee on Agriculture, WTO List of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries for
the Purpose of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries (“The Decision”), G/AG/5/Rev.10 (Mar. 23, 2012),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=106907&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&Fu
llTextSearch=.
34 John M. Breen, Agriculture, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 125, 134 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
33
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continue to provide protection to their domestic agriculture sectors.
For example, the general prohibition on export subsidies (effective
January 1, 1958) excluded “primary products,” which included “any
product of farm, forest or fishery.”35 Most countries employed a
number of policies aimed at assisting their domestic agriculture
sectors, taking different approaches depending on the circumstances
of the particular nation.
While many developed countries
implemented border measures to increase domestic prices and used
export subsidies when domestic supply exceeded demand, developing
countries tended to utilize policies that would lower prices for
consumers coupled with subsidies for agricultural inputs. 36 The
“GATT rules pertaining to agriculture were originally drafted to be
consistent with the agricultural policies of the major signatories,
rather than vice versa.”37
The differing treatment afforded to agriculture is unsurprising
given the role of agriculture not only in the economy, but also in
people’s everyday lives. “The general consensus of opinion was that
agriculture was a unique sector of the economy, that, for reasons of
national food security, could not be treated like other sectors.” 38
Indeed, since its initiation, the global trade regime has recognized the
importance of promoting nations’ ability to protect their food
sources and sought to develop rules that work with food security
goals. In addition to the flexibility of the GATT rules when it came
to agriculture, the agreement also included a provision explicitly
recognizing countries’ ability to take steps to protect their
populations from food shortages. GATT Article XI, which generally

35 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194,
art.
XVI(A)(4),
Annex
I,
art.
XVI(B)(2),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm
[hereinafter
GATT].
36 Dale E. Hathaway & Merlinda D. Ingco, Agricultural Liberalization and
the Uruguay Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
30, 30-31 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
37 Breen, supra note 34, at 134 (footnote omitted).
38 Stephen Healy et al., The Implications of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture for Developing Countries – A Training Manual
(Training Materials for Agricultural Planning – 41), at §1.1.3 (FAO 1998),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/w7814e/w7814e00.htm#Contents.
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prohibits quantitative restrictions, does not extend to “[e]xport
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve
critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the
exporting contracting party.”39 The result of the GATT’s limited
effect on agricultural trade, however, was that trade in agriculture
remained heavily affected by trade-distorting policies used around the
globe.
B.

Uruguay Round Agreements and the Agreement on
Agriculture

The limited disciplines placed on agriculture under the GATT
created problems within the international trade regime, and there was
recognition among the parties to the GATT that the system did not
adequately address agricultural trade. Agriculture was the focus of a
number of trade disputes, and increased subsidization by developed
nations negatively affected developing country agricultural exporters
that could not compete with heavily subsidized products. 40 The
declaration adopted at the 1982 Ministerial identified a number of
problems with the trade regime, including “widespread dissatisfaction
with the application of GATT rules and the degree of liberalization in
relation to agricultural trade, even though such trade ha[d] continued
to expand.”41 Having recognized the need for further liberalization,
adjustments, and/or reforms in many areas, the parties to the GATT
launched the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986. Among other
areas, these negotiations placed agriculture squarely on the agenda.
The special needs of developing countries, and the need to
grant these countries preferential and differential treatment, were
GATT, supra note 35, art. XI(2)(a).
See Terence P. Stewart, Introduction and Overview, in THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1, 7 (Terence P. Stewart
ed., 1993) [hereinafter Introduction and Overview]; Healy, supra note 38, §1.1.3 (noting
that sixty percent of all trade disputes under the GATT between 1980 and 1990
were related to agriculture).
41 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration of 29
November
1982,
L/5424,
1-2
(1982),
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91000208.pdf.
39

40
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acknowledged from the outset of the Uruguay Round negotiations,42
including in the negotiations on agriculture. 43 In addition, in the
course of the negotiations, net-food importing countries—both
developed (such as Japan) and developing (such as Egypt)—as well as
other developing nations made clear the importance of food security
concerns in the context of the agriculture negotiations. 44 These
concerns related to the ability to protect domestic production of
basic foodstuffs (and domestic farmers), as well as access to and the
cost of food imports. 45 The ultimate agreement reached at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations establishing the WTO
included the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which started the
process of liberalizing trade in agriculture and also aimed to help
promote food security concerns.46
1. The Agreement on Agriculture: The Basics. – The AoA is based
on three pillars—market access, domestic support, and export
subsidies—through which greater liberalization is pursued. The
differential treatment provided to developing countries, and to LDCs
in particular, is present in each of these aspects of the agreement.
With respect to market access, the AoA establishes a system where
import barriers, such as quantitative import restrictions, are
converted to tariffs (known as “tariffication”) and then reduced.
Specific targets were identified for both the average cut in tariffs on
agricultural goods as well as a minimum cut per product. Developing
countries were committed to making smaller reductions and were
provided with more time than developed countries (ten years versus
six years); LDCs did not have to make a commitment to reduce
tariffs, although they did have to establish tariff bindings for
agricultural goods. In addition, where imports constitute less than
Id. at 2, 5.
See Introduction and Overview, supra note 40, at 11-13.
44 See Breen, supra note 34, at 186-91; see General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Negotiating Group on Agriculture: Statement Made by the Delegation of Egypt on
Behalf of a Number of Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/101
(July
31,
1989),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92080019.pdf.
45 See Breen, supra note 34, at 186-93.
46 See In a Nutshell: How to Follow Current Issues in Agriculture, WTO (Dec. 2,
2011), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_issues_e.htm.
42
43
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five percent of domestic production for a particular product,
Members were committed to allowing a minimum amount of imports
of that product under low or minimal tariffs, implemented through
tariff-rate quotas.47
The AoA also includes a safeguard provision under Article 5.
Pursuant to this provision, a Member may impose an additional tariff
on products in response to an import surge or a decrease in import
prices if certain triggering criteria are met.48 This safeguard, however,
is somewhat limited. The safeguard may only be used for products
that a country has designated as subject to the safeguard in its tariff
schedule. The safeguard is also limited to products that have been
tariffed. Many developing Members chose to impose ceiling bindings
(i.e., bindings on previously unbound products) and were not
required to reduce the base rate for these products; 49 thus, these
countries effectively opted out of the right to utilize the safeguard.50
With respect to domestic support, the AoA distinguishes
between programs that directly relate to production and those that do
not, permitting the latter and limiting the former. Members agreed to
reduce domestic support policies that directly affect production and
trade, known as “amber box” programs, based on a calculation
known as the “aggregate measurement of support” (AMS). As with
the market access provisions, developing countries committed to
make smaller reductions and were granted a longer implementation
period than developed countries, and LDCs were not required to
make any cuts. In addition, Members are permitted to maintain de
minimis levels of subsidies—five percent of the value of agricultural
Under a tariff-rate quota system, a certain quantity of a good is subject
to a low tariff; once the threshold quantity has been imported, additional imports
of that good face a higher tariff rate.
48 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr.
15,
1994,
Annex
1A,
1867
U.N.T.S.
410,
art.
5,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm
[hereinafter
Agreement on Agriculture].
49 Healy, supra note 38, § 3.2.1.
50 See Agriculture: Negotiations, An Unofficial Guide to Agriculture Safeguards,
WTO
(Aug.
5,
2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/guide_agric_safeg_e.htm.
47
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production for developed countries and ten percent for developing
countries. Programs with little or no impact on trade, known as
“green box” programs, are not limited under the AoA. Similarly,
“blue box” programs, which are programs that would be considered
as “amber box” but have conditions to reduce distortion and limit
production, are not limited.51
Finally, with respect to export subsidies, the AoA capped
existing programs and committed Members to reducing the amount
spent on, and the products covered by, such programs. The
provision encompasses direct subsidies based on export
performance, the export sale of non-commercial stocks of
agricultural products for less than the price charged in the domestic
market, payment on the export of agricultural products, programs
reducing the cost of producing goods for export, the preferential
internal transportation and freight charges for exported goods, and
subsidies on products incorporated into exported goods.52 As with
the other areas, developing countries committed to smaller
reductions over a longer period of time as compared to developed
countries, and LDCs are not obligated to make any cuts. A summary
of the trade liberalization commitments made under the AoA is
below.

51
See Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2014).
52 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 48, art. 9.
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Developed
Developing
Countries
Least-Developed
Countries
6 years: 1995Countries
10 years: 1995-2004
2000
Tariffs
Average Cut For All
-36%
Agricultural Products

-24%

Minimum
Product

-10%

Cut

Per

-15%

Tariff levels must
be bound, but no
reductions required

Tariff Quotas
Minimum
Access
Opportunity As % of
Domestic Consumption 5%
(Base Period: 19861990)

5%

5%

-13%

No cuts required

Domestic Support
Total AMS Cuts For
Sector
-20%
(Base Period: 19861988)
Export Subsidies
Value Of Subsidies

-36%

Subsidized Quantities
(Base Period: 1986- -21%
1990)

-24%
No cuts required
-14%

Source: Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.ht
m.
2. Food Security and the Agreement on Agriculture. – In addition to
the basic pillars of the agreement, the AoA also addressed a variety of
other issues as well as food security concerns, particularly within
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LDCs and NFIDCs, as was reflected in various aspects of the AoA.
Indeed, the preamble to the AoA notes that:
[C]ommitments under the reform programme
should be made in an equitable way among all
Members, having regard to non-trade concerns,
including food security[,] . . . [and] that special and
differential treatment for developing countries is
an integral element of the negotiations, and taking
into account the possible negative effects of the
implementation of the reform programme on
least-developed
and
net
food-importing
developing countries[.]53
Thus, the AoA sought to develop rules and commitments
that would help protect countries’ abilities to address food security
concerns.
For example, Annex 2 to the AoA provides that public
stockholding for food security purposes54 and domestic food aid may
be treated as “green box” programs if they meet the general
requirements—i.e., are provided through a publically-funded
government program and do not provide price support to
producers—as well as other program specific criteria. Likewise,
Article 6 recognizes that, because
encourag[ing] agriculture and rural development are
an integral part of the development programmes of
developing countries, investment subsidies which are
generally available to agriculture in developing
country Members and agricultural input subsidies
generally available to low-income or resource-poor
producers in developing country Members shall be
exempt from domestic support reduction

Id. at pmbl.
If stocks are acquired and released at administered prices, the
difference between the acquisition price and a set external price would be included
in that country’s total AMS.
53

54
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commitments that would otherwise be applicable to
such measures . . . .55
In addition, while export restrictions or prohibitions are still
permitted under certain circumstances by GATT Article XI, AoA
Article 12 requires that any Member imposing a restriction or
prohibition on exports of foodstuff “give due consideration to the
effects” of such a measure on importing Members’ food security.
Additionally, prior to implementing such a measure, a Member
should provide written notice to the Committee on Agriculture with
information on specifics of the measure and, upon request, consult
with other Members that have interests as importers.56
Moreover, AoA Article 16 requires that developed country
Members follow the framework established in the Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on LeastDeveloped and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC Decision).
The NFIDC Decision, which was adopted as part of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, was based on the recognition that
while the progressive implementation of the results of
the Uruguay Round as a whole will generate
increasing opportunities for trade expansion and
economic growth to the benefit of all Members,
during the reform programme least-developed and
net-food importing developing countries may
experience negative effects in terms of the availability
of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external
sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including
short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of
commercial imports of basic foodstuffs.57

Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 48, art. 6.
Id. at art. 12(1); but see art. 12(2) (stating that the provisions do not
apply to developing countries, except when the developing country is a net-food
exporter of the product at issue).
57 WTO Secretariat, The WTO Agreements Series: Agriculture, at 22 (2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries3_ag_2008_e.pdf.
55
56
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Thus, the NFIDC Decision established a number of
mechanisms to help ensure countries would have adequate access to
food, including periodic reviews of the sufficiency of the levels of
food aid provided to developing countries, the adoption of guidelines
to ensure the provision of basic foodstuffs to LDCs and NFIDCs is
“in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms,” the
consideration of requests by LDCs and NFIDCs for technical and
financial assistance related to agricultural productivity and
infrastructure, the provision of preferential treatment for LDCs and
NFIDCs regarding rules on agricultural export credits, and
recognition that developing countries may need to rely on
international financial institutions for short-term financing of
imports.58 In short, in negotiating the AoA, Members aimed to take
account of the effect of agricultural trade and trade rules on food
security.59
C.

Doha Development Agenda

While substantial progress was made with the Uruguay
Round negotiations in terms of agricultural liberalization and
addressing food security issues, the AoA represents the first real
attempt at tackling these issues within the international trade regime.
As noted above, the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT, have
developed through periodic negotiations that have achieved
progressive liberalization. The Uruguay Round negotiations were not
intended to, nor would they have been likely to, resolve all issues
concerning trade in agriculture. Instead, the negotiations recognized
the need for progressive reforms in agricultural trade. In fact, Article
20 of the AoA included an agreement among Members that
agriculture negotiations would begin one year prior to the end of the

58 Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform
Programme on Least-Developed and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries, LT/UR/D1/2, 15 April 1994.
59 WTO Secretariat, supra note 57, at 22-23.
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AoA’s implementation period. 60 Thus, in 2000, Members again
turned to negotiations to further liberalize agricultural trade.61
Soon after, during the November 2001 Ministerial
Conference in Doha, agriculture became part of the single
undertaking known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA),
which encompassed negotiations on a wide variety of areas and put
the “needs and interests” of developing countries “at the heart” of
the negotiations.62 With respect to agriculture, the Doha Ministerial
Declaration espoused the commitment of the Members to undertake
“comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in
market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of
export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support.”63 The declaration also recognized that special and
differential treatment was appropriate for developing countries and
that the rules and disciplines to be negotiated should “enable
developing countries to effectively take account of their development
needs, including food security and rural development.”64
Although the DDA negotiations collapsed in 2008, due in
part to an inability to agree on agriculture issues, the multiple rounds
of negotiations have resulted in discussions on a variety of agriculture
and food security related issues. In addition to achieving further
liberalization in the three pillars of the AoA, Members are also
seeking to address various other issues related to agriculture, many of
60 See Breen, supra note 34, at 166-67 (noting that the problems
surrounding agricultural trade “are substantial and wide-ranging” and suggesting
that “[c]omprehensive agricultural reform on a global scale” was not likely in the
short term); Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 45, at art. 20 (“Recognizing that
the long-term objective of substantial progressive reduction in support and
protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree
that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one year before the
end of the implementation period . . . .”).
61 See Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, supra note 51.
62
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
¶
2
(Nov.
14,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
63 Id. at ¶14.
64 Id.
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which aim to address concerns of developing countries, LDCs, and
NFIDCs. Provided below is a review of the main areas of the
agriculture negotiations under the DDA. As Members have not been
able to come to an agreement, and as many of these topics remain
highly contentious, this represents some of the issues and potential
provisions that had been discussed as of December 2008.65 At the
Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013, the Members agreed
to develop a work program in 2014 to move the DDA to completion.
Whether that effort will succeed and under what time period are, of
course, unknown at present.
1. Market Access. – With respect to market access, Members
have discussed further reductions to bound tariff rates for both
developed and developing counties, with developing countries
committed to smaller reductions (with even smaller reductions for
certain small and vulnerable economies) and LDCs, as well as certain
other new Members, not committed to reductions. The amount of
the reduction would be tied to the current bound tariff level, with
larger reductions required for goods with higher tariffs. Tariff
reductions would also be applied to in-quota tariff rates. The
discussed provisions contain flexibilities in terms of reduced
commitments for politically sensitive products (available to all
Members) and special products (for developing country Members),
i.e., products related to food security and rural development. The
table below provides a summary of the general tariff reduction
commitments discussed.

See generally Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008) (hereinafter
Revised
Draft
Modalities
for
Agriculture),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_dec08_a_e.pdf;
Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat, Unofficial Guide
to the 6 December 2008 ‘Revised Draft Modalities’ (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.htm
[hereinafter Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities].
65
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Developed Countries
Developing Countries*
5 Years
10 years
Tariffs above 75% cut by 70% Tariffs above 130% cut by 46.7%
Tariffs between 75% and 50% Tariffs between 130% and 80% cut
cut by 64%
by 42.7%
Tariffs between 50% and 20% Tariffs between 80% and 30% cut
cut by 57%
by 38%
Tariffs below 20% cut by 50% Tariffs below 30% cut by 33.3%
Minimum average cut of 54%
Maximum average cut of 36%
* LDCs and certain recent new Members would be exempt from
tariff reduction commitments; small and vulnerable economies would
be obligated to further-reduced commitments.
Source: Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities, supra note 65.
2. Domestic Support. – In terms of domestic support, Members
have discussed further reductions to trade-distorting programs,
including amber box, blue box, and de minimis level programs; there
have also been discussions to limit product-specific support for both
amber and blue box programs. Larger reductions would be required
for countries with larger amounts of support. Developing countries
would be subject to smaller reductions, and LDCs and NFIDCs
would be exempt from reduction commitments.66 Revisions to the
treatment of programs as green box programs have also been
discussed, with the objective of allowing more development-related
programs to be characterized as green box and ensuring that green
box programs actually are separated from production levels. For
example, included among programs that could be considered green
box government service programs would be, inter alia, programs
related to nutritional food security. In addition, there have been
proposals to exempt public stockholding and domestic food aid to
support low-income or resource-poor farmers for hunger and
poverty reduction purposes from developing countries’ AMS

Recent new Members would be subject to smaller cuts or exempt from
reduction commitments.
66

139

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

calculations.67 The table below provides a summary of the general
domestic support reduction commitments discussed.68

Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65, at Annex B.
As this table is intended to reflect only the general commitments, it
does not include certain country-specific commitments (such as for recent new
Members) nor does it include per-product limits.
67
68
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Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support (Amber Box + Blue Box + De
Minimis)
Developing
Developing
Countries
Countries
LDCs
Developed
(if support is (if support is
and
Countries
above de
below de
NFIDCs
minimis)
minimis)
Timeframe
5 years
8 years
N/A
N/A
Highest Tier
(support
above -80%
-53.3%
$60 billion)
Middle Tier
(support of $10
No
cuts
-70%
-46.7%
billion
$60
required,
but
No cuts
billion)
must stay within
required
base amount of
Lower Tier
support
(support
below -55%
-36.7%
$10 billion)
-33% for highest &
Immediate Cuts middle tier;
-20%
-25% for lower tier
Amber Box Support
Developing
Developing
Countries (if
LDCs
Developed
Countries
(if
support
is
and
Countries
support is below
above
$100
NFIDCs
$100 million)
million)
Timeframe
5 years
8 years
N/A
N/A
Highest Tier
(support
above -70%
-46.7%
$40 billion)
Middle Tier
(support of $15
-60%
-40%
billion
$40
No
cuts No cuts
billion)
required
required
Lower Tier
(support
below -45%
-30%
$15 billion)
-25% (for highest &
Immediate Cuts middle tier only)
N/A
De Minimis Support
Developed Developing

Developing
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Countries Countries (if support Countries (if support is and
is above de minimis)
below de minimis)
NFIDCs
Timeframe Immediate 3 years
N/A
N/A
6.7% (exempt from
cuts if almost all
De Minimis
support
is
for
No cuts
2.5%
No cuts required
level
subsistence
and
required
resource-poor
producers)
Blue Box Support
Developed
LDCs
and
Developing Countries
Countries
NFIDCs
Timeframe Immediate
N/A
N/A
Maximum 2.5% of average total 5% of average total
Value
of value
of
agricultural value of agricultural No cuts required
Support
production
production

Source: Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65; Unofficial
Guide to Revised Draft Modalities, supra note 65.
3. Export Subsidies and Other Export-Related Measures. –
Members have discussed eliminating all export subsidies over a set
period of time, with more time granted for developing countries than
for developed countries. With respect to export credits, export credit
guarantees, and insurance programs, these measures would be
disciplined to ensure that they do not act as hidden subsidies.
Disciplines imposed would be more lenient for developing countries,
LDCs, and NFIDCs. In addition, disciplines would be imposed on
the activities of state-trading enterprises that engage in agricultural
exports, which would require Members to eliminate or reduce export
subsidies and the use of monopoly powers for such enterprises.69 In
certain developing countries, LDCs, and small, vulnerable
economies,70 however, agricultural exporting state-trading enterprises
that preserve domestic prices for consumers and ensure food security

Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65, at Annex K.
Small, vulnerable economies are WTO Members that are especially
vulnerable to economic uncertainties and environmental shocks, determined by
their share of world trade. See Briefing note: Small, Vulnerable Economies, WORLD
TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/brief_svc_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2014).
69
70
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could maintain and use monopoly powers. 71 Finally, tighter
disciplines would be imposed for countries implementing an export
prohibition or restriction under GATT Article XI(2)(a), and increased
transparency regarding and monitoring of such measures would be
required. The need for additional disciplines on the use of export
restrictions or prohibitions was highlighted during the food price
crises of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011, during which a number of
countries imposed such measures with only a few apparently
providing notification to the WTO. A report on the trade measures
of the G20 countries indicates that, between October 2008 and May
2012, fourteen of these twenty countries (all of which are WTO
Members) imposed quantitative restrictions on agricultural exports;72
other reports indicate that during the 2007-2008 food price crisis
alone, around forty countries put food export restrictions or
prohibitions in place.73 In comparison, from January 1995 to early
2013, only eight Members notified the WTO of quantitative
restrictions on agricultural exports.74
4. Safeguards. – With respect to the safeguard provision
currently in the AoA, Members have discussed reducing the products
subject to the provision and implementing a phase-out date. There
has also been a proposal for a new special safeguard mechanism
(SSM) that would allow developing countries to temporarily increase
tariffs to protect domestic producers facing import surges and price
drops. While there is agreement that a SSM should exist, there has
not been agreement on exactly what can trigger usage of the
safeguard, the tariff increase that can be imposed, and how long the
Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65, at Annex K.
Committee on Agriculture, Transparency Opportunities – Export
Restrictions, ¶ 1.2, G/AG/W/113 (Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Transparency
Opportunities].
73 See Stewart & Manaker, supra note 3, at 602-03 (reviewing export
restrictions and prohibitions put in place during the 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 food
price crises); see also Terence P. Stewart, The Food Crisis: A Survey of Sources and
Proposal
for
Preventing
a
Global
Catastrophe,
9-10
(2008),
http://www.ttalk.biz/pdfs/Food_Crisis_Pamphlet_from_Stewart_and_Stewart_Ju
ne_2008.pdf (reviewing actions taken and implications of imposing export
restraints and prohibitions during the 2007-2008 crisis).
74 Transparency Opportunities, supra note 72, at ¶ 1.2.
71

72
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increase should be applied. In particular, there has been contention
as to whether a SSM would allow developing countries to impose
tariffs above the bound rates agreed upon during the Uruguay Round
(or during accession for those Members that joined post-Uruguay).75
5. Food Aid. – With respect to international food aid, aid
would be treated differently depending on whether or not it was
provided in response to an emergency. Emergency food aid—based
on whether an applicable international organization has declared an
emergency—would be treated as being in a “safe box” so as not to
impede the provision of such aid. Non-emergency food aid would be
disciplined in a manner to prevent it from displacing commercial
trade in the recipient country. Specifically, the Members discussed
requiring that food aid be needs-driven, in grant form, not tied to
commercial exports of agriculture, not linked to the donor’s
development objectives, and not re-exported (except in limited
situations).76 Members would also be committed to not providing inkind food aid that could adversely affect production in the recipient
country and would be encouraged to source food aid from within or
nearby the recipient country.
6. Monitoring and Transparency. – In addition to the specific
requirements, most areas of negotiation have also discussed the need
for increased transparency in terms of the steps Members take under
the various provisions, as well as mechanisms for monitoring the
progress and activities under these provisions. Such provisions are
aimed at ensuring that Members keep each other informed of
measures related to agricultural trade and the AoA obligations.
Notification requirements would concern Members utilizing quotas,
safeguards, domestic support measures and export subsidies,
providing export financing or international food aid, or maintaining
agricultural exporting state trading enterprises. 77 Developing
countries would also be provided with advice and assistance in

75 See An Unofficial Guide to Agriculture Safeguards, WORLD TRADE ORG. 1
(Aug. 5, 2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ssm_explained_4aug08_e.pdf.
76 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65, at Annex L.
77 Id. at Annex M.
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pursuit of meeting their notification obligations.78 In addition, the
Committee on Agriculture, as well as other working bodies, would be
tasked with “provid[ing] an effective forum for Members to monitor
compliance with commitments and disciplines under the [AoA] and
[undertaking] surveillance of progress towards the long-term
objective of establishing a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system.”79 This would include reviewing the implementation
of commitments and obligations regarding, inter alia, the NFIDC
Decision, special and differential treatment provisions related to
development concerns, and notifications of food aid and export
prohibitions.80
7. Trade Facilitation. – Issues relating to trade facilitation are
present in GATT Articles V, VIII, and X, which concern the free
transit of goods, the imposition of fees and other requirements
relating to imports and exports, and the publication and
administration of measures relating to areas such as classification,
valuation, and import and export requirements. These provisions,
however, do not have specific frameworks for certain areas, such as
customs procedures or transparency requirements.81 The potential to
enhance provisions on trade facilitation was raised during the first
WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. During this
ministerial, the Members agreed to have the Council for Trade in
Goods “undertake exploratory and analytical work . . . on the
simplification of trade procedures in order to assess the scope for
WTO rules” and to give “careful attention . . . to minimizing the
burdens on delegations, especially those with more limited
resources.”82 The Ministerial Declaration adopted during the Doha
Ministerial also identified trade facilitation as an area in which
Id.
Id.
80 Id.
81 Briefing Note: Trade Facilitation – Cutting “Red Tape” at the Border, WORLD
TRADE ORG.,
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_tradfa_e.htm
(last
updated Feb. 12, 2014).
82 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December
1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, ¶¶ 21-22 (1996).
78
79
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negotiations should take place, “[r]ecognizing the case for further
expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including
goods in transit, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and
capacity building in this area.”83 Following years of exploratory work,
negotiations on trade facilitation were finally launched in July 2004.84
The negotiations on trade facilitation aimed to address issues
relating to the expeditious movement, release, and clearance of
goods; enhanced technical assistance and capacity building; and
effective cooperation between customs and other authorities.85 In
addition to acknowledging the need for special and differential
treatment regarding the commitments undertaken by developing
countries and LDCs, the negotiations also “recognized that the
provision of technical assistance and support for capacity building is
vital for developing and least-developed countries to enable them to
fully participate in and benefit from the negotiations” and sought to
require that developed Members ensure that sufficient support and
assistance would be provided to developing countries and LDCs
during negotiations.86 As discussed below, an agreement on trade
facilitation was adopted as part of the “mini-package” agreed upon
during the 2013 Bali Ministerial.
D.

Aid for Trade Program

During the 2005 Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, the
WTO launched the Aid for Trade program. The program was
developed based on the understanding that developing countries, and
LDCs in particular, needed to grow their trade capacity and
infrastructure to fully benefit from liberalized trade. The focus of the
Aid for Trade program is to help the existing development assistance

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶ 27 (2001).
84
See Trade Facilitation: Background, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_intro_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2014).
85 Decision Adopted by the General Council, Doha Work Programme,
WT/L/579 Annex D (Aug. 2, 2004).
86 Id.
83
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mechanisms work together and more effectively and to ensure that
development agencies understand the trade needs of those receiving
assistance.87 Four areas have been specifically identified as needing
aid: (1) trade policy and regulation, (2) economic infrastructure, (3)
productive capacity building, and (4) adjustment assistance. The
program is used to identify needs within recipient countries; act as a
bridge between donors and developing countries; and monitor aid
flows, commitments, and needs.88
The Aid for Trade program was not the first recognition by
the international community of the importance of trade assistance,
and aid for trade-related assistance has been provided for many years.
During the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, trade-related assistance was mainly
aimed at technical support to help developing
countries negotiate and implement trade
agreements. Subsequently, the scope expanded to
include building supply-side capacities . . . . Now,
the agenda also includes trade-related structural
adjustment programmes and other trade-related
needs.89
However, the adoption of this program highlights the WTO’s
understanding that the global trade regime “has a clear role and
responsibility for ensuring that countries can effectively participate
in—and benefit from—world trade.”90 Since the program moved
into its first stage of implementation in 2007, the Aid for Trade
program has seen positive, wide-reaching results. In the course of

See Aid for Trade Fact Sheet, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/a4t_factsheet_e.htm
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2014).
88
See
Aid
for
Trade,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2014).
89 Aid for Trade: Is it Working?, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., 1 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aft/45581702.pdf.
90 Aid for Trade Fact Sheet, supra note 87.
87
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conducting its third annual review in 2010, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WTO
jointly sent out a request for “case stories” relating to the Aid for
Trade program; 269 case stories were submitted by countries,
bilateral and multilateral donors, regional economic communities, and
other entities.91 These case studies related to projects covering the
development of public sector human capacities, improved policies,
hard infrastructure (e.g., roads, ports), soft infrastructure (e.g.,
regulatory frameworks), industry-specific policies, and support for
the private sector.92 Moreover, of the 269 case stories, thirty-three
were submitted by LDCs and 123 concerned activities undertaken in
LDCs, indicating that LDCs have been significant participants in the
Aid for Trade program as was intended.93
E.

Bali Package

Following the collapse of the DDA negotiations in 2008,
Members called for a change to the approach of the negotiations
during the 2011 Ministerial Conference in an effort to get
negotiations back on track.94 The Members decided to focus on a
“mini-package” of issues for which it was believed that agreement
would be more likely. The mini-package encompassed a variety of
issues that were already part of the DDA, including trade facilitation,
agriculture, cotton, development, and LDC-related issues. Despite
eleventh hour negotiations and some indications that an agreement
would not be reached, the Bali Ministerial Conference concluded on
December 7, 2013 with a package of adopted decisions.

Liliana Foletti, Aid for Trade in Action, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.
20 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/aidfortrade/Aid%20for%20Trade%20in%20Action.pdf.
92 Id. at 22.
93 Id. at 23.
94 See Briefing Note: Agriculture Negotiations – The Bid to ‘Harvest’ Some ‘Low
Hanging
Fruit’,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
(Nov.
22,
2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_agneg_e.htm
[hereinafter Agriculture Negotiations].
91
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Among the adopted decisions were a number of provisions
relating to agriculture, developing countries, and food security. First,
Members recognized the continuing need among developing
countries and LDCs for trade-related assistance and reaffirmed their
commitment to Aid for Trade.95 Second, Members agreed to expand
the list of government programs that could be treated as green box
programs to include programs related to land reform and rural
livelihood security for the purpose of promoting development and
alleviating poverty. 96 Third, there was an interim agreement that
Members would refrain from challenging a developing country
Member that exceeded its domestic support limits because of public
stockholding for food security purposes; this provision is only
intended to remain in place until a permanent solution is agreed
upon.97 Fourth, Members adopted additional disciplines regarding
the administration and monitoring of tariff-rate quotas, which aim to
address situations where quotas are persistently under-filled and to
ensure that the quotas do not serve as an additional barrier to trade.98
Fifth, Members reaffirmed their commitment to eliminate export
subsidies. 99 Sixth, Members adopted an agreement on trade
facilitation that requires Members to undertake a number of
95 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/34 (2013).
96 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/37 (2013).
97 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/38. To rely on this provision, the developing country
Member’s program must meet the criteria established in Annex 2 of the AoA and
the Member must provide notice of, and additional information on, such a measure
to the Committee on Agriculture. Id.
98 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/39; see Agriculture Negotiations, supra note 94.
99 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/40 (2013). Preferential country-of-origin rules for LDC
products, preferential trade in services provisions for LDCs, and additional
monitoring of the special and differential treatment provided to developing
countries and LDCs were also agreed upon. World Trade Organization, Bali
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/DEC
(2013),
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm#agricultur
e.
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commitments to ease the movement of goods, including areas such
as enhancing the provision of information on export, import, and
transit requirements; further disciplining the imposition of fees and
other charges; ensuring interested parties’ participation in developing
new measures and their ability to challenge customs determinations;
and improved cooperation between customs agencies.100 The trade
facilitation agreement also recognizes that developing countries and
LDCs should be provided with assistance and support for capacity
building and states that LDCs will be required to undertake
commitments only “to the extent consistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and
institutional capabilities.” 101 Finally, the Members encouraged
developed country Members to allow duty-free and quota-free access
for at least ninety-seven percent of products originating from LDCs
and encouraged developing country Members to provide duty-free
and quota-free access to products originating from LDCs to the
extent possible.102
Despite its ultimate success, the Bali Ministerial faced some
significant hurdles and required around the clock negotiations to
come to a conclusion. One highly contentious area that almost led to
a failure at Bali was the treatment of public stockholding for food
security purposes. Under the AoA, public stockholdings that are
developed through government purchases at supported prices are
treated as amber box programs and are thus limited.103 In November
2012, the G33 Group (a group of forty-six developing countries)
proposed an amendment to exempt from limitation government
stockholdings and purchases from low-income or resource-poor
farmers at supported prices.104 There were concerns, however, that a

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/36.
101
Id. at sec. II, ¶ 1.3.
102
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December
2013, WT/MIN(13)/44.
103 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 48, at Annex 2; see Agriculture
Negotiations, supra note 94.
104 See Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, supra note 65, at Annex B;
Agriculture Negotiations, supra note 94.
100
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lack of discipline on public stockholdings developed by purchases at
supported prices could result in excess stock being unloaded on the
international market at low prices, depressing global prices and
negatively affecting other countries.
The concern over public stockholding was exemplified by
India’s 2013 Food Security Bill. Faced with hundreds of millions of
undernourished people and political pressure via an upcoming
election, the Indian government passed a bill aiming to combat the
country’s widespread hunger. Part of this bill provided for the
government purchase of cereals, with a target purchase quantity of
sixty-two million tons, which is equal to about twenty percent of
India’s cereal production in 2012. 105 The substantial quantity of
cereal that could be purchased under this program raises the
possibility that large amounts of unused stockpiles could be dumped
on the international market, negatively impacting other Members,
including other developing countries.106 Indeed, since the completion
of the Bali Ministerial, Canada and the United States have raised
questions concerning India’s exportation of surplus wheat stocks at
prices lower than the selling prices of other wheat-producing
countries.107

See Megha Bahree, How Bad, Really, Is India’s New Food Security Bill,
FORBES, Sept. 2, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghabahree/2013/09/02/how-bad-really-isindias-new-food-security-bill/.
106
David Blandford, Professor of Agriculture & Environmental
Economics, Penn State University, Remarks at the Penn State Journal of Law and
International Affairs Symposium: The 9 Billion People Question: The Challenge of
Global
Resource
Scarcity
(Feb.
7,
2014),
http://mediasite.dsl.psu.edu/Mediasite/Play/623941f54f854efaaa7bcd1a9805b0de
1d (starting at 03:35:39) (noting that when excess stockpiles are dumped on the
international market, developing countries can be harmed).
107 Committee on Agriculture, Points Raised by Members Under the Review
Process, G/AG/W/116, at 8 (Jan. 17, 2014); Amiti Sen, India Refutes US, Canada
Allegations of Subsidised Wheat Exports, HINDU BUS. LINE, Feb. 10, 2014,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-refutes-us-canadaallegations-of-subsidised-wheat-exports/article5674465.ece.
105
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Nonetheless, while some food security-related measures have
proven to be highly contentious, these disagreements do not stem
from any belief that nations should not be able to protect their
populations from food shortages and provide food to those in need.
Instead, disagreement reflects concerns that countries can address the
needs of their populations in other WTO-consistent ways and thus
prevent adding distortions to the trading system.
F.

Next Steps

While there is hope that the completion of the mini-package
at Bali will reinvigorate negotiations at the WTO, the Members still
face a long road to completing the rest of the DDA, with agricultural
issues providing no shortage of difficulties. At the same time, the
WTO (and the global community as a whole) has had to balance the
conflicting needs that often arise in the pursuit of trade liberalization,
protection from food shortages, and access to food for vulnerable
regions. For example, during a year where there is a food shortage
due to weather, Country A may impose an export restriction to
protect its domestic supply and ensure access to food for its
population; this action, however, may mean that Country B is unable
to procure a sufficient supply of food for its population. Both
nations are aiming to make sure their populations have enough food.
Should the trade rules allow Country A to protect its supply, creating
problems for Country B? Or should Country A be prohibited from
taking such actions so that Country B may get access to food, but at
the expense of Country A’s population? There is, of course, no easy
answer. Instead, rules should aim to balance various needs and
ensure that, where one action may create a shortcoming, other acts
can fill the void. Many of the areas that are part of the DDA seek to
pursue such an agenda by addressing further trade liberalization and
additional reduction in the presence of trade-distorting subsidies, as
well as issues directly related to food security and non-trade issues
aimed at helping developing countries in their development goals.
The importance of completing the DDA negotiations, and of
continuing to address food security in the context of trade rules, is
demonstrated by the types of measures the DDA seeks to address.
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As explained by Professor David Blandford, measures that would be
affected by the DDA negotiations are those that have “the biggest
economic drawbacks” and “ultimately are self-defeating in terms of
improving the competitive position of domestic agriculture.”108 This
is also highlighted by the work of other international organizations.
For example, the HLTF’s CFA and updated CFA call for
adjustments to trade rules in areas like minimizing export restrictions,
reducing import tariffs and other restrictions, improving trade
facilitation, promoting agricultural trade, ensuring resources for Aid
for Trade, and reducing trade distortions in higher-income
countries.109 These goals are consistent with the objectives of the
DDA and, in fact, the updated CFA calls for the completion of the
DDA negotiations.110 Similarly, in May 2011, a group of international
organizations 111 prepared a report for the G20 with policy
suggestions to address food price volatility concerns. With respect to
trade policies, the report recommends that steps be taken to improve
market access (but include safeguards for developing countries),
reduce trade-distorting domestic support, eliminate export subsidies,
and strengthen rules regarding export restrictions on foodstuffs.112 In
2012, an even larger group of entities 113 made additional
recommendations to the G20 regarding sustainable agriculture and
small-family farms. In addition to the recommendations provided in
Blandford, supra note 106, at 03:34:45.
High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, Updated
Comprehensive
Framework
for
Action
6-7
(Sept.
2010),
http://unfoodsecurity.org/sites/default/files/UCFA_English.pdf.
110 Id. at 7.
111 Contributions were made by the FAO, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, the World Food Programme, the World
Bank, the WTO, the International Food Policy Research Institute, and the HLTF.
112 Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Price Volatility in Food
and Agriculture Markets: Policy Responses, 23-25 (June 2, 2011),
http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/pdf/Interagency_Report_to_the_G20_on_
Food_Price_Volatility.pdf.
113 In addition to the contributors to the 2011 policy report (except for
the International Monetary Fund), the following groups also contributed to the
2012 report: Bioversity International, the CGIAR Consortium, and the InterAmerican Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture.
108
109
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the 2011 report, this report also suggested that the G20 governments
improve transparency and timely notifications of trade policy and
domestic support measures, support the Aid for Trade initiative, and
strengthen trade facilitation. 114 Again, the 2011 and 2012
recommendations are consistent with the objectives of the DDA
negotiations.115
In addition to recommendations that echo many of the areas
covered by the DDA negotiations, suggestions have been made with
respect to other issues. For example, the E15 Initiative, a partnership
between the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development and the World Economic Forum, is “a non-partisan,
expert-led multi-stakeholder dialogue to explore options for
strengthening the governance and functioning of the multilateral
trade system.” 116 The E15 Initiative established fifteen expert
groups—each covering a different topic—to provide policy options
for the international trade regime; one of the expert groups was
tasked with addressing agriculture and food security. Through this
program, the Agriculture and Food Security Group developed a set
of policy options aimed at addressing challenges that emerged after
the establishment of the DDA. In addition to encouraging the
pursuits of the DDA, the group also provided additional suggestions,
such as establishing provisions on support for biofuels, developing
provisions directed at smallholders and their access to markets, and

114 Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Sustainable Agriculture
Productivity Growth and Bridging the Gap for Small-Family Farms, 23 (June 12, 2012),
http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/2702/Sustainable_Agricultural_P
roductivity_Growth_and_Bridging_the_Gap_for_SmallFamily_Farms.pdf?sequence=1. The report also recommended better adherence to
science-based sanitary and phytosanitary measures developed by the FAO, the
World Health Organization, and the World Organisation for Animal Health and
support for sanitary and phytosanitary capacity building. Id.
115 It is important to note that the groups involved in the HLTF and
those that contributed to the 2011 and 2012 reports overlap to a large degree and
thus one would expect their recommendations to be consistent.
116 Stefan Tangermann, A Post-Bali Food Security Agenda, INT’L CENTER
FOR
TRADE
AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
38
(Dec.
2013),
http://issuu.com/ictsd/docs/ag_post_bali_policy/1?e=4233984/7260487.
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creating measures to address climate change and environmental
concerns.117
As demonstrated by the recommendations of the E15
Initiative, HLTF, and entities involved in the G20 reports,
international trade and the global trade regime can play an important
role in addressing food security concerns. Moving forward, the
international community should continue to work toward the
completion of the DDA negotiations, as well as examine other ways
in which the international trade rules can be monitored to ensure they
are a positive force in addressing global hunger.

CONCLUSION
The causes of, and contributing factors to, global food
insecurity are numerous and complex. It is clear, however, that the
WTO and international trading rules play an important role in the
pursuit of global food security. In fact, when the MDGs were
developed, it was envisioned that the WTO would be involved in
their implementation.118 The international trade regime has sought to
address these issues to the extent that they directly and indirectly
relate to trade. The WTO rules and negotiation process are not
designed to, nor were they intended to, address any and all tradedistortive practices in one fell swoop. Instead, the rules have been,
and should continue to be, progressively developed. Moreover, while
global hunger may be a consistent problem, the contributing factors
may evolve. The international community must continue to examine
how trade rules influence food security issues and how they can be
modified to ensure that the evolving needs of the global community
are met.

117
118

Id. at 18-26.
G.A. Res. 55/162, U.N. Doc. A/55/L.56/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2000).
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THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND
WORLD FOOD SECURITY
David Blandford*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations held a World Food Summit that developed a Plan
of Action for food security, so that “all people, at all times, have
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food
to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life.”1 The Organization also made a Declaration that its
members would “strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and
overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all
through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.”2
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), food
security is defined as “physical and economic access to food that

* David Blandford, Professor of Agricultural and Environmental
Economics, Department of Agricultural Economics, Sociology and Education,
Penn State University. Formerly the head of a unit at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development responsible for analyzing the impact of
agricultural policies on agricultural trade and assessing the outlook for world
agricultural markets.
1 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of
Action, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (Nov. 13-17, 1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm#PoA.
2 Id.
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meets people’s dietary needs as well as their food preferences.” 3
Food security is built on three pillars:
•

Availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a
consistent basis.

•

Access: sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for a
nutritious diet.

•

Use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition
and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation.4

This essay will focus on the economics of food insecurity,
with an emphasis on supply and demand. Food economics is
particularly pertinent for developing countries, as the world’s poorest
countries face the greatest food challenges. This essay will address
whether rules imposed on countries’ domestic agricultural and trade
policies through international agreements administered by the World
Trade Organization (WTO) limit the ability of developing countries
to achieve food security. In answering this question, this essay will
examine the causes of food insecurity and policy approaches
economists advocate for addressing the issues.

I. FOOD INSECURITY
Two major causes of food insecurity are insufficient
availability and lack of access to food.5 Insufficient availability can be
temporary and short-term. It can result, for example, from the
destruction of crops and livestock or the infrastructure needed to
distribute food. Droughts, floods, outbreaks of animal or plant
diseases, and excessively cold or hot temperatures can cause losses of
agricultural output. In some countries, hurricanes, typhoons,
3 Food Security, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/.
4 Id.
5 Hunger, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/hunger/causes (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and their aftermath (like tsunamis)
also lead to such losses. Natural disasters often severely damage or
destroy essential food transport and storage infrastructure. Shortterm disruptions in supply are also caused by wars and conflict, and,
regrettably, conflicts are often a continuing problem for ensuring
reliable food supplies.
Addressing short-term disruptions in poor countries’ food
supplies typically involves emergency aid and assistance. Many
countries, including the United States, have food aid programs.
Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also active
in this area, such as Oxfam and the U.N. World Food Program
(WFP). Oxfam is an association of seventeen non-governmental
organizations that provides disaster relief in more than ninety
countries. The organization has been involved in providing clean
water, food, and sanitation in response to most of the world’s major
humanitarian crises over the last seventy years.6 The WFP, which
was created as part of the United Nations system in 1961, is the
world’s largest humanitarian organization. The WFP acts as a
channel for food assistance using funding provided by governments,
corporations, and private individuals. Each year, the WFP provides
food assistance to more than eighty million people in seventy-five
countries.7
Over the long term, insufficient food availability can be
caused by a persistent failure to produce enough food or to make
food available to those who need it. Availability problems can be
caused by resource constraints that limit agricultural productivity and
market failures, such as the lack of an institutional framework to
underpin increases in productivity in agriculture, inadequate access
for farmers to inputs needed to increase productivity, or the lack of
infrastructure to store, process, and move agricultural products to
where they are needed.

6 Who We Are, OXFAM INT’L, http://www.oxfam.org/en/about (last
visited Sept. 19, 2014).
7 Fighting Hunger Worldwide, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/about (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).

158

2015

Blandford

3:2

The inability of consumers to obtain access to food can be
temporary, as discussed above. For countries with sufficient financial
resources, imports can address these short-term reductions in
domestic supplies. For instance, a recent assessment by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture concluded that “the capacity to pay for
imports is significant in regions like Latin America and the Caribbean
and North Africa that import a large share of their food supplies.”8
Access to international markets can also help reduce price spikes
created by short-term reductions in domestic supply. 9 Sustained
import dependence, however, means that rises in international food
prices affect domestic markets. When consumers spend a large
portion of their disposable income on food, price jumps can lead to
hardship and social unrest.
For example, the most recent
information available from the United Nations (2007-09) shows that
dependency on imports of cereals in Africa is roughly double the
average for developing countries as a whole (30.1 percent of total
supplies, compared to 15.5 percent).10 Since 2000, cereal prices in
Africa have been more than twice as volatile as the world average.
The poorest people in Africa (lowest income quintile) typically spend
between fifty and eighty percent of their disposable income on food,
compared to less than twenty percent in the United States.11 Sharp
increases in food prices in 2007-2008 led to riots in a number of
African countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal,
Somalia and Yemen. Over the longer term, persistent inability to gain
access to food is generally caused by a lack of resources needed to
produce food for consumption or an inability to generate the income
necessary to purchase food through the marketplace.
STACEY ROSEN ET AL., A Report Summary from the Economic Research
Service, in INTERNATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT, 2014-2024 (2014),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1499869/gfa25_final-0708.pdf.
9
See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: HOW DOES INTERNATIONAL PRICE VOLATILITY
AFFECT DOMESTIC ECONOMIES AND FOOD SECURITY? 4 (2011),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e.pdf.
10
Food Security Indicators, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.VNf_VnacM9d (last
updated Sept. 16, 2014).
11
Id.
8
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Both forms of food insecurity—temporary and chronic—can
be addressed through appropriate policies. As noted, short-term
food security issues can be addressed through short-term measures to
increase food availability. International aid, financial resources for
imports, and assistance in rebuilding damaged infrastructure can all
help overcome short-term food insecurity. In contrast, from an
economic perspective, the two most effective ways to address the
long-term resource inadequacy issue should be domestic.12 These
include:
•

Improving access to resources needed by individuals to
produce their own food (e.g., land and water). This usually
requires structural changes, such as land ownership reform
and the creation of a legal framework to guarantee property
rights.

•

Improving the productivity of existing resources through the
adoption of new technology, and improved land and resource
management for food production.

From an economic perspective, long-term access to food can also be
addressed effectively in two ways:
•

Improving the income earning capacity of food insecure
individuals.

•

Providing income transfers to the poor to enable them to
gain improved access to food.

Governments use other approaches in attempting to provide
food security. The most popular approach is to provide subsidies to
farmers to induce them to produce more food. Governments also
use measures that protect farmers from international competition so
that more food will be produced domestically rather than imported.
This is where trade law plays a role.
This conclusion is drawn from my interpretation based on economic
theory and the overall body of literature in this area. See generally C. PETER TIMMER,
WALTER P. FALCON & SCOTT R. PEARSON, FOOD POLICY ANALYSIS (1983).
12
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II. THE ROLE OF WTO DISCIPLINES
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that resulted from the
Uruguay Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), completed in 1994, sought to impose
disciplines on measures used by governments to protect agriculture,
i.e., the provision of price and income support to farmers and the use
of various types of subsidies, particularly trade-distorting subsidies.13
The Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) and the creation of the WTO
represented the first time that agricultural policies had been seriously
addressed multilaterally, as the GATT was largely ineffective in this
area.14 The AoA was negotiated at a time when international prices
for food were low and a major aim was to limit the price-depressing
effect of support measures used by wealthy countries. 15 These
measures reduced the earning potential of farmers who did not
receive subsidies (in both exporting and importing countries)—but,
paradoxically, consumers in import-dependent low-income countries
benefited from the lower prices.16
Agricultural support was classified into three categories:
“amber box,” “green box,” and “blue box.” 17 The two most
important categories were trade distorting amber box subsidies and
green box subsidies considered to be minimally trade distorting.18
Limits were placed on amber box subsidies and reductions were

13 See generally DAVID ORDEN, DAVID BLANDFORD & TIM JOSLING,
WTO DISCIPLINES ON AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT: SEEKING A FAIR BASIS FOR
TRADE (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of international agreements on
agricultural subsidies).
14 See TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, STEFAN TANGERMANN & T.K. WARLEY,
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT (2d ed., 1996).
15 See id.
16 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., NATIONAL POLICIES
AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE (1987).
17 Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct.
1, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.pdf.
18 Id.
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agreed to in the total amount of subsidy that could be provided.19 De
minimis exemptions were granted for amounts of subsidies that were
viewed to be sufficiently small.20 Green box subsidies were exempt
from reductions.21
Developing countries are treated more generously in the
types of subsidies that can be excluded from WTO disciplines.
Specifically, investment subsidies made available to agriculture as part
of development programs, and subsidies for agricultural inputs for
low-income or resource-poor producers (measures that could be used
to increase productivity and food output by smaller and poorer
farmers), are exempt from reductions.22 The de minimis level for the
exclusion of subsidies from WTO calculations of support is set at ten
percent for developing countries, in contrast to five percent for other
countries.23
Green box subsidies are not subject to limits on the amount
of support provided. Several types of expenditures that are directly
relevant to food security policies are exempt from limits under the
AoA. These are summarized briefly below:
•

Expenditures on general government services, including
research, training and extension, pest control, inspection
services, and infrastructure (capital expenditures). Such
expenditures can be used to increase productivity and the

19 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm.
20 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement]. Subsidies that involved
limitations on production were included in the blue box; these subsidies were not
limited in the AoA.
21 Id.
22 Domestic Support: The Conceptual Framework, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro03_domestic_e.htm#othe
r_exempt (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
23 Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 20.
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resilience of the food system to external shocks, such as
weather and disease.24
•

The accumulation and holding of private or public stocks,
which are part of a national food security program. There are
conditions, e.g., there must be predetermined targets for stock
accumulation relating solely to food security objectives, there
must be financial transparency, and purchases and sales must
be made at current market prices. Stockholding under this
provision could be used to provide a buffer against
fluctuations in supply due to weather, disease, or other
factors.25

•

Expenditures on domestic food aid programs with clearly
defined nutritional objectives and eligibility criteria for
recipients. The direct distribution of food to eligible
individuals and sales at subsidized prices are both permitted,
provided the government acquires supplies of food at market
prices. Financial transparency is also required.26

•

Government subsidies for income insurance and income
safety net programs. These are allowed, subject to defined
criteria relating to eligibility for recipients and limits on the
amount of compensation provided. Compensation must not
be linked to the type or volume of production so that the
subsidies do not provide an incentive to increase production,
i.e., act as a production subsidy.27

•

Disaster relief payments to farmers. Such payments are
permissible, provided they are linked to the effects of a
recognizable natural disaster (e.g., drought or flood). There

24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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are limits, however, on the amount of compensation that can
be provided for losses of crops or livestock.28
The menu of policy options for pursuing food security
policies implied by this list of exemptions is broad. Measures exist
that both address short and long term food availability issues and
increase access by poor consumers. Policies have to be targeted and
proportionate, and they have to be minimally distorting in terms of
production and international trade. The framers of the AoA
recognized that governments would often want to implement food
security policies, and provided a means to do so in a way that would
be minimally trade distorting.29

III. ARE WTO DISCIPLINES INCONSISTENT WITH FOOD SECURITY?
Despite the fact that the AoA allows the use of a range of
policy measures directed toward ensuring food security, some
developing countries, e.g., India, argue that the requirements of these
policy measures under the AoA are unduly restrictive. 30 These
countries want to have the ability to use policies that would not
satisfy the criteria specified in the AoA. It is important to stress that
the most economically efficient methods for addressing food
insecurity are not currently affected by the AoA, nor would they be
affected by a proposed new agreement on agriculture under the
current Doha Round of trade negotiations through the WTO. What
are currently affected, and would be affected by a new agreement,
however, are some policy measures used in the name of food
security.
The first such category of measures is general subsidies for
agricultural inputs, i.e., subsidies that are provided to all farmers,
Id.
This observation is based on the author’s conversations with some of
those involved in the negotiations.
30 Minister Sharma Explains India’s Position on Food Security, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2014/281282/cover05.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
28
29
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rather than being targeted to low income or resource-poor farmers.
The targeted subsidies are permissible under the AoA. General input
subsidies on items such as fertilizer, agro-chemicals, energy, and
water are undesirable for two main reasons. First, they tend to
promote the over-use of inputs. Lowering the cost of fertilizer or
energy, for example, induces farmers to use more of these inputs
than needed. The excessive use of fertilizer, agro-chemicals, water,
and energy often has undesirable environmental consequences. 31
Second, input subsidies are most advantageous to farmers that use
large quantities of inputs, such as those who operate larger farms.
From a distributional perspective, general input subsidies are less
desirable than subsidies targeted solely to small or disadvantaged
farmers.32
The second category of measures is price supports. Typically,
price supports are implemented by setting a minimum price for
agricultural products in the domestic market, which is maintained
through government purchases when supplies exceed demand at that
price. The purchases are stored and either disposed of domestically
or, if domestic disposal is not possible, exported using various forms
of export subsidies.33 Some countries argue for this approach on the
grounds that some of the products acquired can be distributed to
domestic consumers at subsidized prices. 34 Unlike a system of
concessional distribution based on the acquisition of products at
market prices, however, purchases through price support programs
almost inevitably end up with the government acquiring larger stocks
than it needs, or can handle, through food assistance programs.35
Often, overproduction results in the disposal of excess purchases

DEPT. OF FOOD AND PUBLIC DISTRIB., http://dfpd.nic.in/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (stating that the most important example is India).
35 Munisamy Gopinath, India, in DAVID ORDEN, DAVID BLANDFORD &
TIM JOSLING, WTO DISCIPLINES ON AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT: SEEKING A FAIR
BASIS FOR TRADE 277-309 (2011).
31
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through subsidized exports.36 Another drawback of price support
programs is that they keep prices higher for consumers who do not
have access to food distributions from government stocks and obtain
their food in the marketplace. It seems strange to have a policy that
is billed as ensuring food security that actually imposes higher costs
for food on consumers.
A third category of measures, which are not part of the
domestic support disciplines, relates to market access provisions.
This category covers various forms of import protection, such as
import tariffs and other related policies (often essential when a price
support program is in operation so that domestic support prices are
not undermined by cheaper imports), which also impose a tax on
domestic consumers of food.37 Like price supports, a policy making
food more expensive for consumers is a rather strange approach to
ensuring food security.
The existing WTO disciplines on agriculture, and proposals
to strengthen these (e.g., to reduce the permitted amount of tradedistorting support), are far from perfect. An important conclusion,
however, is that WTO rules affecting domestic policies designed to
ensure food security are on the right track. WTO rules discourage
the use of inefficient and costly policies that often have undesirable
side effects on consumers and environmental quality, but at the same
time allow countries to pursue food security policies that do not have
such effects.
Food stockholding was a major focus of a ministerial meeting
of the WTO in Bali, Indonesia in December 2013.38 Countries with
stockholding policies that do not conform to current WTO green
The AoA imposes restrictions on the use of explicit export subsidies,
but there are loopholes that allow various forms of disguised subsidies to dispose
of surplus products internationally. These loopholes include subsidized financing
and insurance for exports, as well as food aid, which are not covered by the AoA.
37 See NATIONAL POLICIES AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 16.
38 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 6 December 2013,
WT/MIN(13)/W/10, 1 (2013)
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w10_1.pdf.
36
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box criteria, and whose expenditures on stockholding would be
counted against their allowable amber box support, pressed for a
permanent exemption for their policies.39 A temporary solution was
agreed to, under which WTO members will not challenge countries
whose domestic support exceeds current bindings as a result of the
way their stockholding policies operate.40 If the WTO’s principal
objective to reduce trade-distorting support for agriculture is to be
maintained, it will be important that any modification to existing rules
on stockholding for food security purposes does not provide for
open-ended price support for farmers, i.e., unlimited purchases at a
government-determined price.

CONCLUSION
We have seen from past experience in Europe and the United
States that this type of policy is economically inefficient, and a
potential source of tension among trading partners because of
resulting distortions in international markets. A subsidy war between
the European Union and the United States during the 1970s and
1980s was one the major reasons why countries thought it was
necessary to bring agricultural policies under international disciplines
in the Uruguay Round.41 It would be unfortunate for the world’s
trading system if a loosening of these disciplines resulted in renewed
conflicts over agricultural policies in the future.

39
40
41

Id.
Id.
See JOSLING, TANGERMANN & WARLEY, supra note 14.
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LAND IS NOT THE NEW OIL: WHAT THE
NIGERIAN OIL EXPERIENCE CAN TEACH SOUTH
SUDAN ABOUT BALANCING THE RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF LARGE SCALE LAND ACQUISITION
Scott P. Stedjan∗

“The only reason why we are hungry is because of how we have been investing in
Agriculture.” – Ann Itto, South Sudan’s Minister of Agriculture1
“When food becomes scarce, the investor needs a weak state that does not force
him to abide by any rules.” – Phillepe Heilberg of Jarch Capital2
Recent global food price volatility combined with the growing
use of agricultural land to produce biofuels has sparked a global
scramble for land.3 Precise numbers are difficult to verify, but the
scale of new international land investment in recent years is, by all

∗ Scott Stedjan graduated in 2014 with a J.D. from the Penn State
Dickinson School of Law. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the Penn State Journal of
Law and International Affairs (JLIA). Scott previously worked for a large
international NGO where he managed a policy portfolio that included South
Sudan.
1 SPLM Leaders Call for More Investments in Agriculture in Upper Nile, SPLM
TODAY, July 11, 2008,
http://splmtoday.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=106&Ite
mid=1.
2 Horand Knaup & Juliane von Mittelstaedt, The New Colonialism Foreign
Investors Snap Up African Farmland, DER SPIEGEL, July 30, 2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-new-colonialism-foreigninvestors-snap-up-african-farmland-a-639224.html.
3 Lesley Wroughton, Oxfam Urge World Bank to Freeze Land Investments,
REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2012, 5:40 AM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/worldbank-oxfam-landidUSL1E8L2LKF20121004.
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accounts, enormous.4 Compared to an average annual expansion of
international investment in global agricultural land of less than four
million hectares before 2008, the World Bank estimates that
approximately fifty-six million hectares worth of new large-scale
farmland deals were announced in 2009 alone.5
Developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, are the main targets for investors. 6 These countries are
enticing because land in Sub-Saharan Africa is relatively cheap and
available, the climate is favorable to crop production, and labor is
inexpensive.7 According to the International Land Matrix project,8
since 2001, governments and international investors acquired land

See WARD ANSEEUW ET AL., THE LAND MATRIX PARTNERSHIP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAND DEALS FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH:
ANALYTICAL REPORT BASED ON THE LAND MATRIX DATABASE 7 (Tim Bending
ed., Apr. 2012), http://www.landcoalition.org/en/publications/transnational-landdeals-agriculture-global-south (International investors have acquired 56.2 million
hectares in Africa since 2001); Are Foreign Investors Colonizing Africa, AL JAZEERA,
Oct. 25, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y05fzp0YSrw (Foreign
investors bought or leased a land area in sub-Saharan Africa about the size of
France in 2009 alone).
5 KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., WORLD BANK, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST
IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS xiv (2011).
6 Id. at xiv (noting that more than seventy percent of the demand has
been in Africa).
7 OLIVER DE SHUTTER, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
THE RIGHT TO FOOD, LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITIONS AND LEASES: A SET OF
CORE PRINCIPLES AND MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE
3 (June 11, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/site/%20swacmali2010/44031283.pdf.
8 The Land Matrix is an online public database that permits the public to
contribute data on land deals. The Land Matrix facilitates the collection and
representation of data; encourages citizens, researchers, governments, and
companies to provide data and improve the quality of and access to data; and
provides a regular and accessible analysis of trends. It is supported by nonprofit
organizations as well as the Government of the Netherlands and the European
Commission. What is the Land Matrix, http://landmatrix.org/en/about/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013).
4
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area in Africa equivalent to the northern U.S. plains states of North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska combined.9
Derided as “land-grabbing” by those opposed to the practice,
the phenomenon of large-scale acquisition of farmland by
governments and private investors sparked a global debate among
international organizations, investors, researchers, and global civil
society.10 Some analysts and institutions, like the World Bank, see the
growth of this trend as a potential opportunity for rural
development.11 They argue countries with large endowments of land,
but gaps in productivity, can harness the technologies and capital
associated with responsible international investment and expand
cultivated areas and agricultural productivity.12 Others, however, see
rapid acquisitions of crucial food-producing lands by foreign entities
as a threat to rural economies and livelihoods.13 These analysts argue
that the current trend of international land investment works against
the goals of increasing food security and ending global hunger
9 ANSEEUW, ET AL., supra note 4; see also How Much of Your State is Wet?,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/wetstates.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2012) (reflecting the figures on U.S. area. The land area of North
Dakota (68,976 m2), South Dakota (75,885 m2), and Nebraska (76,872 m2)
combined is 221,773 m2. One square mile is 258 hectares. Thus, 221,773 m2 =
57.4 million hectares.).
10 See WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, LAND GRAB? THE
RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND (Michael Kugleman & Susan L. Levinstein
eds., 2009),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090629_Land%20Grab_r
pt.pdf; David Hallam, Foreign Investment in Developing Country Agriculture – Issues, Policy
Implications and International Response, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV. (Dec. 7,
2009),
http://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/sites/responsibleagroinvestment.org/f
iles/OECD_RAI%20Issure_Policy%20Implications.pdf; see also Responsible Farmland
Investing? Current Efforts to Regulate Land Grabs Will Make Things Worse, GRAIN (Aug.
22,
2012),
http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4564-responsible-farmlandinvesting-current-efforts-to-regulate-land-grabs-will-make-things-worse.
11 DEININGER ET AL., supra note 5, at 129-42.
12 Id. at 5.
13 DANIEL SHEPARD & ANURADHA MITTAL, THE GREAT LAND GRAB:
RUSH FOR WORLD’S FARMLAND THREATENS FOOD SECURITY OF THE POOR 6
(2009).
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because investors prioritize production of food for export over
supporting domestic food supplies. 14 Still, others are generally
supportive of increased investment in farmland, but would prefer
these investments stop until appropriate laws, regulations, and
industry standards can be implemented to protect the rights of
farmers.15
As this article will detail, investors in African land often
encounter many of the same risks as investors faced during the
twentieth century scramble for oil and gas in Africa endured. The
story of oil and gas discovery in Africa has been, for the most part, a
tragic one. For years, the governments of oil producing countries in
Africa proved unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from the
negative consequences of foreign investment.16 At the same time,
many investors involved in the oil industry simply ignored the
damage they caused to communities and the environment.17 As a
consequence, African oil producers such as Nigeria, Angola, CongoBrazzaville, Cameroon, and Gabon have all been largely unable to
convert their oil wealth into broad-based economic growth. 18
Combining weak state institutions with economies completely
dependent on the export of oil or minerals has shown to reduce
economic growth, feed corruption, and increase the risk of civil war.19
Investment practices by multinational corporations acting without
strong regulations in West Africa have led to devastating social and
Id. at 18.
See generally Kate Geary, Our Land, Our Lives: Time Out on the Global Land
Rush, OXFAM INT’L (2012),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-land-lives-freeze-041012en_1.pdf (advocating for the World Bank to institute a temporary freeze on
investments involving large-scale land acquisitions).
16 See infra Part II.
17 Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha, Environmental Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in the Oil and Gas Sector, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN
NIGERIA 115, 131 (Festus Emiri & Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009).
18 See Ian Gary & Terry Lynn Carl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Wealth
and
the
Poor,
CATHOLIC
RELIEF
SERVICES
(2003),
http://www.crs.org/publications/showpdf.cfm?pdf_id=183.
19 Matthew L. Norman, The Challenges of State Building in Resource Rich
Nations, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 173, 173 (2012).
14
15
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environmental consequences. 20 In Nigeria, for example, oil
production since the late 1950s has damaged water and soil resources
so much that fishing, forestry, and agriculture are no longer possible
in large areas of the oil-producing region.21
Some governments and investors in the non-renewable
extractive industries22 have learned they could not simply ignore the
damage their business practices caused and took remedial action.23
According to economist Paul Collier, “Nigeria’s dysfunctional
management of its first oil boom of 1973–83 and its brilliant
management of the second boom of 2003–08 cautions against the
gloomy cynicism that until recently bedeviled investor thinking about
Africa.”24 Unfortunately, in many cases, the remedial steps taken
were too late to save the local environment, guard against corruption,
or protect investors’ reputations.25

See The Curse of Oil: The Paradox of Plenty, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.economist.com/node/5323394.
20

21 Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of
Transnational Corporations, and the Human Right to A Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 261, 271 (1997).
22 Nonrenewable extractive industries are those industries that are related
to the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbon products such as gold, diamonds, oil,
gas, etc. from the land and cannot be replaced. See OIL, GAS, AND MINING UNIT,
Extractive
Industries
Review
Reports,
WORLD
BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,co
ntentMDK:20306686~menuPK:592071~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSiteP
K:336930,00.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
23 David Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Sector: The
Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 69-70 (2011).
24 Paul Collier, The Case for Investing In Africa, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 3
(June 2010),
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_case_for_investing_in_Africa_2611.
25 See Spence, supra note 23, at 72 (“Shell eventually began to recognize
and address its reputational problem by undertaking social investment and making
concerted efforts to cultivate positive relationships with all of its important
stakeholders in Nigeria. However, by that time, much of the reputational damage
had been done. Despite pouring resources into social projects and stakeholder
relations in Nigeria in the 1990s and early 2000s, protests against Shell became
stronger and more organized.”).
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This article is intended to contribute to the global discussion
on international investment in African land by assessing lessons from
the experience of foreign investment in the Nigerian oil sector in the
later part of the twentieth century and applying these lessons to the
current situation of large-scale land investment in South Sudan. One
can derive many lessons about law, social policy, local governance,
and the moral responsibility of multi-national corporations from
studying the Nigerian oil experience. It is important to note,
however, the comparison between agriculture in South Sudan and the
extractive sector in Nigeria can only go so far. Developing policies
and legal relationships based on analogy may lead policymakers and
investors to ignore the peculiarities of each context.
This article will focus on the regulatory framework and legal
relationships between investors and governments, and furthermore,
will make suggestions on what type of frameworks and legal
relationship will be most beneficial for all parties involved in the
South Sudanese agricultural sector. Part I will explore the issue of
large scale land acquisitions by foreign investors in general and will
then focus on the phenomenon in South Sudan. Part I will also
examine who the investors are, the motivations for investment, the
possible threats to the people of South Sudan, and the risks borne by
investors. Part II will explain the economic and social impact of oil
investment in Nigeria during the second half of the twentieth
century. Part II will then examine the reforms pursued by the Federal
Government of Nigeria (FGN) and assess how litigation and
government action influenced the conduct of investors. Finally, Part
III will provide recommendations for investors and the Government
of South Sudan (GoSS) for establishing governance and legal
frameworks that will lead to benefits for both investors and the
African communities.
The story of land investment in Africa is just beginning to be
written. This article argues that the choices made by both investors
and governments will have profound implications for the future of
livelihoods and the global agricultural sector. Unless investors and
governments learn from the mistakes of previous investment in
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Africa’s abundant natural resources, there is little hope that largescale land investment will be mutually beneficial.

I.
A.

LAND INVESTMENT: RISKS AND REWARDS

The Scope and Context of International Land Investment

Global demand for energy, food, and water is expected to
accelerate over the next two decades. Three billion new middle-class
consumers are expected to emerge from poverty and move into
urban areas.26 This rise in demand already strains the agricultural
sector due to its indispensable role in supplying food and energy
needs.27 The rapid increases in demand for agricultural products have
caused price shocks and volatility as the market attempts to bring
supply and demand into proper alignment.28 Largely due to the rise

26 Richard Dobbs, et al., A New Era for Commodities, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (Nov. 2011),
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A_new_era_for_commodities_2887.
27 Production of biofuels, particularly ethanol and biodiesel for use in the
transport sector, has tripled since 2000 and is projected to double again within the
next decade. Regulations in the E.U., U.S., and Canada intended to mitigate
climate change, enhance energy security, and support the agricultural sector to
require the shift of agriculture land from food production to energy-related crops.
This has led to the merger of the energy and food markets and has contributed to
higher food prices as a whole. See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIOENERGY CHALLENGES FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2 (Oct.
12, 2009),
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers%20/HLEF20
50_Climate.pdf/en/; WORLD BANK, RISING FOOD PRICES: POLICY OPTIONS AND
WORLD BANK RESPONSE 9 (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/risingfoodprices%20_back
groundnote_apr08.pdf; INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., HIGH FOOD PRICES:
THE WHAT, WHO, AND HOW TO PROPOSED POLICY ACTIONS (May 2008),
www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/foodpricespolicyaction.pdf.
28 See Catherine Hornby, Food Prices to be Even More Volatile, UN Says,
REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2011, 3:57 PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-food-pricesidUSTRE7995D720111010.
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in demand for agricultural products in China and India, and biofuel
policies in Europe and North America,29 the International Monetary
Fund’s food price index 30 reflected price increases of 130% from
January 2002 to June 2008, and a staggering 56% between January
2007 and June 2008.31
While the numbers are alarming, rapid increases in demand
for energy and food is not new. Similar factors were observed
throughout the twentieth century, as the world’s population tripled.32
The difference is that during the twentieth century, however, prices
for primary commodities remained relatively stable. 33 Economists
from the McKinsey Global Institute attribute the lack of price
volatility in the twentieth century to technological improvements
related to the Green Revolution.34

29 See DEREK HADLEY & SHENGGEN FAN, INT’L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., REFLECTIONS ON THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: HOW DID IT
HAPPEN? HOW HAS IT HURT? AND HOW CAN WE PREVENT THE NEXT ONE? 165
(2010), http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rr165.pdf (providing
a detailed account of the factors that led to the global food crisis of 2008).
30 For more information on the IMF Commodity Price Index, see IMF
Primary Commodity Prices: Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/faq/index.htm#q1 (last updated
Dec. 19, 2012).
31 Donald Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices (July 2008), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/07/28/
000020439_20080728103002/Rendered/PDF/WP4682.pdf.
32 Id.
33 Dobbs, supra note 26, at 1.
34 The Green Revolution refers to the massive investments in modern
scientific research for agriculture in the mid-twentieth century, which were led by a
handful of American foundations, most prominently the Rockefeller Foundation.
This effort led to dramatic increases in agricultural yield, most notably in India.
For more information on the Green Revolution, see Amanda Briney, Green
Revolution: History and Overview of the Green Revolution, ABOUT (Oct. 12, 2014, 2:34
PM),
http://geography.about.com/od/globalproblemsandissues/a/%20greenrevolution.
htm.
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Had supply remained constant [in the twentieth
century], commodity prices would have soared.
Dramatic improvements in exploration, extraction,
and cultivation techniques kept supply ahead of everincreasing global needs, cutting the real price of an
equally weighted index of key commodities by almost
half. This ability to access progressively cheaper
resources underpinned a 20-fold expansion of the
world economy.35
Many investors see land as a unique investment opportunity
in the current environment. Because demand for food is inelastic,
some investors see land investments as secure assets at a time when
the global financial crisis has made other investments less profitable.36
With modest investment in technology and infrastructure, these
investors conclude that productivity in underutilized lands in the
developing world could potentially increase and, in turn, increase
food availability, lower prices, and lead to stable profits over the long
term.37
Private investors are not the only entities entering the market
for African land. Increasing food prices over the past decade have
led governments reliant on food imports to question the capacity of

Id.
ALEJANDRO LITOVSKY & PAULINA VILLALPANDO, EARTH SEC.
INITIATIVE, THE LAND SECURITY AGENDA: HOW INVESTOR RISKS IN FARMLAND
CREATE
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
SUSTAINABILITY
5
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.africafoicentre.org/index.php/reports-publications/8-the-landsecurity-agenda/file.
37 See CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON
THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 8 (2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/mgi/research/productivity_competitiveness_and_growth/lions_on_the_
move (estimating that by bringing more land into production, adding technology to
increase yields, and shifts to a mix of both low-value crops and fruits and
vegetables, Africa could increase its agricultural output from $280 billion in 2010 to
$880 billion in 2030).
35
36
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global markets to provide food at a predictable price. 38 Rich
countries that have land and water constraints, such as those in the
Persian Gulf, have leased or purchased large tracks of land in Africa
in pursuit of domestic food security.39 Likewise, countries with large
populations and food security concerns, such as China, South Korea,
and India, are looking to capitalize on investment opportunities in
food production overseas.40
Investors see Africa as the best place for land investment.
They see the land as plentiful and possessing massive potential for
economic growth. 41 In fact, since 2001 more than half of
international land investment occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.42 The
interest in Africa is unsurprising; Africa is home to more than onequarter of the world’s arable land and sixty percent of the world’s
remaining uncultivated land, but generates only ten percent of global
agricultural output. Further, governments from across the continent
are making strenuous efforts to attract agricultural investments by
encouraging international access to historically national land
resources.43

Lorenzo Cotula & Sonjia Vermeulen, Deal or No Deal: The Outlook for
Agricultural Land Investment in Africa, 85 INT’L AFFAIRS 6, 1233, 1235 (2009).
39 JOACHIM VON BRAUN & RUTH MEINZEN-DICK, INT’L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., “LAND GRABBING” BY FOREIGN INVESTORS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES:
RISKS
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
1
(Apr.
2009),
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp013all.pdf.
40 Oliver de Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 515 (2011).
41 Kartik Jayaram et al., Africa’s Path to Growth, Sector by Sector, MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY (June 2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/africas_
path_to_growth_sector_by_sector.
42 ANSEEUW, supra note 4.
43 David Hallam, International Investment in Agricultural Production, in LAND
GRAB? A RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND 27, 27 (Michael Kugelman & Susan
L. Levenstein eds., 2011).
38
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The Republic of South Sudan, the world’s newest nation,44 is
among the most sought after locations for large-scale land
acquisitions. 45 The semi-autonomous region of southern Sudan
emerged in 2005 after decades of war between the Government of
Sudan and the mostly southern-based Sudan’s People’s Liberation
Army. The peace agreement between the two parties ended the war
and created an interim “Government of southern Sudan.”46 Six years
thereafter, 98.83% of the people of southern Sudan voted in favor of
a Referendum on Southern Independence.47 As a result, the Republic
of South Sudan was formally established on July 9, 2011.48 Private
investors flocked to southern Sudan after the war ended49 mainly due
to its large size, low population density, and impressive natural
resource wealth.50 International investors were welcomed in southern
Sudan with eager partners within the GoSS, local public officials, and
community elites.51
South Sudan is a unique case, because it is a new country
struggling to recover from decades of war and internal violence
44 After a referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan declared its
independence on July 9, 2011. See Jeffery Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South
Sudan
Becomes
a
New
Nation,
N.Y. TIMES,
July
10,
2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=
1&.
45 See United Nations Mission in Sudan, Background to the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, UNITED NATIONS,
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
46 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberations Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Dec.
31, 2004,
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.
47 Results for the Referendum for Southern Sudan, S. SUDAN REFERENDUM
COMMISSION, http://southernsudan2011.com/.
48 Gettleman, supra note 44.
49
DAVID DENG & ANURADHA MITTAL, OAKLAND INST.,
UNDERSTANDING LAND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA: COUNTRY REPORT, SOUTH
SUDAN 5 (Anuranda Mittel & Frederic Mousseau eds., 2011),
http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/%20OI_country
_report_south_sudan_1.pdf.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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between ethnic groups.52 The war seriously disrupted governance
and undermined social hierarchies and traditional authorities. 53
Conflict continues to plague South Sudan. In December 2013,
political rivalries erupted into a major conflict between ethnic groups
in South Sudan.54 A ceasefire was signed in May 2014,55 but violence
remains and reports of serious human rights abuses continue to be
reported by aid organizations and human rights groups.56
The GoSS is faced with resolving disputes between its own
people through strengthening and rebuilding social institutions, while
at the same time creating state institutions and a legal regime basically
from scratch.57 Because South Sudan is going through a fundamental
shift in its governance systems and law, investors in South Sudan
operate under the ambiguity of the prevailing law and weak

See Jok Madut Jok & Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Sudan’s Prolonged Second
Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities, 42 AFR. STUD. REV.
2 (1999).
53 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN LAND
COMMISSION, DRAFT LAND POLICY (Feb. 2011) (copy held by author H.E. Robert
Lado Lwoki).
54 Isma’il Kushkush, Three Days of Violence in South Sudan Leaves Scores Dead,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/africa/violence-in-southsudan.html?_r=0.
55 South Sudan rivals Kiir and Machar agree peace deal, BBC NEWS, May 10,
2014, 2:30 AM, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27352902.
56 Carol Odera, South Sudan Ceasefire Under Threat as Government and Rebels
Clash, REUTERS, July 20, 2014, 9:30 AM; see also Isma’il Kushkush & Nicholas
Kulish, Civilians Flea as Violence Worsens in South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/africa/civilians-flee-as-violenceworsens-in-south-sudan.html.
57 See generally Florence Martin-Kessler & Anne Poiret, How to Build a
Country
From
Scratch,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
4,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/opinion/how-to-build-a-country-fromscratch.html (opinion article arguing that the nascent nation had just a few short
paved roads for a territory roughly the size of France; no infrastructure; no public
services to speak of; no justice system, let alone law or order; the area was lush with
weapons, rife with ethnic violence and in the midst of a tense divorce with its
northern half).
52
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government institutions.58 Operating in such a context comes with
many potential risks and rewards to both investors and the people of
South Sudan.59
B.

The Risks and Rewards For Investors of Land Investment in
Southern Sudan

All investments involve risk in the sense that any number of
events may unfold that lead to economic loss. This article will focus
on political and reputational risks. Political risks are “threats to the
profitability of a project that derive from some sort of governmental
action or inaction, rather than changes in economic conditions in the
marketplace.” 60 Categories of political risk associated with land
investment may include: (1) civil unrest; (2) direct or indirect
expropriation of property; and (3) corruption.61 A forth type of risk
is the risk that a company will lose potential business because its
reputation or character has been called into question.62 Investors in
some countries may be faced with risks that fall under one or two of
these categories. In South Sudan, however, investors must grapple
with serious risks that fall under each of the four categories.

DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 42; see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L
DEVELOPMENT, LAND TENURE ISSUES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: KEY FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOUTHERN SUDAN LAND POLICY (Dec. 2010),
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Southern_S
udan_Findings_and_Recommendations.pdf (provides a detailed account of
tradition land ownership system and how the transitional period attempted to
adjust the land ownership system).
59 See Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?, 30 WORLD DEV. 107,107-11 (2002).
60
NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 3 (2005).
61 Id. at 6 (Authors cite seven forms of political risks. Not all the risks
cited apply to land investment (such as currency risks and trade restrictions) and
some risks overlap in the context of land investment. Thus, for the purpose of this
article I have reduced the number of risks to three.).
62
Reputation
Risk, THE ONLINE BUSINESS DICTIONARY,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/reputationrisk.html#ixzz2HbAdhSQE.
58
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1. Civil Unrest. – The threat of civil unrest is the most serious
risk facing foreign investors in South Sudan. Although no longer at
war with its northern neighbor, violence and bloody conflict continue
to plague South Sudan. 63 Political rivalries, social institutions
weakened by decades of war, pressures on land, and the prevalence
of small arms among the civilian population 64 have enabled and
fueled violent conflicts. Conflicts between ethnic groups and among
pastoralists that in the past would be solved by traditional institutions
instead continue unabated.65 If the GoSS continues66 to be unable to
insulate business interests from the direct and indirect impact of
violence and civil strife, investors may find their property damaged or
they may not be able to carry on regular operations due to threats to
the workforce.67

See Robyn Dixon, South Sudan Violence Leaves Donors Disillusioned, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/01/world/la-fgsouth-sudan-governance-20140301 (detailing the concern by donors on the future
of state building in South Sudan); See also, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, SOUTH
SUDAN: A CIVIL WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME, Africa Report No. 217 (2014),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/south%20sudan/217-south-sudan-a-civil-war-by-any-other-name.pdf
(detailing the dynamics of the most recent civil conflict in South Sudan).
64 See generally Adam O’Brien, Shot in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan
Civilian Disarmament Campaign, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 10 (2009),
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBAWP-16-South-Sudan-Civilian-Disarmament-Campaign.pdf (author argues that “the
market for small arms thrives with strong demand and supply, undermining
stability and threatening the fragile peace.”).
65 See SCHOMERUS ET. AL, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS INSTITUTE
FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, SOUTH SUDAN AT ODDS WITH ITSELF: DYNAMICS
OF
CONFLICT
AND
PREDICAMENTS
OF
PEACE
9-10
(2010),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/businessAndConsultancy/LSEConsulting/pdf/southernSud
an.pdf; Jonah Leff, Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda
Border Region, 3 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 188, 191 (2009).
66 See Ashish Kumar Sen, Violence Mars Investment Scene in South Sudan,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/13/violence-mars-investmentscene-in-south-sudan/?page=all.
67 RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 19. Under international law, host
governments are not required to compensate for loss to the investor caused by
non-governmental actors, though this sort of risk is usually insurable.
63
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Outside of violence, political or social unrest spurred by
large-scale land investment is a serious risk in South Sudan. The right
of communities to exercise ownership and control over their land
was at the heart of the Southerners’ demands during the civil war.68
Because communities endured hardship throughout the war, many
believe they have earned the right to be involved with decisions
relating to the use of land held by the community.69 Any attempt to
adjust or undermine the rights of landholders is likely to face stiff
opposition from groups at the local level.70
2. Expropriation. – Under international law,71 host nations have
the sovereign right to expropriate assets and to regulate activities
within their jurisdiction.72 There are, however, some conditions to
the general rule: a taking is illegal unless it is (1) non-discriminatory;
(2) carried out for a public purpose; and (3) accompanied by full
compensation.73
In a classic expropriation situation, the host government
annuls the investor’s title to an asset acting under local law. 74
Expropriation can also occur in indirect ways when no formal
transfer of ownership or control from an investor to the government
68
69
70
71

DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712

(1987).
72
The United Nations General Assembly expressed the principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in General Assembly Resolution
1803 in 1962. The Resolution declares that both people and nations have a right to
exercise sovereignty over natural resources in the area under which they have
sovereign control. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962);
see also Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and People’s Ownership of Natural
Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. Rev. 33, 37 (2006) (arguing
the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources is vested in peoples, not
states, though states retain a pivotal role insomuch as government exercises the
right to permanent sovereignty).
73 G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 72, ¶4; see also, RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra
note 60, at 8.
74 The term “nationalization” is often used interchangeably with an
expropriation of this sort if the taking occurs across an entire industry.
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occurs.75 International arbitral tribunals over the past twenty years
have concluded that government measures that eliminate
substantially all of an investment’s value may constitute “regulatory
expropriation” or “indirect expropriation.”76 These tribunals held
that withholding operational permits promised to an investor after
the considerable funds have been expended, enacting legislation
requiring corporations to be structured in certain ways, or
establishing the investment land as a protected area could constitute
regulatory takings.77
The Investment Promotion Act of South Sudan of 2011
provides a guarantee against expropriation that should, in theory,
reduce the risk of direct expropriation.78 It states that “there shall be
no expropriation of any enterprise . . . unless the expropriation is in
the national interest for a public purpose, . . . is made on a nondiscriminatory basis, [and] in accordance with due process of law.”79
According to this Act, compensation will be given without delay and
the amount given will be determined by means agreed to by both the
Government and the person whose property has been expropriated.80

Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratter v. TAMS-AFF Consulting Eng’rs
of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 219 (1984).
76 See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/1, Arbitration Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000) 40 ILM 36 (2001)
(“Expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host state.”).
77 See Metalclad, supra note 76; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Arbitration Award (May 29,
2003) 43 ILM 133; Starrett Housing Corp. v. Gov’t of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, 4
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122 (1983).
78 The Investment Promotion Act of 2011, 34 (S. Sudan), Jan. 20, 2010,
http://www.oxfam.ca/sites/default/files/imce/country-profile-south-sudan.pdf.
79 Id. at 34 (2).
80 Id. at 34 (3-4).
75
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While the GoSS has addressed direct expropriations in the
Investment Promotion Act, the manner in which community land is
held in South Sudan, combined with the practice of other
governments in Africa raises some concerns for investors.81 The
Land Act of 200982 states that all land is owned by the people of
southern Sudan, and the Government is responsible for regulating its
use.83 When no tenure can be established, the land is designated as
public land and may be granted to investors by the Government.84
Public lands only represent a small fraction of South Sudanese land,
and management of most rural lands is given to customary
institutions. 85 This situation differs from most African countries
81 The Government of Madagascar, for example, entered into a ninetynine-year lease for 3.2 million acres with a South Korean firm in 2009. The public
revolted against the agreement and helped lead to the fall of the Government of
Madagascar. The new leader almost immediately cancelled the deal with the South
Korean firm when he came into office. Madagascar Leader Axes Land Deal, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7952628.stm; see also
Anastasi Telesetsky, A New Investment Deal in Asia and Africa: Land Leases to Foreign
Investors, in EVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 1 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2012) (detailing the
expropriation experiences of other governments).
82 By discussing the Land Act I do not intend to provide an analysis of
land tenure issues in South Sudan. Rather, the Land Act forms the backbone of
the regulatory regime in land investment in South Sudan in the same way that the
Petroleum Act, discussed infra note 208, addresses oil production in Nigeria.
83 The Land Act of 2009 (S. Sudan) § 7 (copy on file with author).
Section nine of the Act classifies “land” as public, community, or private land. Id. §
9. Public land is land owned collectively by the people of South Sudan and held in
trust by the GoSS. Id. § 10. Public land includes land used by government offices,
roads, rivers, and lakes for which no customary ownership is established, and land
acquired for public use or investment. Id. § 73(5). Community land is land held,
managed, or used by communities based on ethnicity, residence, or interest.
Community land can include land registered in the name of a community, land
transferred to a specific community, and land held, managed, or used by a
community. Id. § 11. Private land includes registered freehold land, leasehold land,
and any other land declared by law as private land. Id. § 12.
84 The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 10(2)(ii)(b).
85 IS ACADEMY ON LAND GOVERNANCE, SOUTH SUDAN FOOD
SECURITY AND LAND GOVERNANCE FACTSHEET 4 (Apr. 2011),
http://www.landgovernance.org/system/files/Sudan%20%20Factsheet%20landac
%20april%202011.pdf (LANDac is a partnership between several organizations
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where the land is owned by the state.86 Establishing a land system
whereby communities are given ownership rights protects the rights
of communities, but makes allocating land for investment more
cumbersome.87
According to the Land Act, it is communities, not national or
state governments, that have the authority to allocate community
land rights for investment activity.88 The objective of this provision
was outlined in the 2011 Draft Land Policy, which states:
In many parts of the region, land holdings, large and
small, urban and rural, are being allocated . . . without
taking account of the rights of current landholders.
These practices reflect a disregard and in some cases
confusion over the proper land administrative
authorities to engage in when applying for land.
Some government officials have taken land allocation
decisions without consulting communities and
individuals who have ownership or use rights to the
land in question.89
These provisions of the Land Act and the Draft Land Policy
raise two red flags for land investors. First, the Draft Land Policy
unambiguously states that many land deals have been carried out in
an incorrect manner. This is, in part, due to the fact that state
governors across the country believe that attracting foreign
investment is among their top priorities and often do not strictly

involved in development-related research, policy and practice and supported by the
Government of the Netherlands).
86 Lorenzo Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the contracts?, INT’L INST.
FOR ENV’T & DEV. 16 (2011).
87 See generally Clemens Hoffman, The Contradictions of Development: Primitive
Accumulation and Geopolitics in the Two Sudans, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER
GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER
SECURITY 454 (Tony Allan et al. eds., 2013).
88 The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 15.
89 GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN, DRAFT LAND POLICY 2011,
1.6.7. (copy held by author).
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adhere to the law.90 At the same time, some communities have failed
to hold their state and local governments accountable because they
are reluctant to turn away foreign capital that may provide economic
opportunities.91 The lack of accountability, however, is beginning to
erode as communities are organizing and using the Government’s
rhetoric about community ownership to demand respect for their
interest in the land.92 These activities by the community increase the
risk of expropriation on the grounds that an established investment
violated the principles of the Land Act.
Second, the Land Act provision that grants the community
the authority to allocate community land poses some major
challenges to investors. Because South Sudanese communities are
rarely a cohesive unit, it is difficult for investors to determine who
may grant the land leases.93 South Sudanese communities are highly
mobile and often host a mix of groups.94 It is not uncommon for a
community to be comprised of those who have lived on community
lands for generations, those who have left the area during the war
and have recently returned and are claiming rights to the land, local
strongmen who claim ownership of an entire region, and those who
claim rights to land because they have historically enjoyed access to
the land for seasonal grazing purposes.95
In an example reported on by Financial Times and Rolling Stone
Magazine, a U.S. firm entered into a fifty-five year lease agreement for
400,000 hectares of land with Paulino Matip, a local warlord turned

David K. Deng, Competing Narratives of Land Reform in South Sudan, in
HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER SECURITY 454, 450 (Tony Allan et al. eds.,
2013).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Deng, supra note 90, at 450 (“communities are often fractured and
ambiguously defined entities”).
95 Id.
90
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deputy commander-in-chief of the army.96 The U.S. firm packed its
board with Southern Sudanese with strong political connections in
the hope that political connections could circumvent the need to
abide by the Land Act.97 Yet, the state governor did not believe the
General, or his family for that matter, owned the land.98 The leader
of the local county also knew nothing of the deal until nonprofit
researchers asked him about it. 99 The investor believed that his
contract to the land was secure by the strength of General Matip.100
General Matip died in August of 2012,101 and it is unknown at the
time of writing whether the land deal has been or will be nullified.102
Even if investors find an authorized representative of a local
community with whom to negotiate, local governance systems have
been so severely undermined by years of war that leaders may not
have the capacity to manage land transactions. 103 A particularly
extreme example of this occurred in 2008, when a Texas-based
company reportedly negotiated a forty-nine-year lease on 600,000
hectares in Lainay County, Central Equatoria State. Unfortunately
for the investor, Lainay County is comprised of only 340,000 hectares
and it is not clear how the investor was given rights to 600,000
hectares. This egregious example shows a lack of professionalism by
the investors, but also illustrates that some “leaders” in South Sudan’s
rural areas either do not understand the scale of the deals in which

96 Javier Blas & William Wallis, U.S. Investor Buys Sudanese Warlord’s Lands,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, 11:18 PM, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4cbe81e-de8411dd-9464-000077b07658.html#axzz2HGEDrED8; McKenzie Funk, Will Global
Warming, Overpopulation, Floods, Droughts, and Food Riots Make this Man Rich? Meet the
New Capitalists of Chaos, ROLLING STONE, May 27, 2010; see also FRED PEARCE, THE
LAND GRABBERS: THE NEW FIGHT OVER WHO OWNS THE EARTH 42 (2012).
97 Funk, supra note 96.
98 Deng, supra note 90, at 452.
99 Id.
100 Funk, supra note 96.
101 South Sudan’s Paulino Matip Dies in Kenya, BBC NEWS, Aug. 22, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19346831.
102 Email from David Deng, Research Director of South Sudan Law
Society, to Author (Jan. 2, 2013, 9:37 EST) (on file with author).
103 Deng, supra note 90, at 449.
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they are entering or are making illusionary agreements in order to
make a quick fortune.104
3. Corruption. – Corruption of both the local decision-making
mechanism and the larger political apparatus of the host state can
have a significant impact on the establishment and operation of a
foreign investment. 105 Government officials may require a bribe
before signing investment agreements, may require fees for access to
important decision-makers, or may sell land they do not actually
own.106 Investors may decide to pay these bribes or fees for several
reasons, most notably, because many projects would not ultimately
occur without payment.107 Yet, if an investor decides to work within
a corrupt system, it opens the investor up to liability under both
national and multilateral anti-corruption enforcement measures.108
Corruption is rampant in South Sudan. The President of
South Sudan admitted publicly in 2012 that South Sudanese
Government officials had stolen close to $4 billion since the end of
the civil war. 109 This amounts to about twenty percent of the
country’s annual GDP.110 Corruption in South Sudan is caused by
personal greed, but is also seen by some leaders as a necessary evil in
a time of political instability.111 According to a Reuters special report

Id. at 451.
See RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 22.
106 Id.
107 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed., 1997),
http://www.iie.com/
publications/chapters_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf (highlighting the economic
opportunities found in corrupt environments).
108 Id. at 48.
109 South Sudan Officials ‘Stole $4bn’, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18326004.
110 According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the GDP of
South Sudan in 2011 was $21.12 billion. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: SOUTH SUDAN,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/od.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
111 See Leonardo R. Arriola, Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, 42
COMP. POLITICAL STUD. 1339 (2009).
104
105
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from 2012, “the rulers of the world’s newest nation have fostered a
system of patronage and reward to provide short-term stability in this
vast and ethnically diverse country. But that has fuelled rampant
corruption that undermines the stated ideals of the country’s
liberators and its foreign backers.”112
The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission Act of
2009 governs anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan.113 This Act
establishes an independent commission “responsible for the
investigation of cases of corruption with a view to protecting public
property and combating administrative malpractices in public
institutions.”114 The Commission’s role was further clarified in the
Transitional Constitution in 2011, which states:
without prejudice to the powers of the Ministry of
Justice in public prosecution, the Commission shall,
inter alia, (a) protect public property; (b) investigate
cases of corruption involving public property and
public interest; and it shall submit such investigation
to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution; (c) combat
administrative malpractices in public institutions; and
(d) pursuant to the provisions of Article 121 (1)
herein, require all persons holding such public offices
to make confidential formal declarations of their
income, assets and liabilities.115

112 Hereward Holland & Pascal Fletcher, Special Report - In South Sudan,
Plunder Preserves a Fragile Peace, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2012, 6:35 AM,
http://uk.reuters.com/article
/2012/11/20/uk-south-sudan-governors-idUKBRE8AJ08K20121120.
113
Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2009 (S. Sudan),
http://southsudanngoforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AntiCorruption%20Commission%20Act%202009.pdf.
114 Id. § 6(1).
115 THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN § 20 (2011),
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/South%20Sudan/South%20Sudan_Trans
itional_constitution_2011.pdf.
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While the Interim Constitution grants the Commission the
power to prosecute cases of corruption, some analysts argue that this
rarely occurs in practice. 116 Some attribute the failure of the
Commission to prosecute cases to the lack of clear lines demarcating
the role of the Justice Ministry and the Commission.117 The failure to
establish clear lines has contributed to a situation where the
Commission has the authority to prosecute corruption but lacks the
experienced staff and political will to be an effective anti-corruption
entity.118
Recent attacks on activists and officials who publicized
corruption raise serious questions about the will of the GoSS to
combat corruption within its ranks.119 However, the current state of
affairs may not continue and investors cannot become complacent.
The GoSS is under intense pressure to crack down on corruption and
is receiving ample support from the international community to
strengthen its anti-corruption capabilities. 120 These pressures and
116 Mut Turuk, South Sudan: Anti-Corruption Commission, Functions and
Effectiveness, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 2012,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43878.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Alan Boswell, American Expelled from South Sudan for Anti-Corruption
Work,
MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS,
Aug.
20,
2012,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/20/162893/american-expelled-fromsouth-sudan.html; Hereward Holland, Anti-Graft Activist Kidnapped for 2 Days in
South
Sudan,
REUTERS,
July
14,
2012,
12:18
PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/14/southsudan-corruptionidAFL6E8IE15H20120714.
120 See GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011-2013
(2011),
http://www.jdt-juba.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/South-Sudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf
(providing government’s plan to use donor funding to combat corruption); see
generally U.K. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., SOUTH SUDAN OPERATIONAL PLAN 20112015
(2011),
http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SouthSudan-Development-Plan-2011-13.pdf; U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
TRANSITION PLAN FOR SOUTH SUDAN 2011-2013 (2011),
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/policy_planning_and_learning/documents/
SouthSudanTransitionStrategy2011-13.pdf (detailing the plans of two major
development donors for anti-corruption assistance).

190

2015

Stedjan

3:2

inducements may lead to more investigations and more oversight of
investment deals.
U.S. land investors must worry about more than just
corruption from within, and possible enforcement efforts taken by
the GoSS. U.S. investors must strictly adhere to anti-bribery
regulations on international investments placed on them by the U.S.
Government. Chief among the U.S. regulations that apply to largescale land acquisition in Africa is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977 (FCPA).121 Additionally, thirty-nine countries, including the
United States, have adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (AntiBribery Convention), which mirrors the FCPA in many ways.122
Land investment in South Sudan is particularly ripe for FCPA
violations.
Democracies with weak legal systems, endemic
corruption, and poor infrastructure pose significant FCPA risks.123
As many non-U.S. persons or entities vying for land in South Sudan
come from countries with no FCPA counterpart, 124 they may be
permitted to bribe local officials and place U.S. persons or firms at a
competitive disadvantage in securing leases. In such an environment,
15 U.S.C § 78dd-1 (1998). The FCPA makes it unlawful for certain
classes of U.S. persons and entities to make payments to foreign government
officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business. A detailed explanation and
analysis of the FCPA is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed account see
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE
U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
11
(2012),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/29520121114101438198031.pdf.
122 Conv. on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Int’l
Business Trans., Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 ILM 1,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/antibriberyconvention/38028044.pdf.
123 Lucinda A. Low & John E. Davis, Coping with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: A Primer for Energy and Natural Resource Sectors, 16 ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 286, 287 (1998).
124 Parties to the Conv. on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in Int’l Bus. Trans. does not include China or any Middle Eastern country. South
Africa is the only African country that has ratified the Convention. For a full list of
state parties, see Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD (Sept. 20, 2014)
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/.
121
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U.S. investors may feel compelled to resort to paying bribes in order
to not lose the investment opportunity.125 Violations of the FCPA
can lead to large civil and criminal penalties, sanctions, and remedies,
including fines, disgorgement, and/or imprisonment. 126 Thus,
international investors must take the law seriously and develop both
internal compliance programs and transaction-specific safeguards.127
4. Litigation and Reputational Risks. – According to the Interim
Constitution of South Sudan, “the right to litigation shall be
guaranteed for all persons; no person shall be denied the right to
resort to courts of law to redress grievances whether against
government or any individual or organization.”128 If the courts of
South Sudan follow the example of the courts of other African
countries, it is likely that investors in South Sudan face a risk of
litigation and the associated risk to the investor’s global reputation.
It is too soon to determine how South Sudan’s nascent legal
system will address potential litigation against land investors.
However, courts of other African countries have begun to broaden
the legal liability of international corporations operating in their
country.129 There has been a growth in litigation against transnational
corporations in Africa over the past two decades,130 which in large
part can be attributed to campaigns by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and media reports about the damage inflicted
by oil and mining companies in Africa.131 The globalization of media
Low & Davis, supra note 123.
Id. at 315.
127 Id. at 315.
128 THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
SUDAN § 20 (2011),
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/The_Draft_Transitional_Constitution_
of_the_ROSS2-2.pdf.
129 Jedrzej George Frynas, Social and Environmental Litigation against
Transnational Firms in Africa, 42 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 363, 371 (2004).
130 See id. (Between 1981 and 1986, Nigerian courts heard 24 claims
against Shell Oil. In early 1998, Shell was reportedly involved in over 500 cases.
Chevron was involved in only 50 cases in the entire 1980s and by the end of the
1990s was involved in over 200 cases).
131 Id.
125
126
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and the rise of new technologies, such as the Internet and cellular
phone cameras, enabled NGOs to detect and publicize wrongdoing
with speed and efficiency never seen before.132 These campaigns
have generally made judges more responsive to those injured by the
acts of oil and mining companies.133
While awards given by African courts are relatively small
compared to American or European courts,134 there is great risk of
damage to a company’s reputation. Even if the investor or company
obtains a legal victory, the damage inflicted upon its reputation may
outweigh the liability of a lawsuit. Damage to a brand can eliminate
millions of dollars from a company’s share value, initiate consumer
boycotts, and even result in serious recruitment problems. 135
According to a survey of major corporations by the Economist
magazine’s intelligence unit, companies found reputational problems
to be the most costly form of risk in financial terms.136 Among those
who had faced reputational problems, twenty-eight percent described
the financial toll as major.137
C.

The Risks of Land Investment in Southern Sudan for
Communities

Other articles and books have comprehensively addressed the
threats to the rights of communities posed by the wave of large-scale
land acquisition in Africa.138 Some studies argue that international
land investment contributes to food insecurity, 139 environmental
David Spence, supra note 23, at 61-62.
See generally Frynas, supra note 128, at 375 (quoting the Nigerian Chief
Justice of the High Court in 1989, “Judges . . . are more aware now of oil industry
than thirty years ago. . . . The judge cannot be isolated from what is currently going
on in society in line with a particular subject.”); Id.
134 Id. at 373.
135 Richard Boele, Heike Fabig & David Wheeler, Nigeria and the Ogoni II:
A Study in Unsustainable Development, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 121, 125 (2001).
136 Reputation: Risks of Risk, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Dec.
2005), http://www.acegroup.com/eu-en/assets/risk-reputation-report.pdf.
137 Id.
138 See de Schutter, supra note 40, at 503.
139 See, e.g., Geary, supra note 15.
132
133
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degradation,140 corruption, lack of benefits for small-scale farmers,141
and the possibility of eviction and displacement.142 Because many of
the risks to communities have been covered by other studies, this
article will only focus on the most serious risks: social turmoil and
armed conflict due to corruption and lack of benefits flowing to the
local population.
South Sudan desperately needs investment in the agricultural
sector.
According to a World Food Program 2012 assessment,
thirty percent of South Sudanese households are either moderately or
severely food insecure.144 About forty-four percent of households
receive at least one form of food-related assistance, such as food aid
or seeds.145 Approximately eighty-five percent of South Sudanese are
involved in agriculture for their livelihood and almost all South
Sudanese are small-scale subsistence farmers.146 Because subsistence
farmers do not produce food for the local market, much of the food
found in South Sudan’s urban markets is imported from Uganda,
143

140
See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL
ENVIRONMENTALISTS (NAPE) / FRIENDS OF THE EARTH UGANDA, LAND, LIFE
AND JUSTICE: HOW LAND GRABBING IN UGANDA IS AFFECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT, LIVELIHOODS, AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY OF COMMUNITIES (Apr.
2012), http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2012/land-grabbingcases-uganda/view.
141 See, e.g., Cotula & Vermeulen, supra note 38, at 1243.
142 See, e.g., de Schutter, supra note 40.
143 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 42.
144 See generally WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, FOOD SECURITY ANALYSIS:
SOUTH SUDAN FOOD MONITORING COLLABORATIVE (Oct. 2012),
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp253180.pd
f (The World Food Programme uses the term food security as a composite
indicator that includes information on food consumption (Food Consumption
Score), coping strategies (Coping Strategy Index), relative expenditure on food and
reliability and sustainability of income sources).
145 Id. (detailing the food security situation in South Sudan in 2012).
146 Astrid R.N. Haas & Sarah Armstrong, South Sudan’s Greenbelt: Can
Tapping Agriculture Assets Become the New Nation’s Economic Elixir?, USAID
FRONTLINES (Sept./Oct. 2011),
http://transition.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_sep11/FL_sep11_SUDAN_
AGRICULTURE.html.
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Kenya, and other countries.147 According to the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), over the last three years, South
Sudan imported approximately $262 million worth of produce from
neighboring countries, half of which were fresh vegetables that could,
and should, be grown locally.148
The South Sudanese Government believes their best hope for
food security comes from increasing private investment. 149
Experience around the world suggests that the central path toward
improving food security is through private investment and
entrepreneurship.150 Some analysts argue that if private investment is
properly channeled to support farming, South Sudan may be able to
increase its food production to target levels of one million metric
tons of cereal production annually. 151 Private investment in
agriculture also has the potential to generate government revenues
through leases and tax revenues, create employment, and bring the
technology and know-how required to develop infrastructure.152
While private agricultural investment has the potential to
unlock broad scale economic growth and development, a lack of
meaningful consultations, low employment prospects, and the lack of
domestic food security may undermine support for the government’s
investment promotional activities and could lead to social turmoil
and even armed conflict.153 As stated earlier, the Land Act of 2009
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
See SPLM Leaders Call for More Investments in Agriculture in Upper Nile,

supra note 1.
150 CALVIN MILLER, U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE AGENCY, SOUTH
SUDAN
AGRICULTURAL
MARKET
INVESTMENT
1
(2008),
http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/521/3-4_sudancase_150en.pdf.
151 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 10; see also GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011-2013 (2011),
http://www.jdt-juba.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/South-SudanDevelopment-Plan-2011-13.pdf (listing development targets).
152 DEININGER, supra note 5, at 34-42.
153 See generally id. (arguing that rural populations have sacrificed so much
in order to control their community lands. Also, attempts to undermine
community land ownership are likely to face stiff opposition from groups at the
local level).
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promised a community-led process of agricultural development and
consultations with community leaders about land policy. Yet, there is
a danger the process of large-scale land acquisition will reflect a
“continuation of the war-time economy which was characterized by
capital flight, one-sided contracts that favor the foreign investor, and
the government prioritizing the need of the investor over the local
population.” 154 According to a report by the aid organization
Norwegian People’s Aid, “generally speaking, there is a serious
deficiency in the extent to which communities are being consulted
regarding land investments.”155
Southern Sudanese expect large-scale investment to bring
jobs to the local population. 156 Yet, many of the foreign
multinational entities investing in South Sudan plan to employ highly
mechanized types of farming that maximizes returns. 157 Historic
evidence on the effects of foreign direct investment in agriculture
suggests the benefits of the investment do not materialize when the
investment uses highly mechanized production technologies. 158
High-tech farming reduces the need to create local employment and
may have more adverse environmental impacts, such as a more rapid
depletion of water supplies and land degradation.159 Additionally,
benefits in the form of jobs are further limited should the investor
import labor to manage high-tech farming enterprises. 160 It is

Deng, supra note 90, at 451.
DAVID K. DENG, NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID, THE NEW FRONTIER,
A BASELINE SURVEY OF LARGE-SCALE LAND BASED INVESTMENT IN SOUTH
SUDAN 30 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.rtfn-watch.org/uploads/media/new_frontier_largescale_land_grab_sout_sudan.pdf.
156 Id. at 32 (explaining a case study where the company promised 6,000
jobs but only hired 600 and laid off most of these individuals after three years).
157 Deng, supra note 90, at 453.
158 HALLAM, supra note 10, at 7.
159 Id. at 7.
160 See generally Ward Anseeuw, Lorenzo Catula & Mike Taylor, Expectation
and Implications of the Rush for Land, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND WATER GRABS IN
AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER SECURITY 424,
(Tony Allan, et al., eds. 2013).
154
155
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common for investors to import management and skilled positions,
leaving locals with only seasonal and low paying jobs.161
Finally, there is a conflict inherent in international agricultural
investment in food insecure countries like South Sudan. Investors
typically wish to export agricultural yield in order to meet their own
food security needs or to obtain profits by selling the products on the
international market.162 Host countries, on the other hand, justify
large-scale land acquisition as necessary to meet the host country’s
own food security needs.163 Many of the contracts investigated by
researchers are silent on this issue and leave the investor free to
decide whether to export or sell on local markets.164 The choice to
mainly export agricultural products may result in increased social
costs.
The South Sudanese have high expectations about what
independence will bring in terms of development165 and demand a
“peace dividend” from their government.166 The people of South
Sudan expect land investment to create employment opportunities
and food security and expect to be involved in land ownership and
use decisions. 167 Any attempt to remove communities from the
decision-making process will be faced with stiff opposition, and
possibly, armed conflict.168

Id.
COTULA, supra note 86, at 38.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Press Release, Amid ‘Huge Expectations’ for Transition to Democracy,
South Sudan Will Need All Support It Can Get, Special Representative Tells
Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/10450 (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10450.doc.htm.
166 See ERIN MCCANDLES, UN PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE, PEACE
DIVIDENDS
AND
BEYOND
24
(2012),
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peace_dividends.pdf.
167 DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
168 Id. at 15.
161
162
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II. LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
IN NIGERIA
The experience of international engagement in the extractive
sectors in Africa is a cautionary tale for both host governments and
land investors. Experience has shown that African nations that are
rich in primary commodities, whether fossil fuels, minerals, timber,
or land, often fall prey to the “resource curse,”169 unless governments
and investors take certain steps to minimize risk.170 Competition for
control of revenues from primary commodity exports and rents
continues to fuel cycles of corruption, conflict, and poverty in many
African countries. 171 Where large-scale resource exploitation
preceded the formation of a functional state, the effect of large-scale
commodity extraction has been negative, on average, and disastrous
in some cases. 172 The risks of investment fueling corruption or
The “resource curse” thesis posits that there is a negative relationship
between dependency on natural resource endowments and economic development
in part due to the deleterious impact resource dependency has on institutional
quality. See generally TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS
AND PETROL STATES
(1997); JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. WARNER,
NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (Harv. Inst. for
Int’l Dev., Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, 1995); CARLOS LEITE & JENS
WEIDMANN, DOES MOTHER NATURE CORRUPT? NATURAL RESOURCES,
CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMF WORKING PAPER WP/99/85 (1999)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9985.pdf.
170 See Norman, supra note 19, at 1-2.
171 See KARL, supra note 169.
172 Governments that rely on revenues from primary commodities face
risks for two main reasons: (1) rents and (2) price shocks. Rents are payments by
foreign entities to the government of a host country. Rents can come in the form
of oil leases, leases of land for plantations or agricultural development, or passage
rights through a canal. When a country allows foreign entities to exploit natural
resources, these rents form a large nontax income stream. Where a government
has little or no need for taxing its citizens, citizens lose the incentive to demand
accountability of those who spend the tax revenues, and consequently,
governments tend to be more corrupt. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Resource
Rents, Governance, and Conflict, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 625, 627 (2005); H.
Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of
Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 428, 428
(M.A. Cook ed., 1970); Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil
Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 17 (2005).
169
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conflict is particularly acute in post-conflict settings where tensions
between groups linger, legal and other accountability mechanisms are
weak, and many military age men, still armed and fresh off the
battlefield, are looking for employment.173
Governments that rely on revenues from the export of
primary commodities are also susceptible to the deleterious effects of
price volatility.174 The global prices of primary commodities are more
volatile than other prices largely due to the impact of weather and
new discoveries on the supply of these products.175 Spikes and drops
in revenues can make economic management very difficult, often
resulting in over-spending and corruption when the price of the
commodity is high, and public sector debt and popular frustration
when the global price is low.176
The experience of international oil and gas companies in
Nigeria between 1973 and 1999 is often cited as the poster child for
poor management of primary commodity exploitation.177 When the
Nigerian civil war ended in 1970, the country began a thirty-year
period of almost uninterrupted military rule.178 Nigerian military

Jill Shankleman, Mitigating Risks and Realizing Opportunities:
Environmental and Social Standards for Foreign Direct Investment in High-Value Natural
Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10519, 10521 (2012).
174 Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 172, at 627.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See ANNEGRET MÄHLER, GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL AND
AREA STUDIES, NIGERIA: A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE RESOURCE CURSE?
REVISITING THE OIL-VIOLENCE LINK IN THE NIGER DELTA (Jan. 2010),
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp120_maehler.pdf;
Carmen Gentile, Analysis: Nigeria’s Resource Curse, UPI, Feb. 14, 2008, 9:03 PM,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2008/02/14/AnalysisNigerias-resource-curse/UPI-82671203041007/.
178 See JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND
LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 42-43 (2000)
(arguing that between 1970-1999 there was only one civilian government in charge
of Nigeria. President Shenu Shagari held office from 1979-1983 but was
overthrown by a coup on December 31, 1983).
173
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dictators led the country down a path where the government became
almost entirely reliant on oil revenues.179 In 1970, twenty-six percent
of the government’s total revenue came from oil revenue.180 By the
end of military rule in 1999, oil revenues made up over eighty percent
of all government revenues.181 Despite the massive increase in oil
revenue, Nigeria in 1999 was one of the poorest counties in the
world.182 That year, Nigeria’s per capita GDP was thirty percent
lower than in 1965 despite oil revenues of roughly $350 billion during
the intervening period.183
In addition to the economic costs of oil dependency, the
people of the Niger Delta were routinely subjected to extra-judicial
executions, arbitrary detentions, and “draconian restrictions on the
rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly” by the
Nigerian security forces.184 These violations of human rights have
been committed principally in response to protests about the

179 See James Donnelly-Saalfield, Note, Irreparable Harms: How the
Devastating Effects of Oil Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by Nigerian Courts,
the African Commission, or U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
371, 373 (2009).
180 FRYNAS, supra note 178, at 26.
181 Id.
182 IMF
World
Economic
Outlook
Database,
Apr.
2000,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/01/data/ (Nigeria in 1999 was
the twenty-first poorest nation in the world with a per capita GDP of $279); See also
GB AYOOLA ET AL., COUNTRY SYNTHESIS REPORT PREPARED FOR THE WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000-2001, CONSULTATIONS WITH THE POOR: NIGERIA,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/3356421124115102975/1555199-1124138866347/nigeria.pdf (provides an assessment of
the poverty situation in Nigeria at the turn of the century).
183 SALA-I-MARTIN, XAVIER &, ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 9804, ADDRESSING THE
NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE: AN ILLUSTRATION FROM NIGERIA (2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9804.pdf (in PPP terms, Nigeria’s per capita GDP
was $1,113 in 1970 and is estimated to have remained at US$1,084 in 2000).
184 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING
COMMUNITIES 1 (Jan. 1999),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf.
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activities of the multinational oil companies. 185 Further, the
environment has been severely degraded by oil development. By one
estimate, the Niger Delta endured oil spills equivalent of the Exxon
Valdez disaster every year for fifty years.186
The FGN and multinational companies operating in Nigeria
learned from previous mistakes. At the turn of the century the
government and oil companies began to implement reforms and
change their behavior.187 These changes were intended to reduce
political risk for investors, build confidence in state institutions, and
ensure Nigeria’s natural resource wealth is used for the benefit of the
population. While Nigeria has a long way to go, these reforms have
begun to bear fruit.188
A.

Government Reforms

Since 1999, the FGN has been carrying out an ambitious
reform agenda that focuses on fiscal responsibility,189 transparency
and accountability, development, and privatization.190 The specific
Id.
Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf, A Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html?_r=0.
187 See Nigeria: Sustaining the Momentum for Growth, WORLD BANK (Aug. 1,
2009), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/08/11516615/nigeriasustaining-momentum-growth.
188 See Collier, supra note 24, at 3.
189 See
generally NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION (NIGERIA),
NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Nigeria_PRSP%28Dec2
005%29.pdf (outlining the National Strategy for reform, focusing on four main
areas: improving the macroeconomic environment, pursuing structural reforms,
strengthening public expenditure management, and implementing institutional and
governance reforms); see also Investment and Securities Act, No. 29 (2007)
(Nigeria),
http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/20090915470014THE%20INVESTMENTS%20AN
D%20SECURITIES%20Act%202007.pdf.
190 World Bank, supra note 187; see also Pat Utomi et al., Nigeria—The
Political Economy of Reform: Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth, THE POLICY
PRACTICE (Oct. 2007), http://thepolicypractice.com/papers/10.pdf.
185
186

201

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

reforms that can most effectively teach governments and investors
involved in large-scale land acquisition are discussed below.
1. Anti-corruption and Transparency Measures. – When the
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office in
1999, corruption “had eaten deep into the entire fabric of the
Nigerian society.” 191 President Obasanjo promised to fight
corruption during his election campaign, and Section 15(5) of the
new Constitution of 1999 required that the state abolish corrupt
practices and abuses of power.192 Accordingly, the first legislation
President Obasanjo brought to the National Assembly was the
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act of 2000.193 The
Legislature subsequently enacted the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission Act of 2004194 establishing the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission.195
The Corrupt Practices Act made it a crime for government
officers to ask for or receive any benefit for their governmental duties
outside of government salary.196 The Act further criminalizes bribery
by any individual of a public official,197 and makes the failure of a
government official to report an attempted bribe punishable by a fine
A. Irene Pogoson, Globalization and Anti-Corruption Reform in Nigeria:
2003-2007, in ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN NIGERIA SINCE 1999: ISSUES,
CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD 59, 65 (David U. Enweremadu & Emeka
E. Okafor eds. 2009).
192 Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999),
http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm;
Osita Nnamani Ogbu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Laws,
Institutions, and the Political Will, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 100 (2008).
193 See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 100; see also Corrupt Practices and other
Related Offenses Act No. 5 (2000) (Nigeria), http://www.nigerialaw.org/Corrupt%20Practices%20and%20other%20Related%20Offences%20Act
%202000.htm [hereinafter Corrupt Practices Act].
194 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act § 1
(2004) (Nigeria),
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Economic%20And%20Financial%20Crimes%20
Commission%20(Establishment)%20Act.htm.
195 Id.
196 Corrupt Practices Act § 8(1).
197 Id. §§ 18, 23 (related to contract awards).
191
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or a prison term not exceeding two years or both.198 The Act gives
the power to investigate corruption to an Independent Corrupt
Practices Commission. 199 After concerns arose over the political
independence of the Commission, an amendment to the Corrupt
Practices Act in 2002 clarified the roles and responsibilities of the
Commission and gave the power to prosecute offenses under the Act
to the Attorney-General. 200 Some analysts bemoan the lack of
political will by the government to fight corruption201 and how that
has stalled the effective implementation of the Act. 202 However,
others argue the Act fills a necessary gap in the Nigeria’s anticorruption regime and is “a strong step towards the eradication of
corrupt practices in Nigeria.”203
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of 2004
ambitiously attempts to eradicate “non-violent and illicit activity
committed with the objective of illegally earning wealth.”204 Financial
crimes include money laundering, contract scams, counterfeiting, and
fraud.205 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has been
a resounding success.206 In its first year the Commission recovered
over $700 million, arrested more than 500 notorious criminals, and

Id. § 22.
Id. § 3.
200 See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 130-31 (arguing that this was a bad
decision and that the Commission should be given the concurrent power to
prosecute corruption).
201 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL POLITICS: VIOLENCE,
GODFATHERS, AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA 31 (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/nigeria1007webwcover.pdf.
202 Ogbu, supra note 192, at 128-29.
203 Ijeoma I. Opara, Nigerian Anti-Corruption Initiatives (Berkeley Electronic
Press Working Paper No. 1392) (2006),
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6368&context=expresso.
204 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act §
46, cited in Ogbu, supra note 192, at 131-34.
205 Id. § 6.
206 Ogbu, supra note 192, at 134.
198
199
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investigated and prosecuted high profile cases such as the former
Inspector General of the Police.207
In addition to national legislation, Nigeria was the first
country to adopt the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI).208 The EITI is a global initiative that promotes transparency
in company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and
mining.209 Countries voluntarily sign up to the EITI and report to an
internationally appointed independent auditor on a monthly basis.210
The Nigerian experiment with the EITI is ambitious and path
breaking.211 Audit reports were carried out between 1999 and 2004
and subsequently made available to the public. According to
Nicholas Shaxson of the British Think Tank, Chatham House:
These reports . . . contributed to significantly better
transparency in Nigeria’s oil industry, collecting and
publishing an array of detailed and useful information
for the first time. Nothing remotely like this has been
done before, let alone published. The reports went
far beyond the basic core requirements of global
EITI; it produced not only raw data on the industry
and on tax and other fiscal matters; but it also
provided crucial and useful insights into processes
involved in the industry that have helped many
insiders and outsiders to see the oil sector in overview
for the first time.212
2. Extractive Sector Regulatory Regime. – The Petroleum Act of
1969 213 is the primary legislation underpinning the oil and gas
Id.
Nicholas Shaxson, Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
CHATHAM HOUSE (2009), http://eiti.org/files/NEITI%20Chatham%20house_0.
pdf.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Petroleum Act, ch. 350 (1969) (Nigeria),
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/nig/petroleumact.pdf.
207
208
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regulatory regime in Nigeria. The Petroleum Act was enacted in the
midst of the Nigerian Civil War and vests the entire ownership and
control of all petroleum in, under, or upon, any lands in the country
to the government. 214 While the government owns the oil, the
Petroleum Act further states that Nigerian citizens or companies
incorporated in Nigeria may be granted an oil exploration license, an
oil-prospecting license, or a lease to search for and carry away
petroleum.215 The holders of a license or lease are granted extensive
rights and powers over the land. 216 The First Schedule of the
Petroleum Act limits the rights of lease or license holders by stating
that a licensee or lessee may not enter upon, occupy, or exercise any
of the rights and powers conferred by his license or lease over any
private land until “fair and adequate compensation has been paid to
the persons in lawful occupation of the land.”217 The First Schedule
also requires that within ten years of the enactment of the lease, at
least seventy-five percent of all employees hired by a lessee or
licensee must be Nigerian citizens.218
The Petroleum Act remains in force, but some of its
provisions that protect the rights of investors and communities were
overtaken by events.219 When Nigeria joined the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) in 1971, it began to
institute reforms in line with OPEC’s preference for indigenization of
oil industries.220 In 1972, the government announced that it assigned
all of the areas of the country not covered by an existing license or
lease to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).221 In
order to take advantage of foreign capital and expertise, the NNPC
was authorized to form joint ventures with international

Id. § 1.
Id. § 2(1).
216 Yinka Omorogbe, The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in
Nigeria, 5 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 273, 275 (1987).
217 Petroleum Act § 36.
218 Id.
219 Omorogbe, supra note 216, at 275-76.
220 Frynas, supra note 178, at 31.
221 Omorogbe, supra note 216, at 277.
214
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companies. 222 From 1971, the government gradually set up joint
ventures with oil exploration and production companies and acquired
shareholding ventures.223 By 1979, the government had acquired a
sixty percent ownership of all major foreign oil companies in the
country.224
Under a joint venture model, the NNPC combined the
functions of an oil company with the regulatory powers of a
government ministry.225 This led to a “fox guarding the hen house”
situation where the incentives to regulate the industry based on social
and environmental needs of the Nigerian people were diminished.226
In March 1996, United States and Nigerian human rights groups
partnered to jointly submit a legal communication to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights alleging that Nigeria,
through a joint venture between NNPC and Shell International,
facilitated acts that were in violation of its commitments under the
African Charter.227 The complainants alleged that, because the FGN
was involved in oil production through the NNPC, it “did not
monitor or regulate the operations of oil companies, and in so doing
paved a way” for destruction of the environment and human rights
222 See Chudi Ubezonu, Doing Business in Nigeria by Foreigners: Some Aspects
of Law, Policy, and Practice, 28 INT’L LAW. 345, 359 (1994) (noting that before 1989 a
foreign company could only invest in Nigeria’s oil sector in the form of a joint
venture arrangement); see also Oserheimen A. Osunbor, Nigeria’s Investment Laws and
the State’s Control of Multinationals, 3 ICSID REV. 38 (1988).
223 Frynas, supra note 178, at 31.
224 Id. The sixty percent figure cited above exempts a production-sharing
agreement with Ashland and the Tenneco-Mobil-Sunray venture.
225 Id. at 33.
226 Tunde Morakinyo & Odigha Odigha, The Niger Delta and Oil
Exploration, Presentation to the 2009 Katoomba XV Conference, Accara, Ghana,
(Oct. 6-7, 2009), http://rmportal.net/library/content/translinks/translinks2009/forest-trends/2010-katoomba-xv-meeting-accraghana/Presentation_NigerDeltaOil.pdf.
227 Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic
Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria), Case No.
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rts. May 27, 2002),
available at
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_9
6_eng.pdf.
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abuses.228 After finding Nigeria in violation of its African Charter
obligations, the Commission appealed to the FGN to ensure that
“the safe operation of any further oil development is guaranteed
through effective and independent oversight bodies for the
petroleum industry.”229
Many observers of Nigeria believe reform of the countries’
regulatory regime is past due. 230 While privatization of the oil
industry proceeded steadily since the end of military rule231 and the
government transitioned to a policy of awarding all new contracts via
production sharing contracts232 instead of joint ventures, the basic
regulatory regime has remained more or less unchanged. Several
Id. ¶ 55.
Id.
230 SNR Denton, Nigerian Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, AFRICAN UPDATE
(Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2012/november/14/nigeriandraft-petroleum-industry-bill-2012 (stating that industry players are eagerly
anticipating and welcoming the notion of a more structured, consistent, and
transparent framework for the industry); see also Nigeria’s Oil: A Desperate Need of
Reform, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/middleeast-and-africa/21564906-goodluck-jonathan-says-he-wants-reform-oil-industryreally.
231 See generally Oil and Politics in Nigeria, PBS NEWSHOUR, Apr. 5, 2007,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/africa/nigeria/oil.html (noting
that President Olusegun Obasanjo introduced reforms in 2003 to privatize the
government-owned and -subsidized oil operations, or parastatals, partly in an
attempt to attract more capital investment and foreign business partners).
232 Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence As
A Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
395, 412 (2009) (Production sharing contracts are agreements “under which a
foreign company, serving as a contractor to the host country, recovers its costs
each year from production and is further entitled to receive a certain share of the
remaining production as payment in kind for the exploration risks assumed.”);
ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 72 (1994) (The switch to production sharing contracts has
been attributed to the government of Nigeria’s inability to adequately meet its cash
call obligations to fund joint venture operations); Olajumoke Akinjide-Balogun,
Nigeria: Legal Framework Of The Nigerian Petroleum Industry, MONDAQ (Apr. 3, 2011),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/10726/Legal+Framework+Of+The+Nigerian+Petr
oleum+Industry.
228
229
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unsuccessful attempts have been made over the last decade to pass
reform legislation. Finally, in the spring of 2014, the passage of a
Petroleum Industry Bill, 233 adjusting the fiscal and legal regime
governing the petroleum and natural gas industry, seems to be
gathering steam in the Nigerian National Assembly.234
The Petroleum Industry Bill seeks to reshape the entire oil
and gas industry in Nigeria.235 The Bill establishes a series of agencies
and positions charged with overseeing the industry, and introduces a
more transparent and competitive license award process. 236 The
major oil companies are actively lobbying for changes in the bill and
their opposition has in part caused the delay.237 Discussion of the
233 The
Draft
Petroleum
Industry
Bill
(2012)
(Nigeria),
http://www.nigerialaw.org/Legislation/LFN/2012/The%20Petroleum%20Industry%20Bill%20%202012.pdf.
234 Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill to Be Passed Soon - Sen Nwaogu,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Dec. 26, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212270299.html.
For details on what the Bill includes see KPMG, ADVISORY SERVICES PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY BILL 2012: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FISCAL PROVISIONS (Aug. 2012),
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxne
wsflash/Documents/nigeria-oct3-2012no1.pdf.
235 Draft Petroleum Industry Bill § 1(a-k) (Objectives include: enhance
exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in Nigeria and promote
petroleum production for the benefit of the Nigerian people; create a conducive
business environment for petroleum operations; establish a progressive fiscal
framework that encourages further investment in the petroleum industry whilst
optimizing accruable revenues to the Federal Government of Nigeria; establish a
commercially oriented and profit driven National Oil Company; deregulate and
liberalize the downstream petroleum sector; create an efficient and effective
regulatory entity; promote transparency, simplicity and openness; promote the
development of Nigerian content in the petroleum industry; protect health, safety
and environment; in the course of petroleum operations; and optimize domestic
gas supplies, in particular for power generation). Id.
236 Draft Petroleum Industry Bill § 190-1; see also SNR Denton, supra note
230.
237 See Elisha Bala-Gbogbo, Nigeria Bill Risks Output in Top African Oil
Country,
Shell
Says,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
Nov.
30,
2012,
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/taxne
wsflash/Documents/nigeria-oct3-2012no1.pdf; Pass Petroleum Industry Bill, Paul
Collier
Tells
Nigeria,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Nov.
9,
2012,
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/11/pass-petroleum-industry-bill-paul-collier-
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benefits and drawbacks of the Bill is beyond the scope of this
discussion,238 but passage of these reforms would address some of
the concerns of the African Commission and remove the cloud of
uncertainty facing investors.239
3. Land Use Act. – The Land Use Act of 1978 vested the
ownership of all land within a state to the governor of that state in an
effort to remove the traditional barrier to alienation of land and allow
for oil to be extracted cheaper and more efficiently.240 Prior to the
Land Act, the traditional land tenure system241 made it difficult to
purchase land owned by a community or family because the system
required oil companies to negotiate extraction rights with many
stakeholders.242
The Land Act is one of Nigeria’s most controversial laws,
because of the effect on both customary land rights and the inability

tells-nigeria/ (arguing that there are strong indications that one of the reasons
International Oil Companies (IOCs) are opposing the PIB is the lack of guarantees
to existing investors. Holders of existing joint-venture and Production Sharing
Contracts (PSC) licenses and leases would be required to re-apply for their
respective contracts within a year of the PIB’s passage).
238 For a detailed discussion on the bill with section by section
commentary, see ERNST & YOUNG, NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL – 2012
(2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Nigeria_Petroleum_Industry_Bill_
%E2%80%94_2012/$FILE/Nigeria_Petroleum_Industry_Bill_26Oct12_lowres.p
df.
239 See Camillus Eboh, Nigeria Oil Reforms to Be Taken-up by New Parliament,
REUTERS, June 1, 2011, 5:47 AM EST,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/01/nigeria-oil-reformsidUSLDE75019L20110601 (arguing that “[U]ncertainty over the Petroleum
Industry Bill . . . has left billions of dollars of potential investment on hold.”).
240 Land Use Act, ch.. 202, § 1(1) (1978) (Nigeria), http://www.nigerialaw.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm.
241 The traditional land tenure system was in effect in southern Nigeria.
The northern part of Nigeria operated under Islamic law and had a different land
system. See L. K. Agbosu, The Land Use Act and the State of Nigerian Land Law, 32 J.
AFRICAN LAW 1, 4-5 (1988).
242 Id.
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of communities to assert their rights in connection to oil
exploitation.243 Arguably the most controversial section of the Land
Act is Section 28, which provides that land may be appropriated for
“overriding public interest.” 244 Overriding public interest in this
context includes “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or
oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith.”245 The Act
legitimized the expropriation of land from traditional communities
whenever oil interests were present and allowed oil companies to gain
easier access to the land and oil resources because companies were
not obliged to negotiate with landowners.246 After enactment of the
Land Use Act, all negotiations on the alienation of land were to go
through the state. Nigerian scholar Jedrzej Georg Frynas has argued
that as a consequence of the Land Act “companies had lesser
economic incentive to investigate the local patterns of land
ownership, which can partly explain the carelessness with which oil
companies deal with communities.”247
Both President’s Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua
advocated for reform or amendment of the Land Use Act.248 The
Legislature has failed to enact the proposed amendments to the Act
and no major progress has been seen during the Administration of
President Goodluck Jonathan.249

243 Rhuks T. Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental
Justice, 53 J. AFRICAN LAW 289, 289 (2009).
244 Land Use Act § 28.
245 Id. § 28(2)(c).
246 See Ako, supra note 243, at 294-95.
247 Frynas, supra note 178, at 80.
248 Otei Oham, Nigeria: Representatives Reject Yar’Adua’s Land Reform Bill,
DAILY INDEPENDENT, Mar. 23, 2010,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003240320.html; Presidential Committee Seeks Land
Reform Panel, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 1, 2010,
http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=94072:presidential-committee-seeks-land-reform-panel&catid=1:national&Itemid=559.
249 See Emma Amaize, Ex-MEND Leaders Threaten Jonathan Over Land Use
Act, VANGUARD, July 22, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007220464.html.
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4. Investment Promotion and Protection. – While the government
of Nigeria, through the NNPC, was gaining a larger share of the oil
market and promoting an indigenization policy in the 1970s and 80s,
the government paradoxically also introduced new incentives for
foreign oil companies to stimulate new exploration.250 By the mid1990s, the Nigerian government was ready to promote international
investment and implement measures to protect foreign capital. 251
The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commissions Act of 1995
(NIPC)252 is the primary legislation regulating foreign investment in
Nigeria.253 The law was amended in 1998 to include the petroleum
industry within its scope.254
Because the FGN feared foreign investors were reluctant to
invest in the country due to the indigenization program of the 1970s
and 1980s, and particularly the nationalization of British Petroleum
by the Nigerian Government in 1978, 255 the NIPC Act provides
Frynas, supra note 178, at 33.
See generally Obida Gobna Wafure & Abu Nurudeen, Determinants of
Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis, 10 GLOBAL J. OF HUMAN
SOCIAL SCIENCE 26, 26 (2010) (reasoning that the new industrial policy of 1989,
the establishment of the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) in
early 1990s, and the signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the late
1990s are all examples of the Nigerian authorities trying to attract FDI via various
reforms).
252 See Id. at 26. While passage of the amended NIPC Act preceded the
Obasanjo administration by a year, implementation of the NIPC Act was left to the
civilian authorities and is often grouped as part of the reforms initiated by the
civilian government.
253 Investment Promotion Commissions Act Decree No. (16) (1995)
(Nigeria),
http://www.nigerialaw.org/Nigerian%20Investment%20Promotion%20Commission% 20Act.htm; see
also Khrushchev U.K. Ekwueme, Nigeria’s Principle Investment Laws in the Context of
International Law and Practice, 49 J. AFRICAN LAW 177, 177 (2005).
254 Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 179.
255 See ANN WEYMOUTH GENOVA, OIL AND NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA,
1970-1980 125 (2007) (arguing that the FGN nationalization of BP was justified as
an effort to punish the United Kingdom for its failure to support anti-apartheid
efforts in South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, the public narrative leaves too
many gaps and argues that the nationalization fits within the larger trend of
economic nationalism that the military government was pursuing in the 1970s.).
250
251
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concrete investment guarantees.256 Section 25 (1)-(2) of the NIPC
Act provides guarantees against nationalization and expropriation and
provides for fair and adequate compensation and access to courts
should land be expropriated.257
Additional guarantees against direct and indirect
expropriation have come in the form of bilateral investment treaties
and individual contract clauses.258 Nigeria currently has twenty-two
Bilateral Investment Treaties in effect259 that elect to have disputes of
all sorts settled by international arbitration forums such as at the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).260 Section 26(2) of the NPC also allows for the parties to a
contract to determine how the dispute will be settled.261 Most

Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 188.
Investment Promotion Commissions Act § 25(1)-(2) states:
“(a) No enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any
Government of the Federation; and
(b) No person who owns whether wholly or in part, the capital
of any enterprise shall be compelled by law to surrender his
interest in the capital to any other person.
(2) There shall be no acquisition of an enterprise to which
this Decree applies by the Federal Government unless
this acquisition is in the national interest or for a public
purpose and under a law which makes provisions for:
(a) payment of fair and adequate compensation; and
(b) a right of access to the courts for the determination of the
investor’s interest or right and the amount of compensation
to which he is entitled.”
258 See Duncan E. Alford, 36 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 506, 506 (2008)
(reviewing Khrushchev Ekwueme, et al., PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN CONTEXT: NIGERIA’S INVESTMENT LAWS, TREATIES, AND PETROLEUM
AGREEMENTS (2007)).
259 Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 198-202.
260 Id.
261 Investment Promotion Commissions Act § 26(2).
256
257
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Nigerian petroleum agreements contain local arbitration clauses and
are thus resolved in Nigerian arbitral tribunals.262
The enactment of the NIPC Act has not opened the
floodgates of new investment in Nigeria. 263 While the risk of
expropriation diminished, other forms of risk remain high in Nigeria
and deter investment.264
B.

Reforms of Multinational Corporations

Because the Petroleum Act gives ownership of oil resources
to the government and the Land Use Act vests ownership over land
to state governors, multinational companies made the mistake of
believing the government was the only Nigerian stakeholder involved
in their business. This failure, combined with some heinous practices
by oil companies, produced severe reputational damage to companies
operating in Nigeria.265 The behavior of oil companies in Nigeria also
resulted in an increasing number of civil suits filed against
companies266 and violent conflicts between oil companies and village
communities.267 Multinational oil companies have thus adjusted their
behavior since 1995 by, among other things, implementing

Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 203.
Id.
264 Id. See also Alford, supra note 258, at 507 (noting that frequent changes
in government, the Biafran civil war, the continuing unrest in the Niger Delta, the
imposition of Sharia law in the northern states of Nigeria, endemic corruption,
armed violence, an erratic power supply, and a persistent shortage of fuel have
discouraged foreign investment).
265 See Paul Lewis, Rights Groups Say Shell Oil Shares Blame, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/11/world/rights-groups-sayshell-oil-shares-blame.html?ref=kensarowiwa.
266 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
267 See generally INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, NIGERIA: OGONI LAND
AFTER SHELL 2-3 (2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/westafrica/nigeria/B054%20Nigeria%20Ogoni%20Land%20after%20Shell.pdf
(detailing the history and dynamic of the conflict between Shell and the Ogoni
people).
262
263
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development programs, adjusting environmental practices, and
engaging with communities.268
Generally, foreign investors can protect their investments
against political risk by structuring its business in a way that local
population have a stake in the project’s success.269 In the same way
that community opposition to an investment can lead to
governmental adversity to an investment, community interest in an
investment can lead to a stable investment environment.270 Often,
governments compel foreign investors to implement certain
measures aimed at building community support by host nation law.271
Some corporations, however, implemented policies on their initiative
to reduce reputational or legal risk272 or to gain consent from a local
community to carry out business activities in a certain area.273
1. Changes in behavior due to reputational risks. – Nigeria has
experienced a rise in litigation against international corporations since
268 See SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA, GAS
FLARING IN NIGERIA (2013), http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shellnew/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/gas-flaring.pdf (Shell oil cut
gas flaring by seventy-five percent since 2003); SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY OF NIGERIA, IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE NIGER DELTA (2012),
http://s07.staticshell.com/content/dam/shell/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefingnotes/improving-lives-2012.pdf (Shell contributed $83.5 million to development
initiatives (as required by law) in 2011, provided micro-credit that helped 30,000
people establish or expand businesses since 1998, and implemented a practice of
obtaining Memorandum of Understanding with communities and local
governments in 2006); see also CHEVRON CORP., Nigeria: In the Community,
http://www.chevron.com/countries/nigeria/inthecommunity/ (last modified Apr.
2012).
269 RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 40.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 David Spence, supra note 23, at 64-65; see also A Survey of Corporate
Social Responsibility: Just Good Business, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/10491077.
273 Sylvanus Elijah Abila & Damfebo K. Derri, Sustainable Development
Issues in the Niger Delta, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT
CHALLENGES 213, 227 (Festus Emirir & Gowon Deinduomo eds. 2009).
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the end of military rule in 1999.274 Litigation not only increased in
Nigerian courts, but companies from the United States have also
been hauled in front of U.S. courts and other international courts for
actions that occurred in Nigeria.275
As explained above, a company’s reputation has a direct
bearing on the likelihood of successful litigation.276 No other incident
impacted the reputation of oil companies in Nigeria more than the
violence and environmental degradation in Ogoniland.
Oil
companies gained billions of dollars from the oil extracted from the
land of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta since oil was discovered
there in the 1950s. 277 Dissatisfied Ogoni leaders joined with
international campaigners in the 1990s in a campaign to address the
deleterious impact of oil exploitation.278 The Nigerian government
Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Nigerian citizens filed suit against Chevron, asserting claims under Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) that Chevron allegedly acted through Nigerian subsidiary to pay
Nigerian military to carry out attacks on offshore oil platform. Ninth Circuit
upheld jury verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims.); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted 132 S.Ct. 472 (Nigerian
residents filed putative class action, under Alien Tort Statute (ATS), claiming that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations engaged in oil exploration and
production aided and abetted Nigerian government in committing human rights
abuses. Second Circuit dismissed claims.); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jad Mauoawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?_r=0 (Shell
settled out-of-court with the Saro-Wiwa family for $15.5 million in 2009); see also,
Ivana Sekularac & Anthony Deutsch, Nigerian Villagers Sue Shell in Landmark
Pollution
Case,
REUTERS,
Oct.
11,
2012,
11:24
AM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/us-shell-nigeria-lawsuitidUSBRE8991SE20121011 (discussing case against Shell in the Netherlands);
Alexis Flynn, Shell Faces Two Nigerian Spill Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304636404577299733426
445746?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%
2FSB10001424052702304636404577299733426445746.html.
276 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 147-48.
277 See Richard Boele, Heike Fabig & David Wheeler, Shell, Nigeria and the
Ogoni I: A Study in Unsustainable Development, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 74 (2001).
278 Id.
274
275
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responded to this campaign through repressive tactics that resulted in
thousands of Ogoni deaths and numerous other serious human rights
abuses.279 Under pressure from the Ogoni and international NGOs,
Shell was forced to pull out from Ogoniland in 1993.280
In response to the Ogoniland tragedy and other situations
that led to reputational damage, oil companies in Nigeria took action
to improve their environmental and human rights practices.281 While
oil companies undertook social responsibility initiatives for decades,
the quality of the investments greatly improved since 1995.282 Since
then, Shell International, for example, “has re-invented its corporate
strategy in line with principles of sustainable development and it has
committed itself to a level of stakeholder engagement on its
environmental and social performance which would have been
unthinkable in 1995.”283 Prior to 1995, Shell “placed emphasis on
one-time ‘gifts,’ rather than support for sustainable development
programs.”284 Previous development initiatives were uncoordinated
and focused on what Shell felt the communities needed, as opposed
to engaging the communities in their own development and making
communities stakeholders in Shell’s projects. 285 Instead of a top
down approach, Shell’s new approach “places emphasis on the
empowerment of communities” and empowers communities and
local governments to produce development plans, in which
communities set their own development priorities.286

279 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 184 (exploration of
human rights violations related to oil exploration and production in the Niger
Delta).
280 See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 267, at 1.
281 Uwem E. Ite, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in
Developing Countries: A Case Study of Nigeria, 11 CORP. SOC. RESPONSIB. ENVIRON.
MGMT 1, 4 (2004).
282 Id.
283 Boele, supra note 277, at 74.
284 Ite, supra note 281, at 5.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 6.
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2. Changes in behavior due to government regulation. – In addition to
actions taken by investors to improve their reputation and guard
against the risk of litigation, the FGN enacted laws that guide the
behavior of oil and gas companies. The Nigerian Oil and Gas
Industry Content Development Act of 2010 is intended to support
economic development by promoting indigenous service providers
and locally supplied goods to support the oil and gas industry.287 The
law sets minimum thresholds for the use of local labor, services, and
materials, 288 with a goal of embedding the oil industry within the
wider Nigerian economy by creating economic linkages between
Nigerian businesses and the oil and gas companies.289 According to
an analysis by KPMG, “if properly implemented, the Act has the
potential to facilitate the participation of Nigerians in the oil and gas
sector, and stimulate the development of other sectors of the
economy, especially the manufacturing sector.”290
Another way the Government is using law to change the
behavior of oil companies is to require companies to set aside funds
for local development initiatives. The Niger-Delta Development
Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act291 requires an oil producing or

Soji Awogbade, The New Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content
Development Act – A Game Changer, BUSINESS DAY (Nigeria), Apr. 29, 2010,
http://www.businessdayonline.com/ARCHIVE
/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=10547:the-new-nigerian-oiland-gas-industry-content-development-act-a-gamechanger&catid=133:legalindignity&Itemid =557.
288 Id.
289 KPMG,
NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY CONTENT
DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2010 1 (2010),
http://www.kpmg.com/NG/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docume
nts/Newsletter%20on%20Nigerian%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Industry%20Conte
nt%20Development%20Act%20-%20June%202010.pdf.
290 Id.
291 Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act
(Nigeria), Act. No. (6) (July 12, 2000),
http://www.commonlii.org/ng/legis/num_act/ndcea504/. For a detailed analysis
of the act, see Nelson E. Ojukwu-Ogba, Legislating Development in Nigeria’s OilProducing Region: The NDDC Act Seven Years On, 17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 136
(2009).
287
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gas processing company operating in the Niger-Delta Area to pay
three percent of its total annual budget to a Development
Commission. 292 The Development Commission is charged with
formulating development policies and implementing development
programs focused on transportation, health, education, employment,
industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban
development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications. 293
The proposed Petroleum Industry Bill discussed above294 also creates
a Petroleum Host Communities Fund to be filled by a requirement
that upstream petroleum companies295 contribute ten percent of their
net profits to the Fund on a monthly basis.296 The Fund will direct
money to the development of the economic and social infrastructure
of communities in petroleum producing areas.297
The reforms described above, in addition to other reforms
not mentioned, have helped the Nigerian economy grow an average
of 7.6% between 2003 and 2010.298 Unfortunately, the benefits have
not reached the average Nigerian. According to the U.S. Agency for
International Development, “while the successive administrations of
Presidents Obasanjo and Yar’Adua have enacted broad . . . policy
reforms, the implementation of these reforms has yet to register

Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act,
supra note 291, § 14(2)(b).
293 Id. § 7(b).
294 The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, supra note 233.
295 The upstream sector includes the searching for potential underground
or underwater oil and gas fields, drilling of exploratory wells, and subsequently
operating the wells that recover and bring the crude oil and/or raw natural gas to
the surface. Conversely, the downstream sector is defined as an oil sector term
commonly used to refer to the refining of crude oil, and the selling and distribution
of natural gas and products derived from crude oil. OIL & GAS IQ, IQ GLOSSARY,
http://www.oilandgasiq.com/glossary.
296 The Draft Petroleum Industry Bill, supra note 233, §§ 116-119.
297 Id. § 118.
298 WORLD BANK, NIGERIA: MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND
DELIVERING
SERVICES
TO
THE
POOR
1
(2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/731531302790208764/IDA_AT_WORK_Nigeria_2011.pdf (updated Apr. 2011).
292
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significant impact on the daily lives of ordinary Nigerians.”299 The
main reason for the failure of these reforms to reach ordinary
Nigerians is the lack of strong governance institutions, especially at
the state level, and a weak, non-oil economy.300 Decades of military
rule and underinvestment in the non-oil sector will not be erased in
one or two decades. If Nigeria continues along its current trajectory,
however, it may finally be able to escape the resource curse.

III.

APPLYING LESSONS FROM NIGERIA TO LAND INVESTMENT IN
SOUTH SUDAN

Governments and investors can draw many lessons from the
Nigerian experience in oil exploitation. Nigeria’s experience shows
that large-scale natural resource exploitation comes with multiple
risks to all stakeholders. Large-scale resource exploitation when state
institutions are weak, corruption is rampant, and rights of
populations are ill defined may lead to a situation where the benefits
of the resource extraction do not reach the population, and investors
face significant political risk. Nigeria’s reform efforts have also
shown, however, that effective policies and legal frameworks may
reduce risk.
Governmental efforts at combating corruption,
improving governance, creating an effective legal framework for
investment, and cooperating with investors to reconcile the
objectives of investors with the development needs of communities
may lead to benefits to all stakeholders.
The remainder of this article will use the Nigerian example to
provide eight recommendations for the GoSS and investors looking
to enter the South Sudanese land market that will reduce political risk
and help ensure the investment is beneficial to both investors and the
people of South Sudan.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, NIGERIA STRATEGY, 20102013 1 (2010), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP977.pdf.
300 WORLD BANK, supra note 298, at 2.
299
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Lesson 1: The Government and investors must engage in meaningful
consultations with communities prior to investment.
Government promotion of land investment in South Sudan is
an appropriate response to the food security and developmental
needs of the country. However, the pace of large-scale land
investment should slow in order to ensure the provisions of the 2009
Land Act are effectively implemented. The Land Act provides a
useful framework for allowing investment in a sustainable and
consultative manner. According to the Act, the Ministry granting the
lease must ensure that “the members of the community are duly
consulted . . . and the project for which the land has been leased
contributes to the social and economic development of the
community, the County or/and the State.”301 The Act goes further
and requires that customary land rights only be granted as a lease to
international investors if there is “consensus between members of the
community.”302
Implementing these provisions will likely frustrate investors
and government officials who want to speed up the pace of
investment. However, given Sudan’s history with conflict and civil
unrest caused by disputes over land rights, these measures are
absolutely essential. Populations must not only be consulted; they
must have the ability to refuse an investment contract. In Nigeria,
the Land Use Act vested the authority to grant leases to the state
governor without consultations with the community. This mode led
to a situation where the oil companies believed the government was
the only stakeholder and acted carelessly toward the local population.
South Sudan has wisely adopted a different approach. The GoSS
must rigorously implement these provisions of the Land Act because
the investment provides benefits to both investors and the South
Sudanese if power is given to local communities.

301
302

The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 27(4).
Id. § 27(1).
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Lesson 2: The Government must aggressively combat corruption.
Corruption creates distrust between the government,
investors, and the public, and thus must be urgently addressed if
South Sudan is going to have any chance of creating an enabling
environment for mutually beneficial land investment. Nigeria
continually struggled with corruption at levels that rival or exceed the
levels of corruption in South Sudan. In response to endemic
corruption, both countries established independent anti-corruption
commissions that take decisions over whether to investigate and
prosecute government officials outside the political process. South
Sudan is now faced with similar issues to what Nigeria faced in 2002
when, prior to the amending of the Corrupt Practices Act, power to
prosecute corruption was concurrently vested in an independent anticorruption commission and the Ministry of Justice. Because there
was a perceived competition between the Ministry and the
independent commission, the Nigerian legislature decided to vest sole
prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General. 303 South Sudan
similarly has vested prosecutorial duties to both an independent anticorruption commission and the Ministry of Justice.304 The GoSS
need not decide to vest sole authority in one entity over the other.
Concurrent authority has worked in other countries and has the
potential to succeed in South Sudan.305 However, the GoSS must
See Ogbu, supra note 192, at 130-31.
See Turuk, supra note 115.
305 See generally John R. Heilbrunn, WORLD BANK INST., Anti-Corruption
Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? (2004),
http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/AntiCorruption%20Commissions%20by%20John%20Heilbrunn.pdf
(noting
the
success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption and arguing
that the first key variable that might explain a failure to reduce corruption through
the establishment of an anti-corruption agency is the absence of laws necessary for
its success. Without the legal tools to go after venal officials, a commission cannot
succeed.); Melissa Khemani, Anticorruption Commissions in the African State: Burying the
Problem or Addressing the Issue? (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1353586_code1176273.pdf?abstractid=1334286&miri
d=5 (arguing that anti-corruption commissions can play a critical role in the anticorruption strategies of African states, provided they have certain structures,
functions and characteristics).
303
304
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make a decision to either build up the prosecutorial powers and
political will of the Commission or to grant sole authority to the
Attorney General. Without the legal tools and strong political
backing, no independent commission will succeed.306
Lesson 3: The Government must limit expropriation of customary land
to truly public purposes.
Implementing the Land Act requires the government to
ensure that any expropriation of private or community held lands is
legitimate. Like the Land Use Act of Nigeria, the South Sudan Land
Act allows the government to expropriate land for “public
purposes.” 307 Yet, unlike Nigeria’s law, where public purposes
embrace “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil
pipelines or for any purpose connected therein,” the South Sudan
Land Act defines public purposes in a relatively narrow way. 308
However, the South Sudan Land Act also includes a clause that states
that a public purpose can include “any activity with a public purpose
undertaken by the government as specified by any other law.” 309
South Sudan’s government must ensure that it does not interpret this
provision to include promotion of land investment notwithstanding
the communities’ right to refuse an investment.

Heilbrunn, supra note 305, at 15.
The Land Act of 2009, supra note 83, § 73.
308 Id. § 73(5) (Public Purposes is defined by the Act as: (a) exclusive for
government or general public use; (b) planning of any new Government area or the
extension or improvement of any existing Government premises; (c) sanitary
improvements and urban development; (d) social housing, resettlement and
reintegration; (e) control over land contiguous to any port, airstrip or airport; (f)
control over land required for defense purposes; (g) control over land whose values
enhanced by the construction of any railway, road, or public works about to be
undertaken or provided by the Government; and (h) any other activity with a
public purpose undertaken by the government as specified by any other law).
309 Id. § 73(5)(h).
306
307
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Lesson 4: Investors must guard against indirect expropriation.
While the legal regime established by the South Sudanese
Land and Investment Promotion Acts provides protection for
investors against direct expropriation of its investment, investors still
must face the risk of indirect expropriation.310 Government action,
such as increased regulation or a drastic change in the legal or tax
environment, which “would have the effect of depriving the owner,
in whole or significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit or property”311 remains a risk.312
Investors in South Sudan can learn from the Nigerian
experience. With great changes in society, like when Nigeria joined
OPEC in 1971 or the end of military rule in 1999, come significant
regulatory changes. These changes may have an adverse impact on
particular investment ventures. Protections for investors found in
the Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 were effectively ignored once
Nigeria joined OPEC. Further, reforms of the oil industry outlined
earlier in this paper could have great impacts on the ability of
investors to enjoy the benefits of their assets. South Sudan, as a new
state, will be crafting a large amount of legislation in the coming years
and the stability of the government remains in question as peace
negotiations between rival factions continue. Once an investment is
made and infrastructure is developed, investors become vulnerable to
changes in the local laws regulations and government policies. 313
Investors must therefore find protection against “creeping”
expropriation.314

See Marina Azzimonti & Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte, Barriers to Foreign
Direct Investment Under Political Instability, 93 ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 287, 289 (2007)
(countries that have higher political instability are predicted to exhibit higher levels
of indirect expropriation).
311 Metaclad, supra note 76, ¶ 103.
312 Azzimonti & Sarte, supra note 310, at 289.
313 See COTULA, supra note 86, at 40.
314 See RUBINS &KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 183 (creeping expropriation
may occur where a series of State acts have a cumulative effect of depriving an
asset of its value).
310

223

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

Investors in Nigeria and beyond use a variety of tactics to
guard against indirect expropriations. Such tactics include Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), stabilization clauses in contracts, and
political risk insurance. South Sudan has not entered into any BITs
at the time of writing. Yet stabilization clauses in contracts may serve
some of the same ends as BITs and could be included in land
contracts. Stabilization clauses may prohibit the application of any
new laws or regulations to an investment. 315 Other forms of
stabilization clauses would apply new laws and regulations to the
investment, but require the state to fully compensate the investor for
any compliance costs.316 While stabilization clauses are controversial,
especially when a country is implementing non-discriminatory
regulations aimed at promoting human rights or environmental
protection, these clauses can provide predictability and protect
investments from regulatory expropriation.317
The purchase of political risk insurance is one of the simplest
steps an investor can take to mitigate political risk.318 Insurance is
available through private insurance companies, state-sponsored
investment agencies, such as the United States’ Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), and multilateral agencies, such as
the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA).
Both OPIC and MIGA protect against indirect expropriation and
political violence. 319 At the same time, the simple purchasing of
insurance through a World Bank or U.S.-government-associated
entity may reduce political risk because the GoSS has an interest in
maintaining a productive relationship with both entities.320

315
316
317
318
319
320

Telesetsky, supra note 81, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 60, at 69.
Id. at 70-109.
Id. at 113.
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Lesson 5: The Government must not give up its police powers through
contracts.
There is a thin line between the sovereign right of a state to
regulate its economy and the act of indirect expropriation.321 The
GoSS, however, must find a way to effectively regulate its economy
while at the same time promote secure investments. According to
Lorenzo Cotula, “these tensions between investment protection and
sustainable development goals call for the development of innovative
approaches that can reconcile the investors’ legitimate need to ensure
stability of the investment climate with efforts to maximize the
contribution of foreign investment to the pursuit of sustainable
development goals.”322
The Nigerian government failed at reconciling the goals of
investment stability and sustainable development. The FGN erected
a regulatory regime in the 1960s and 70s that promoted investment at
the expense of oversight, transparency, and due process.323 Because
the FGN gained a majority stake in the oil companies in the 1970s,
the incentives for holding these companies accountable and ensuring
fair competition were diminished. To its credit, the FGN is
attempting to change the dynamics through passage of the Petroleum
Industry Bill. Yet, the process has proven difficult, and it is not clear
how easy it will be to make the petroleum industry more accountable
and transparent when much of the industry is operating under long321 OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS,
“INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION” AND THE “RIGHT TO REGULATE” IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 43 (2005), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/finance-and-investment/international-investment-law-achanging-landscape_9789264011656-en#page1.
322 LORENZO COTULA, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV.,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
3
(Mar.
27-28,
2008),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf.
323 See generally Decision Regarding Communication 155/96, supra note
227, ¶ 55 (finding that the FGN did not monitor or regulate the operations of oil
companies, and in so doing “paved a way” for destruction of the environment and
human rights abuses).
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term contracts. Nigeria has signed twenty-two bilateral investment
treaties that insulate investments from major changes in regulatory
approaches, 324 and the political power of oil companies remains
strong.325
The GoSS must learn from Nigeria’s failures and implement a
regulatory regime that protects community land rights and ensures
the benefit of investment is shared by shareholders and communities
alike. South Sudan must take particular care not to give up its power
to regulate through contracts or BITs. Because South Sudan has yet
to enter any BITs, it can start with a clean slate and ensure the public
interest is not compromised by allowing investments to shield
themselves from non-discriminatory regulations. South Sudan
should require, as a prerequisite for entering any BITs, language that
allows it to establish its own level of environmental protection and
human rights standards.326 This approach has been implemented by
the Belgium-Luxembourg and Ethiopia BIT327 and the USA-Rwanda
Ekwueme, supra note 253, at 198-202.
See generally Nils Klawitter, Battling Big Oil: How Four Nigerian Villagers
Took
Shell
to
Court,
DER
SPIEGAL
(Jan.
29,
2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/nigerian-farmers-take-on-shell-in-adutch-court-a-880159.html (stating that individuals filing a lawsuit against Shell will
be facing an armada of lawyers); Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, PIB - Oil Majors Lobby
Senators, Govt Officials Over Fiscal Provisions, THIS DAY, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210020070.html (“Multinational oil companies are
said to have spent millions of dollars lobbying the National Assembly and top
government officials to address their concerns over the fiscal provisions in the new
Petroleum Industry Bill.”).
326 Such an approach could follow the Article 12 of the BIT between
Mauritius and Comoros in 2001, which states: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting any measure whatsoever to
protect its essential security interests or in the interest of public health or the
prevention of diseases affecting animals and plants.” Agreement Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mauritius – Comoros, May
18, 2001,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.169.01.0001.01.ENG.
327 Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Belg.-Lux.-Eth., Oct. 26, 2006,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/360.
324
325
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BIT.328 Likewise, South Sudan should limit the scope of stabilization
clauses it signs with investors. Stabilization clauses may be
appropriate in certain circumstances, but only if these clauses do not
require the Government to abdicate its police powers.329 According
to Anastasia Telesetsky:
We should expect States to demand more of their
private investors. States with the ability to lease
arable land have a high demand commodity and need
not be cowed by sophisticated private investors who
present a ‘take it or leave it’ offer . . . States should
demand contract . . . conditions that will create an
investment climate which not only protects investors’
expectations but also safeguards the public interest in
a safe environment and meaningful employment.330
Lesson 6: The Government must ensure agreements are transparent.
According to a study by the Economist, land deals in Africa are
“shrouded in secrecy.”331 Transparency in land investment can help
set the conditions for greater competition among investors.
Transparency also fosters public confidence in land investment by
foreigners because contract awards would be subject to public
scrutiny. 332
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 110-23, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2241.
329 See COTULA, supra note 322, at 13-16.
330 Telesetsky, supra note 81, at 28.
331 Outsourcing’s Third Wave: Buying Farmland Abroad, ECONOMIST, May 21,
2009,
http://www.economist.com/node/13692889?subjectid=478044&story_id=136928
89.
332 THE WORLD BANK ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (RAI) THAT RESPECT RIGHTS, LIVELIHOODS AND
RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE PLATFORM FOR RESPONSIBLE AGROINVESTMENT
(RAI)
–
EXTENDED
VERSION
9
(2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/2145741111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf [hereinafter RAI].
328
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implemented by Nigeria was ambitious.333 It informed the public and
policymakers on the activities of oil companies and equipped civil
society with a tool to hold their government accountable.334 South
Sudan can learn from this experience and implement policies that
provide information on pending contracts and existing allocations of
land in a publicly assessable registry.335 Such a registry should include
meaningful information such as: the price paid for the property,
projections on use and cultivation targets, employment generated,
and expected tax revenue. This information would enable civil
society to take a more active role in land decisions. A land registry
would also lower transaction costs borne by investors who currently
must expend funds to investigate whether the claimed owner has
good title.336
Lesson 7: The Government and investors should negotiate contracts that
prioritize local food security and development.
Because South Sudan suffers from food insecurity and
underdevelopment, structuring land investment in a way that will
contribute to, rather than undermine, food security and development
is the utmost priority.337 Both investors and governments have a role
to play in ensuring food security. A joint United Nations and World
Bank report argues that while it is unrealistic to expect investors to
make food security their primary concern, slight modifications of
project design can have a major impact on the nutrition of local
populations at little extra cost to investors.338

Shaxson, supra note 208, at 2.
Id. at 7.
335 RAI, supra note 332, at 9.
336 See RAI, supra note 332, at 9. Such a registry would also prevent
situations like that of Lainay County, where the investor acquired 600,000 acres in a
County comprised of other a little more than half that amount. See supra Part
II.B.2.
337 See generally WORLD FOOD PROGRAM, supra note 144 (showing the
food security situation in South Sudan).
338 RAI, supra note 332, at 7.
333
334
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The GoSS must address food insecurity in a variety of ways.
The larger approach to food security is beyond the scope of this
article. Yet, as it relates to land investment, there are at least three
things the GoSS must do. First, South Sudan should consider
implementing temporary export restrictions on food that limit the
amount of food investors may export when food insecurity is
acute.339 Second, the Government should negotiate contracts that
require products to be grown that align with local dietary
preferences. 340 Finally, the GoSS must fully integrate investment
plans within a larger development strategy.
South Sudan has wisely embedded foreign investment in land
within its National Development Plan through the 2011 Draft Land
Policy.341 Yet, equally important is to ensure that investment plans
and contracts promote development initiatives.
Large-scale
agriculture based only on ad hoc decisions by often ill-informed
investors might not correspond to a host community’s best interest
in the long run.342 The GoSS must undertake legislative efforts and
negotiate contracts that ensure land investments contribute to its
national strategy for agriculture or rural development.”343
Nigeria’s efforts to promote indigenous service and sourcing
industries through the Oil and Gas Industry Content Development
Act of 2010 is one way of linking investment projects to
339 South Sudan is not a member of WTO and has not adopted the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, such export
restrictions are consistent with GATT article XI:2(a) (GATT’s prohibition on
quantitative export restrictions does not apply to “export prohibitions or
restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs
or other products essential to the exporting contracting party”). See Julia Ismar,
How to Govern the Global Rush for Land and Water, in HANDBOOK OF LAND AND
WATER GRABS IN AFRICA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOOD AND WATER
SECURITY 286, 290 (Tony Allan et al. eds. 2013); see also Joachim von Braun & Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, supra note 39.
340 RAI, supra note 332, at 6.
341 See SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 120,
at 72.
342 DEININGER, supra note 5, at 112.
343 Id.
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development initiatives. 344 South Sudan should consider passing
appropriate legislation requiring large scale agricultural projects to
hire local workers, train workers on mechanized farming techniques,
and require local sourcing of seed, fuel, and other inputs. Additional
legislation similar to Nigeria’s Niger-Delta Development Commission
(Establishment, etc.) Act 345 requiring investors to contribute to
development funds is also something that South Sudan should
consider.
Even if a land deal seems to be beneficial to the development
of the country as a whole, there may be local social and economic
impacts that must be addressed prior to a land transfer.346 The GoSS
should thus require social and environmental impact assessments
prior to the transfer of land. This requirement could be embedded in
the lease contract or through passing a national law that requires an
impact assessment to be carried out.347
Lesson 8: Investors must practice Corporate Social Responsibility
Because community attitudes toward an investor could
damage an investment or the investor’s reputation, practicing socially
responsible behavior is not simply charity; socially responsible
practices are necessary to minimize political and reputational risks.348
Because the community’s right to land has been undermined by
colonialism, years of war with its northern neighbor, and tribal
conflict,349 issues of land and food production are highly emotive for

See Awogbade, supra note 287; KPMG, supra note 289, at 1.
See Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act,
supra note 291, § 7(b).
346 COTULA, supra note 86, at 30.
347 See id.
348 See generally U.N. FOOD AND AGRIC. AGENCY, FROM LAND GRAB TO
WIN-WIN: SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN
AGRICULTURE 2 (2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/ak357e/ak357e00.pdf
(arguing that realizing the benefits of land investment will take efforts of both
investors and recipients. “Above all, it requires an understanding that collaboration
promises mutual benefits.”).
349 Id.
344
345
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the South Sudanese.350 How a community interacts and feels about
an investment in such an environment will have as much impact on
the productivity of the investment as market forces. Further, nonprofit campaigns focusing on the impact of land investment in the
developing world are starting to have an impact 351 and have the
potential to severely damage an investor’s reputation. The Nigerian
experience has shown these campaigns could lead to costly litigation
and changes in the regulatory framework under which investors
operate.352
The experience of oil companies in Nigeria is particularly
instructive in the area of social responsibility. It seems from Shell’s
recent social responsibility practices353 that the company has learned
that their investments operate within a set of social norms and
community expectations.
Shell seems to have learned that
empowering the community and giving everyday Nigerians a voice in
their own future is an essential part of their efforts to minimize
political and reputational risk.354
Land investors in South Sudan should not only attempt to
follow the example of Shell, but to exceed it. Shell’s reputation has

See DENG & MITTAL, supra note 49, at 15.
See, e.g., Josh Kron, In Scramble for Land, Group Says, Company Pushed
Ugandans
Out,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
21,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/africa/in-scramble-for-land-oxfamsays-ugandans-were-pushed-out.html?_r=0Oxfam;
Press
Release,
Oxfam
International, Investigation into Uganda “Land Grab” Must Be Genuinely
Independent
and
Transparent
(Oct.
4,
2011),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pressroom/pressrelease/2011-1004/investigation-nfc-uganda-land-grab-must-be-independent-transparent (noting
that the World Bank has called for an investigation into land grabbing claims in
Uganda).
352 See Frynas, supra note 129, at 371.
353 Spence, supra note 23, at 60-61.
354 See generally Ite, supra note 281, at 5-7 (“Shell has departed from the
community assistance (CA) mode to the community development (CD) approach.
The CD approach places emphasis on the empowerment of communities with a
view to significantly reducing dependence on Shell for socio-economic
development.”).
350
351
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suffered from decades of neglecting the needs and desires of
communities in their project areas. Land investors should strive from
the outset of an investment to not only increase shareholder value
but to generate tangible benefits for the communities in the project
area. This would require at the least: (1) respecting internationally
relevant human rights and labor standards; 355 (2) subscribing to
voluntary guidelines on land investment developed by international
organizations 356 and those endorsed by the African Union; 357 (3)
engaging with local communities to identify social risks, especially the
risks to women and vulnerable groups, and implementing risk
mitigation plans; (4) hiring local workers for higher skill work when
possible; and (5) rigorously complying with government regulations
and respecting existing land rights.
Finally, none of the socially responsible practices listed above
will succeed if the project itself is not economically viable and fails to
result in durable shareholder value. 358 All parties will lose if an
investment is not economically successful. Investors must be wary of
investments that are only economically viable when food and energy
prices are high and would fail under normal market conditions.359
The increase in investment in African agricultural land has occurred
at a blistering speed and the long-term economic viability of these
projects is still unknown. Because the economic decisions taken by
investors will have major repercussions for the livelihoods of people
355 Such standards are outlined in the U.N. Global Compact and the
ILO’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
356 See, e.g., WORLD BANK ET AL., Principles for Responsible Agricultural
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.II/CRP.3
(Apr. 16, 2010).
357 See, e.g., AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, AND
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, Framework and Guidelines for Land Policy in
Africa (Sept. 2010),
http://rea.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Framework%20and%20Guidelines%20on
%20Land%20Policy%20in%20Africa.pdf.
358 Harold Liversage, INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT, Responding to ‘Land Grabbing’ and Promoting Responsible Investment in
Agriculture
9
(IFAD
Occasional
Paper
2,
2010),
http://www.ifad.org/pub/op/2_e.pdf.
359 See RAI, supra note 332, at 13.
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in the project area, the stakes are particularly high. Investors must
not enter into contracts lightly and without doing all they can to
ensure the project is viable.

CONCLUSION
International investment in agriculture plays a vital role in
development and poverty reduction. Yet, international investors
operating in South Sudan face many risks: the lack of predictable
regulation, an unproven government, corruption, civil unrest, and
reputational risks. 360 Land investment also brings many risks to
communities: the erosion of land rights, uneven development,
environmental degradation, and violent conflict spurred by unmet
expectations. 361
This article argues these risks are not
insurmountable. The experience of international investment in the
oil sector in Nigeria has shown that with effective government
regulation and a combination of successful risk management and
responsible practices by investors, there is hope that international
investment would meet the expectations of investors, governments,
and communities.362
The task of transforming large-scale land investment from a
challenge to an opportunity will not be easy. In order to meet the
challenge, the Government of South Sudan should slow international
investment to ensure the rights of landholders are secured, the
challenge of corruption is addressed, and that land investment is
integrated into its national development and food security
strategies. 363 Investors must likewise take efforts to secure their
investment against the risk of indirect expropriation, engage in
meaningful consultations with communities, ensure investments

360
361
362

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 169-87.
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contribute to food security, and practice corporate responsible
practices.364
Since the end of military rule in 1999, investors and the
Government of Nigeria transformed themselves from the poster
child of the resource curse into something closer to being called a
success story. Nigeria still has a long way to go. But the reforms
undertook by the FGN and investors since 1999 shows that a
reform-minded government and investors willing to take the
necessary steps to protect investments and all stakeholders can pave
the way for mutually beneficial investment.
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NOT IN MY BACKYARD: UNCONVENTIONAL GAS
DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL LAND USE IN
PENNSYLVANIA AND ALBERTA, CANADA
Nathaniel L. Foote, Esq.*

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Province of
Alberta, Canada, lie in different countries, with different legal systems
and norms; but both areas have recently experienced prolific oil and
gas development. Pennsylvania’s and Alberta’s recent experiences
with exploding oil and gas development have much in common.1
Both have deep ties to the oil and gas industry, and each has beheld
massive growth in drilling activity in recent years.2 The industry’s
resurgence has produced a windfall, and communities in
Pennsylvania’s and Alberta’s energy-rich regions are prospering.3

Nathaniel Foote is an attorney with Andreozzi & Associates, P.C., a
litigation boutique that specializes in representing injury, crime, and sexual abuse
victims in civil lawsuits. The firm has represented victims from across the country
in high profile cases, including the Jerry Sandusky/Penn State University case.
1
Compare, e.g., Ross H. Pifer, What a Short Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving
Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 622
(2011) (explaining the increase in drilling since 2003 in Pennsylvania), with
AlbertaCanada,
About
the
Industry,
ALBERTACANADA.COM,
http://www.albertacanada.com/business/industries/og-about-the-industry.aspx
(last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (describing the dramatic expansion of Alberta’s oil and
gas industry).
2
See generally Pifer, supra note 1, at 622; About the Industry, supra note 1.
3
Compare, Pifer, supra note 1, at 625 (“[T]he natural gas industry has
spurred economic activity in affected communities.”), with Tavia Grant & Ora
Morison, Hot Job Market Feeds Alberta’s Record Population Boom, GLOBE & MAIL, June
22, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/hot-job-market-feedsalbertas-record-population-boom/article4362155/.
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With the good, however, comes the bad. 4 New wells and more
people have caused friction between landowners; state, provincial,
and local governments; and the oil and gas industry.5 Pennsylvania’s
and Alberta’s legislators and regulators are left playing catch-up. 6
After years of steady or slow development, each was caught off guard
by such rapid growth.7
Forced to cope with increased oil and gas development,
citizens in Pennsylvania and Alberta looked to their local
governments to rein in drilling. 8 As a result, government
representatives in both places became more active in the regulatory
process.9 In Pennsylvania, many localities used their authority over
local land use to check otherwise unfettered resource extraction.10
4
See, e.g., Pifer, supra note 1, at 625; see Kate Schneider, Urban Drilling
Policy
Announced,
CALGARY
SUN,
June
24,
2012,
9:14
PM,
http://www.calgarysun.com/2012/06/24/urban-drilling-policy-announced
(discussing residents’ worries about property values, air and water quality, traffic,
and lack of an evacuation plan).
5
See generally Pifer, supra note 4; see also Schneider, supra note 4.
6
Compare, e.g., Schneider, supra note 4 (explaining Calgary’s outdated
urban drilling policy), with Ayesha Rascoe, U.S. Shale Gas Regulators Struggle To Keep
Up With Rapid Development, Government Finds, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2012, 9:37
PM,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/us-shale-gasregulators_n_%201953135.html (explaining several GAO reports that recount the
EPA’s struggle to regulate drilling).
7
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 4; Rascoe, supra note 6.
8
Compare Ross H. Pifer, Drake Meets Marcellus: A Review of Pennsylvania
Case Law Upon the Sesquicentennial of the United States Oil and Gas Industry, 6 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 47, 59 (2010-2011) (“[C]itizens often look to their
municipalities as the primary regulator to remedy any real or perceived problems.”),
with Nickie Vlavianos & Chidinma Thompson, Alberta’s Approach to Local Governance
in Oil and Gas Development, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 55, 63 (2010) (“[M]unicipalities are
also increasingly being asked to respond to their constituents’ concerns about the
environmental and public health risks of oil and gas development.”).
9
See Pifer, supra note 8, at 59; Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at
63.
10 See Sabrina Tavernise, Pennsylvania: Gas Company Sues Over Zoning Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/us/pennsylvania-gas-company-sues-overzoning-rules.html (discussing Range Resources’ lawsuits against three Pennsylvania
towns).
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Alberta’s municipal governments enjoy comparatively less authority,
but have also opposed11—and even managed to halt—unpopular oil
and gas projects in some communities.12
Yet Pennsylvania’s and Alberta’s treatments of local land use
in this context differ considerably. On a basic level, Alberta’s
municipalities are statutory creations,13 while Pennsylvania’s localities
owe their existence to the state constitution.14 Fundamental cultural
differences also exist between Alberta and Pennsylvania regarding the
role of local authority. Pennsylvania has “a long and rich tradition of
local governance.”15 Alberta, on the other hand, “scarcely mention[s]
municipalities” as part of the Province’s regulatory framework.16
As a result, oil and gas companies operating in Pennsylvania
must navigate thousands of local zoning rules. Such a “[l]ack of
[regulatory] uniformity has long been an Achilles’ heel” for the

11 See, e.g., Dave Mabell, Council Opposes Oil & Gas Drilling in City,
LETHBRIDGE
HERALD,
Nov.
14,
2012
2:01
PM,
http://lethbridgeherald.com/front-page-news/council-opposes-oil-gas-drilling-incity-111412.html; see also Vincent McDermott, Shell Project Could Burden Population:
Municipality,
FORTMCMURRAY.COM,
Nov.
14,
2012
5:56
PM,
http://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/2012/11/14/shell-project-could-burdenpopulation-municipality.
12 See, e.g., Sepac Canada’s Oil and Gas Entrepreneurs, Population Growth,
Urbanization, and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as Potential Challenges for the Oil and Gas
Industry,
EXPLORER,
Fall
2012/Winter
2013
at
1-2,
http://explorersandproducers.ca/assets/files/SEPAC_Fall2012_Winter_2013.pdf
(recounting Calgary citizens’ opposition to a recent drilling project).
13 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 56 n.1.
14 See, PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (gives municipalities the right to adopt
charters, but the constitution does not explicitly establish the municipality).
15 Forced Municipal Consolidation, House Bill 2431, Pa. House Local Gov’t
Committee (Aug. 18, 2010) (statement of Betty Ann Moyer, 2d Vice-President, PA
State Association of Township Supervisors),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bBwzraeZKT0J:www.pa
house.com/Freeman/documents/CommitteeTestimony/HB2431%2520—
%2520Boroughs%2520Testimony.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=sa
fari.
16 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 56.
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energy industry.17 In fact, the state has twice tried to legislate away
local zoning in the oil and gas context. The Oil and Gas Act of 1984
and Act 13 of 2012 each sought to preempt local land use ordinances
affecting oil and gas development.18 Both laws, however, fell prey to
municipal challenges in state courts.19
Alberta, on the other hand, has largely avoided the “not in my
backyard” (NIMBY) approach to oil and gas development, and
“emphasiz[ed] the well-being of many, rather than the interests of a
few.”20 Though not immune to local political pressure, Alberta’s
energy industry enjoys manageable land use rules compared to
operators in Pennsylvania.21
Alberta’s approach to local land use should instruct
Pennsylvania’s. As much as the oil and gas industry would like to do
away with local roadblocks to drilling, Pennsylvania’s localities
cannot, and will not, be browbeaten by the state legislature.
“Individual citizens have more incentive to be involved” at the
municipal level,22 and local control over land use decisions is deeply
ensconced in Pennsylvania law and custom. Put simply, people care
17 Press Release, Marcellus Shale Coalition, MSC Statement on Pa.
Commonwealth
Court
Ruling
(July
26,
2012),
http://marcelluscoalition.org/2012/07/msc-statement-on-pennsylvaniacommonwealth-court-ruling/.
18 See generally Alex Chiaruttini, Comparison of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984
and Act 13 of 2012, STOCK & LEADER,
http://www.stockandleader.com/cms/uploads/articlesUploads/Pdf_101.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2012).
19 See generally Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa.
207 (2009); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012).
20 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 56.
21 Cf. Dan Packel, Drillers Face Harder Times if Pa. Pro-Fracking Law Falls,
LAW360, Oct. 16, 2012 6:20 PM,
http://www.law360.com/articles/387105/drillers-face-harder-times-if-pa-profracking-law-falls (explaining how Act 13’s defeat will make it harder for drillers
and landowners looking to capitalize on Pennsylvania’s gas boom).
22 WENDELL
COX
CONSULTANCY,
GROWTH,
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN PENNSYLVANIA 67
(2005), http://66.241.215.190/local_gov_growth_report.pdf.
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a lot about their neighborhoods. That is not to say, of course, that
Albertans do not feel strongly about their local communities,23 but
Alberta’s land use framework strikes a more delicate and nuanced
balance between local and provincial interests, and allows for a more
collaborative approach to land use decisions.24
This article recounts the recent history of oil and gas
development in Pennsylvania and Alberta and explains the two
jurisdictions’ divergent approaches to land use regulation in the
context of resource extraction. It will also describe the effects each
jurisdiction’s approach has had on oil and gas development, and how
Pennsylvania’s and Alberta’s local governments have respectively
adapted to increased drilling activity. Finally, it will suggest that
Alberta’s cooperative land use framework could be applied in
Pennsylvania, which would help mitigate the touchy relationship
between the state and local governments.

I. PENNSYLVANIA’S OIL AND GAS COMEBACK
The modern oil and gas industry was born near Titusville,
Pennsylvania, when Edwin Drake struck oil there in 1859.25 Derided

23 See, e.g., Nathan Vanderklippe, Calgarians Near Urban Oil Well Say ‘Not
in
my
Backyard’,
GLOBE MAIL,
June
28
2012,
7:10
AM,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/calgarians-near-urban-oil-wellsay-not-in-my-backyard/article4375710/ (describing community opposition to an
oil well in Calgary).
24 See, e.g., South Saskatchewan Regional Advisory Council, ALBERTA.CA, Nov.
29, 2012,
https://landuse.alberta.ca/RegionalPlans/SouthSaskatchewanRegion/SSRPRAC/
Pages/default.aspx (describing the South Saskatchewan Regional Advisory Council
and the communities’ involved in the planning process).
25 Judah Ginsberg, The Development of the Pennsylvania Oil Industry, ACS,
CHEMISTRY FOR LIFE, https://communities.acs.org/docs/DOC-1706 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2012).
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by critics as “Drake’s Folly,”26 the endeavor provided the world’s first
commercially successful oil well.27 The discovery ushered in a period
of rapid mineral development, and by 1901 Pennsylvania produced
half the world’s oil.28
Petroleum did not prove to be Pennsylvania’s only bountiful
mineral resource. Natural gas was discovered in Murrysville,
Pennsylvania in 1878.29 Soon, Pennsylvania was the center of U.S.
gas production, and remained so until the turn of the twentieth
century.30 The state experienced a decline in its share of national
production in subsequent decades,31 but a century later Pennsylvania
reclaimed its place at the forefront of the gas industry thanks to
Marcellus Shale and coalbed methane gas.32
The Marcellus Shale formation stretches 95,000 square miles,
from upstate New York, through Pennsylvania, and into parts of
Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, and Virginia.33 The Marcellus region
is particularly attractive to energy companies for several reasons.34
First, the formation is four times larger than the combined size of the
other well-known shale gas formations in the western United States.35
Second, Marcellus Shale has proved more productive than

Samuel T. Pees, Drake’s Well, PETROLEUM HIST. INST.,
http://www.petroleumhistory.org/OilHistory/pages/drake/drakewell.html
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2012).
27 Ginsberg, supra note 25.
28 Oil
and Gas, MCNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC,
http://www.mwn.com/services/xprServiceDetailSym.aspx?xpST=ServiceDetail&s
ervice=42 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
29 Pifer, supra note 1, at 618-19.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Bill DesRosiers, Northeast Pennsylvania Leads U.S. Natural Gas Production,
ENERGY
IN
DEPTH:
MARCELLUS
(Sept.
14,
2011),
http://energyindepth.org/marcellus/northeast-pennsylvania-leads-u-s-gasproduction/.
33 John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return To
Pennsylvania with a Vengeance: Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
34 Pifer, supra note 1, at 623.
35 Id.
26
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comparable shale formations by a large margin. 36 Finally, the
Marcellus Region is closer to cold weather population centers in the
northeastern United States than other shale gas formations, and thus
enjoys lower transportation costs.37
Until recently, however, Marcellus Shale gas was considered
commercially unviable, although the requisite extraction technology
has existed for more than seventy-five years. 38 That was proved
wrong in 2003 when Range Resources drilled the first successful well
into the Marcellus formation in Washington County, south of
Pittsburgh.39 Pennsylvania quickly witnessed a dramatic increase in
the number of shale gas wells drilled, both in western Pennsylvania
and in previously unexploited areas in the northern tier of the state.40
In fact, in the nine years since Range Resource’s first well, nearly
12,000 well permits have been issued in Pennsylvania.41
Coalbed methane extraction has also exploded in
Pennsylvania over the last several years. 42 Greater demand and
higher gas prices have made previously unexploited coalbed gas
profitable.43 Progress has also been made in techniques to extract
coalbed gas on a commercial scale, paving the way for increased
production.44 Today, for example, producers have the technology to
Id.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Pifer, supra note 1, at 623.
40 Id.
41 Russell Wright, Shale Tech: Marcellus/Utica Liquids-Rich Gas Production
Tempers Effects of Low Gas Prices, WORLD OIL (Nov. 25, 2012),
http://www.worldoil.com/magazine/2012/june-2012/features/shale-techmarcellusutica-liquids-rich-gas-production-tempers-effects-of-low-gas-prices.
42 Jason P. Webb, Pennsylvania & Coalbed Methane: Reviving the Traditional
Willingness to Protect Surface Owners, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 35, 36
(2008).
43 Id. at 35-36.
44 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas World
Energy Outlook Special Report on Unconventional Gas, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 29
(2012),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/WEO
2012_GoldenRulesReport.pdf.
36
37
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drill into coal seams both horizontally and vertically,45 making the
techniques for “fracking”46 modern shale gas wells and coalbed wells
substantially similar.47
Currently, there are over seventy oil and gas companies
working in Pennsylvania, including many recognizable multinational
corporations.48

II. OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE CORRESPONDING
POPULATION BOOM IN ALBERTA
Like Pennsylvania, Canada has a long history of oil and gas
development.49 Natural gas was first discovered in Ontario in the
1880s, 50 and has been extracted from Alberta for generations. 51
Alberta currently accounts for almost eighty percent of the natural

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 503 Pa. 140, 146 (1983).
Mike Soraghan, Baffled About Fracking? You’re Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/13/13greenwire-baffledabout-fracking-youre-not-alone-44383.html?pagewanted=all.
47 Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas
Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 999, 1011 (2010).
48 Pifer, supra note 1, at 622-624.
49 See generally, Canadian Ass’n of Petroleum Producers, The Facts on
Natural
Gas,
UPSTREAM
DIALOGUE
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.capp.ca/upstreamdialogue/naturalgas/Pages/default.aspx (click on
interactive publication).
50 Id. at 5.
51 THE APPLIED HISTORY RESEARCH GROUP, The Oil and Gas Frontier:
1913-Present, UNIV. OF CALGARY (1997),
http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/calgary/oil.html.
(Gas
was
discovered in the early 1910s in Turner Valley, southwest of Calgary. In the early
1930s oil was discovered beneath the Valley’s gas wells).
45

46
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gas produced in Canada.52 The province is also home to the third
largest crude oil reserves in the world.53
Like Pennsylvania, mineral development in Alberta has
expanded rapidly in recent years.54 Revenues from Alberta’s entire oil
and gas sector increased by almost fifty percent from 2009 to 2010,55
and the size of the province’s energy industry more than doubled
between 2000 and 2010. 56 Although exploration is ongoing, the
province appears to contain large unconventional shale gas and
coalbed methane reserves.57 The provincial government anticipates
shale and coalbed development will add substantially to Alberta’s
resource reserves in the future. 58 In just the last ten years, for
instance, the number of coalbed wells in Alberta increased from 20 to
over 18,000.59
At the same time, the Calgary-Edmonton Corridor, Alberta’s
most populated region, grew more than fifty percent from 1.7 to 2.7
million people. 60 This trend is not expected to slow down. 61
Boasting low unemployment and high wages, “Calgary and
Edmonton are Canada’s fastest-growing cities.” 62 The provincial
government expects Alberta will draw another million people in the

About the Industry, supra note 1.
Id.
54 AlbertaCanada,
Natural
Gas
and
Coalbed
Methane,
ALBERTACANADA.COM, Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.albertacanada.com/business/industries/og-natural-gas-and-coal-bedmethane.aspx.
55 About the Industry, supra note 1.
56 Id.
57 Natural Gas and Coalbed Methane, supra note 54.
58 Id.
59 AlbertaEnergy, Coalbed Methane FAQs How many producing coalbed methane
well connections are there in Alberta?, ALBERTA.CA, Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/naturalgas/750.asp.
60 Population and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as Potential Challenges for the
Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 12, at 1.
61 See generally Grant, supra note 3.
62 Id.
52
53
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next ten years. 63 The province has accommodated this growth
through construction of “sprawling residential projects . . . as well as
large-scale commercial and industrial projects surrounding Calgary
and Edmonton.”64 The cities’ growth has happened “mainly around
the edges, suggesting that urban sprawl has become the norm in the
growth of Canadian cities.”65 As a result, new oil and gas wells, and
suburban residential development, are converging for the first time.66

III.

LOCAL LAND USE AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN
PENNSYLVANIA

The drilling upsurge in Pennsylvania has had a significant
effect on communities in the Marcellus Region.67 The reinvigorated
energy industry has stimulated economic activity in affected
communities.68 Landowners have received windfalls from mineral
leases, and new jobs have been generated.69 The real estate market
has also been strengthened thanks to an increased demand for
housing and commercial space. 70 On the other hand, affected
communities have experienced “light, noise, dust, fumes, traffic, and
drastic changes to the land.”71 For some, this has meant a “decline in
the overall quality of life as a result of continuous industrial
operations.”72

See, e.g., Vanderklippe, supra note 23.
Population and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as Potential Challenges for the
Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 12, at 2.
65 Jordan
Press, Census: Edmonton, Calgary Fastest-Growing Cities,
VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Census+Edmonton+Calgary+fastest
+growing+cities+Canada/6119830/story.html.
66 E.g., Schneider, supra note 4.
67 See generally Pifer, supra note 1, at 625.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Smith, supra note 33, at 9.
72 Pifer, supra note 1, at 625.
63
64
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In an effort to protect their citizens from the unseemly side
of mineral development, municipal officials throughout Pennsylvania
have sought to restrict development through zoning for years. 73
Local government “has a strong heritage in Pennsylvania”74 and its
citizens often turn to local officials to address daily problems.75 With
2,632 governmental entities76 that possess zoning authority,77 oil and
gas companies face obvious problems trying to navigate a complex
and Balkanized legal framework.78 Some in the energy industry have
even complained that Pennsylvania’s municipalities use zoning as a
back door way to ban drilling altogether.79
Pennsylvania’s unwieldy regulatory mix generated a legislative
response in 1984 with the passage of the Oil and Gas Act.80 The Act
was intended to promote the development of the state’s oil and gas
resources,81 and, to that end, Section 602 of the Act preempted local

73 See Smith, supra note 33, at 30 (“Restricting drilling activities by zoning
districts seemingly employs a zoning method enjoyed by municipal officials for
years.”).
74 Pifer, supra note 8, at 59.
75 Id.
76 PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, LOCAL GOV’T ENTITIES
IN PA. 11, 11 n. 1 (3d ed. 2006),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MQA2qBthjQcJ:www.lg
c.state.pa.us/deskbook06/Basics01_Local_Government_Entities.pdf+&cd=1&hl=
en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari (in January 2003, there were 67 counties, 56
cities, 961 boroughs, one incorporated town, 1,548 townships (91 first class and
1,457 second class), 501 school districts and 2,015 authorities).
77 Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. 10601-10602 (the
MPC grants zoning powers to municipalities and limited zoning power to counties).
78 Cf. Press Release, supra note 17.
79 Kevin Begos, Pennsylvania Zoning Laws For Gas Drilling, Known As Act
13, Debated In State Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 2012 10:07 AM,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/18/pennsylvania-gas-drillinglaws_n_1979334.html.
80 1984 Oil and Gas Act, P.S. § 601.102, repealed by 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv.
Act 2012-13 (H.B. 1950) (West).
81 Id.
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ordinances that imposed conditions, requirements, or limitations on
those aspects of oil and gas operations regulated by the Act.82
To the chagrin of Pennsylvania’s legislature, however, the
state’s Supreme Court reached conflicting decisions in two cases
interpreting Section 602. The first, Range Resources v. Salem Township,
illustrated a typical clash between state and local regulation.83 In that
case, Range Resources challenged a local ordinance that regulated
certain surface development associated with oil and gas drilling
operations.84 The Supreme Court held the Township’s ordinance was
preempted because it “overlap[ped] substantially with the goals as set
forth in the Oil and Gas Act.”85
In Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont, on the other hand, the Court
held that the Oil and Gas Act did not preempt a local zoning
ordinance that governed well location, and not the “technical aspects
of well functioning.” 86 The Court found the ordinance did not
overlap with the Act’s stated purpose of protecting health, safety, the
environment, and property. 87 Oakmont had instead sought to
“preserv[e] the character of residential neighborhoods and
encourag[e] beneficial and compatible land uses.”88
By declining to extend 1984 Oil and Gas Act preemption to
ordinances affecting well location, the Huntley Court “opened the
door for some regulation of natural gas activities through municipal
zoning powers.”89 The decision consequently frustrated the oil and
gas industry’s quest for uniform statewide land use rules, since the

82
83
84

Id.
Reeder, supra note 47, at 1000.
See Range Resources–Appalachia, LLC v. Salem, 600 Pa. 231, 232

(2009).
85
86

Id.
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 223

(2009).
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 224.
Pifer, supra note 8, at 62 (2011).
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ability to select well location is seen as a critical requirement for
resource extraction.
Pennsylvania’s legislature did not rest on its laurels.90 Three
years after the Huntley decision, in February 2012, the state repealed
and replaced much of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984 with Act 13 of
2012.91
Act 13 made four significant changes to the 1984 law: (1) it
allowed for new fees to be assessed on unconventional wells; (2) it
created a formula for distribution of those fees; (3) it made changes
to environmental requirements; and, most germane here, (4) Chapter
33 of the Act required local governments to allow oil and gas
development in all zoning districts, drastically curtailing the authority
of municipalities to prevent drilling through zoning.92 The Act also
created an “expedited review process” that empowered
Pennsylvania’s Public Utility Commission (PUC) to render quick
decisions regarding local ordinances’ compliance with the law.93
Act 13 thus addressed the local ordinance provision of the
1984 Oil and Gas Act that had provoked significant zoning litigation,
including the Range and Huntley decisions. The Act attempted to
close the loophole left open by the Huntley court’s decision by
stripping localities of the power to regulate well siting by zoning
district.94
Act 13 was the result of negotiations between legislators,
industry players, and environmentalists.95 Yet despite support from

E.g., 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2012-13 (H.B. 1950) (West).
Id.
92 See generally PA’s New Oil and Gas Law, BABST CALLAND (Oct. 25,
2012), http://www.babstcalland.com/legal-resources/pa-new-oil-gas-law.php.
93 PA Commonwealth Court Prohibits All PUC Review of Local Ordinances under
Act 13, BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.bipc.com/pa-commonwealth-court-prohibits-all-puc-review-of-localordinances-under-act-13-11-05-2012/.
94 See Chiaruttini, supra note 18.
95 PA’s New Oil and Gas Law, supra note 93.
90
91
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the oil and gas industry, citizen groups,96 and Pennsylvania’s local
government associations, 97 the Act remained controversial. 98 In
particular, the law angered seven communities affected by drilling in
Marcellus shale. Two months after the Act’s passage, those localities
brought suit in the Commonwealth Court seeking to enjoin the law’s
enforcement and challenging its constitutionality.99
The localities won the day. 100
In July 2012, the
Commonwealth Court found Chapter 33 of the Act, the part
governing local zoning, unconstitutional.101 The Court said the Act’s
restrictions on municipal ordinances violated landowners’ substantive
due process rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania and United States
constitutions. 102 Act 13’s local zoning restrictions, the Court
explained, failed to “protect the interests of neighboring property
owners from harm, alter[ed] the character of neighborhoods, and
ma[de] irrational classifications.”103
The day after the ruling, Governor Thomas Corbett’s
administration filed an appeal with the state Supreme Court. 104
Arguments were heard in October 2012.105

EUGENE E. DICE, PENNSYLVANIA’S NEW OIL AND GAS ACT 10
(2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018416.
97 Scott Detrow, Corbett Administration Files Act 13 Appeal with State
Supreme
Court,
STATE
IMPACT,
July
27,
2012
4:53
PM,
http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2012/07/27/corbett-administration-filesact-13-appeal-with-state-supreme-court/.
98 E.g., Pam Kasey, PA Establishes Gas Impact Fee, Limits Local Regulation,
STATE
JOURNAL,
http://www.statejournal.com/story/16906145/shale-gaslegislation-only-awaits-pa-govs-signature (last updated Mar. 11, 2012 8:15 AM)
(“Environmental groups decried both the inadequacy of the fee and the removal of
local control, characterizing the local ordinance measure as a ‘takeover’ of
municipalities.”).
99 Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d 463.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 494.
102 Id. at 484-85.
103 Id. at 484.
104 Detrow, supra note 98.
105 Begos, supra note 79.
96
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After the Commonwealth Court rendered its decision, the
PUC suspended its accelerated review process for local ordinances
pending decision on the lawsuit by the Supreme Court. 106 In
September 2012, however, the Commission recommenced its
evaluations.107 It focused on ordinances it believed violated Act 13’s
still constitutional provisions and the Municipalities Planning Code.108
In response, the Commonwealth Court issued a “terse” order that
the PUC stop acting on requests for review of local ordinances
pending a final resolution of the case.109 The order relegated local
land use ordinance challenges to the “cumbersome land use appeal
process established in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code.”110 Rather than review by the PUC, the process requires a
decision at the local level by either a zoning board or a municipality’s
governing body.111 Appeals are then heard by county courts and
ultimately by the Commonwealth Court—the “process can easily take
a year or more.”112
Before issuance of the order, however, the PUC made two
decisions with broad implications. First, the PUC found that
Pittsburgh’s drilling ban—which earned the city council a standing
ovation in 2010 113 —conflicted with state environmental law. 114
Second, the Commission declared a North Towanda Township
Laura Olson, Pa. Reviewing Legality of South Fayette Drilling Ordinance,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE,
Aug.
22,
2012,
http://www.postgazette.com/local/marcellusshale/2012/08/22/Pa-reviewing-legality-of-SouthFayette-drilling-ordinance/stories/201208220188.
107 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC, supra note 93.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC, supra note 93.
113 Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh Forbids Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/us/17brfsPITTSBURGHFO_BRF.html?_r=0.
114 Laura Olson & Joe Smydo, Pennsylvania Says Its Drilling Law Trumps
Pittsburgh’s, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2012 12:00 AM,
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/pennsylvania-says-its-drillinglaw-trumps-pittsburghs-652872/.
106
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ordinance that governed well setback standards and water
impoundment areas to be overly restrictive on oil and gas operations,
and therefore in violation of state law.115 The Commission was also
studying ordinances from ten other municipalities, but the court
order prevented the PUC from rendering final decisions on those
ordinances.116
The Commonwealth Court’s ruling frustrated the oil and gas
industry.117 Unconventional shale gas wells come with “high initial
costs,” which puts “an additional premium on predictability.”118 The
imbroglio regarding Act 13 and PUC ordinance review jeopardized
the industry’s search for certainty.119
After waiting more than a year, the oil and gas industry was
dealt another serious blow when the Supreme Court decided the fate
of Act 13’s local zoning provisions in December 2013. In its
decision, the Court determined Act 13 violated the Environmental
Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania constitution that guarantees
citizens’ “right to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of

Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion re Compliance of North Towanda
Township, Bradford County, Zoning Ordinance with Act 13 of 2012; Docket No. M-20122298565,
P A.
PUBLIC
UTILITY
COMM’N
(Sept.
5,
2012),
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=
0CCQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.puc.state.pa.us%2Fpcdocs%2F119017
0.doc&ei=X60ZVOiUCtSfyATugIGYCg&usg=AFQjCNH2NvYwnQINtv3zj3Ux
Q92fnQFbIQ&sig2=23alq9qZBlADV6ryKDE2cg&bvm=bv.75558745,bs.1,d.aW
w.
116 The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission on Act 13, SAUL EWING LLP
(2012), http://www.saul.com/publications-alerts-934.html.
117 See Dan Packel, Drillers Face Harder Times If Pa. Pro-Fracking Law Falls,
LAW360, Oct. 16, 2012 6:20 PM,
http://www.law360.com/articles/387105/drillers-face-harder-times-if-pa-profracking-law-falls (“zoning issues could significantly curtail development if [gas
developers] have to go back through each municipality”).
118 Id.
119 See id.
115

250

2015
the natural, scenic,
environment.”120

Foote
historic

and

3:2
esthetic

values

of

the

IV. LOCAL LAND USE AND RESOURCE EXTRACTION IN ALBERTA
The oil and gas industry enjoys a comparatively simpler set of
local zoning rules in Alberta than in Pennsylvania. In fact, “little legal
attention is typically paid to local governments or municipalities in
Canada.” 121 This is particularly true with regards to oil and gas
development. 122 The province’s top down approach promotes
consistency, and has largely prevented the creation of a regulatory
patchwork.123 Alberta’s local governments are conciliatory toward oil
and gas interests, as they recognize “the importance of recovering [a]
valuable nonrenewable Provincial resource and to . . . [avoid]
compromis[ing] [its] extraction.”124
This is increasingly in doubt, however. 125 Mineral
development and the population grew precipitously in Alberta over
120 Marie Cusick, Pa. Supreme Court Will Not Reconsider Act 13 Decision,
STATE IMPACT, Feb. 21, 2014,
http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/02/21/pa-supreme-court-will-notreconsider-act-13-decision/.
121 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 56.
122 Id. at 91. (“There are no legal requirements to consult with, or even
notify, municipalities when such decisions are made, thereby reducing the ability of
local governments to influence decision-making and to plan and prepare for the
impacts from ensuing development.”).
123 Id. at 56.
124 Id. at 57 n.6 (referring to the City of Calgary’s position regarding
provincial mineral development).
125 See Roger Gibbins & Barry Worbets, Managing Prosperity: Developing a
Land Use Framework for Alberta, CANADAWEST FOUND. (last visited Jan. 9, 2013),
https://landuse.alberta.ca/Documents/LUF_Managing_Prosperity_%20Developi
ng_a_Land_Use_Framework_for_Alberta_Report-2005-09.pdf (“Although cracks
in the status quo do not yet signal an acute crisis, they foreshadow serious
challenges to come as pressures on the provincial land base rapidly increase.
Population growth and urbanization will continue, fueled by economic prosperity
and an enviable quality of life. The energy sector could expand dramatically in the
next decade in response to strong markets and the huge opportunities provided by
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the last decade.126 The changes beget conflict. Dramatic growth
caused issues among “competing land users, including industrial,
agricultural, residential, and recreational users; Aboriginal
communities; and environmental groups.”127 Alberta’s municipalities
are thus “increasingly being asked to respond to their constituents’
concerns about the environmental and public health risks of oil and
gas development.”128 In the last several years, several of Alberta’s
local governments have resisted conciliation, and taken a more active
role in oil and gas development.129
Alberta’s localities do maintain primary jurisdiction over
some land uses.130 Municipal governments are authorized to enact
land use bylaws that divide the municipality into zoning districts and
govern what uses are permitted within those areas.131 Many projects
require a development permit or subdivision approval from a locality
before land can be developed or subdivided.132 Alberta’s Municipal
Government Act,133 however, specifically exempts oil and gas

untapped conventional deposits, enhanced recovery, unconventional deposits like
oil sands and coal bed methane, and increased value-added processing.”).
126 See Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 63 (“[R]esidential
expansion of cities, towns or acreage subdivisions is occurring on the land above
existing oil and gas fields, coal and gravel deposits, or other subsurface resources.
In other places, previously undetected oil and gas fields are being identified beneath
existing urban and residential sites or new energy projects are being developed
within expected growth areas. Accessing these resources increases the potential for
conflict between industry, landowners and the public.”).
127 Alan Harvie & Trent Mercier, The Alberta Land Stewardship Act and Its
Impact on Alberta’s Oil and Gas Industry, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 295, 296 (2010).
128 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 63.
129 See, e.g., Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 57; see also Mabell,
supra note 11; Vincent McDermott, Shell Project Could Burden Population: Municipality,
FORTMCMURRAY.COM, Nov. 14, 2012 5:56 PM,
http://www.fortmcmurraytoday.com/2012/11/14/shell-project-could-burdenpopulation-municipality.
130 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 61.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26 (Can.).
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operations from municipal land use planning and regulation.134 The
decision to exempt oil and gas operations from local bylaws was the
province’s affirmation that “as the lifeblood of Alberta’s economy,”
mineral development “should not be subjected to local control that
might vary from place to place.”135 Indeed, Alberta’s Cabinet has the
power to supersede local land use by enacting laws governing
municipal matters in all areas of development.136
Alberta’s Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB)
handles oil and gas project permitting, as well as the overall
management of energy resources in the province. 137 Again, the
ERCB is not required to consult with municipalities in approving
energy projects.138 The Board does, however, require companies to
consult with those affected during the permit application process,
including local governments. 139 If unhappy, a municipality may
attempt to challenge a permit before the ERCB. But only those
whose rights may be “directly and adversely affected by a proposed
project will be granted standing before the Board” to challenge a
permit application.140 “[O]ne would think that municipalities should
almost always be able to meet the Board’s test for standing,” but the
ERCB has denied local governments standing on several occasions.141
Despite their relative ineffectuality, Alberta municipalities
have quashed several unpopular oil and gas projects. In 2006, for
example, the ERCB’s predecessor142 refused to issue licenses for six
Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 79.
Id.
136 Id. at 66.
137 See generally About Us: What We Do, ENERGY CONSERVATION BD.,
http://www.aer.ca/about-aer/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
138 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 65, 69.
139 Id. at 72.
140 Id. (internal citations omitted).
141 See id. at 73.
142 Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), ALBERTACANADA.CA, June
12, 2012 1:26 PM, http://www.albertacanada.com/business/invest/energyresources-and-conservation-board.aspx (“On January 1, 2008, the Alberta Energy
and Utilities Board was divided to create two agencies. The Energy Resources and
Conservation Board and the Alberta Utilities Commission focus on two distinct,
expanding and complex segments of Alberta’s economy.”).
134
135
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dangerous “sour gas”143 wells along Calgary’s southeastern edge.144
The decision hinged on the inadequacy of Compton Petroleum’s
emergency plans, which were necessary to protect the public from a
release of poisonous gas. 145 In the context of such a complex,
dangerous project, the Board instructed that municipalities—Calgary
in this instance—be allowed to evaluate the safety protocols and
provide recommendations prior to project approval.146 Instead, the
gas company had remained unresponsive and acted unilaterally.147
Calgary did not intend its reservations to be an “obstacle to business
development,” but the municipality refused to “roll over when it
[came] to public safety.”148 At the time, the ERCB’s refusal to grant
Compton the licenses was harkened as a “benchmark” for future
permitting applications.149
Local governments across the province have since presented
opposition to oil and gas development within their boundaries.150
For example, Lethbridge, in Southern Alberta, adopted a policy

143 Sour gas: Why it Makes People Nervous, CBC NEWS ONLINE, Aug. 10,
2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/environment/sour_gas.html.
144 Jodie Hierlmeier, EUB Gives Conditional Green Light on Sour Gas Wells
Outside
Calgary,
20
ENV.
L.
CENTER
1,
1
(2005),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ihKox344vRMJ:www.elc
.ab.ca/Content_Files/Files/NewsBriefs/EUBgiveconditionalgreenlight-Vol203.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari.
145 Id. at 1-2.
146 Id. at 3.
147 Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, Compton Petroleum Corporation:
Applications for Licenses to Drill Six Critical Sour Natural Gas Wells, Reduced Emergency
Planning Zone, Special Well Spacing, and Production Facilities—Okotoks Field (Southeast
Calgary Area), EUB DECISION 2005-060 (22 June 2005) [hereinafter Compton:
Okotoks],
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MQnrNcOqR1oJ:www.a
er.ca/documents/decisions/2005/2005-060.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
148 Plans Dropped for Sour Gas Well Project, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 5, 2006,
http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=82a0d40b-f818-4630-a20a848c0526d3e7&sponsor.
149 Id.
150 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 57.
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resolution in 2012 that fully opposed any drilling within city limits.151
Although the city council acknowledged the region “had fairly limited
exposure to oil and gas well drilling activity,” Lethbridge feared a
repeat of cases where the provincial government awarded drilling
rights within urban boundaries. 152 The city council intended the
measure to get “the attention of the provincial Energy Resources
Conservation Board.”153
In another case, reminiscent of Compton Petroleum’s
defunct sour gas wells, Kaiser Exploration ran into political
roadblocks in Calgary that halted development of an oil well within
the city.154 The planned well was expected to be over 500 meters
from the nearest house or body of water, far more than the 100
meters provincial rules required,155 and Kaiser obtained the necessary
permits from the ERDC without trouble.156 Before drilling, however,
“not-in-my-backyard” community opposition157 prompted the City of
Calgary and a local provincial representative to intervene. 158 The
provincial Energy Minister was also called.159 The Minister launched
a review of the province’s urban drilling policy160 and requested the
ERCB delay approval of Kaiser’s plans until the evaluation is
complete.161 In developing the new policy, Alberta plans to consider

Mabell, supra note 11.
Id.
153 City of Lethbridge: Council Adopts Position Opposing Oil & Gas Drilling
Within Urban Boundaries, 4-TRADERS.COM, Nov. 13, 2012 6:45 PM, http://www.4traders.com/news/City-of-Lethbridge-Council-Adopts-Position-Opposing-OilGas-Drilling-Within-Urban-Boundaries%E2%80%9415507503/.
154 Population Growth, Urbanization, and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as
Potential Challenges for the Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 12, at 1.
155 Vanderklippe, supra note 23.
156 Population Growth, Urbanization, and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as
Potential Challenges for the Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 12, at 1.
157 Vanderklippe, supra note 23.
158 Population Growth, Urbanization, and NIMBYism in Alberta Emerge as
Potential Challenges for the Oil and Gas Industry, supra note 12, at 1.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Schneider, supra note 4.
151
152
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issues such as well proximity to houses and what emergency response
plans will be required of companies operating in urban areas.162
To address Alberta’s increasing land-use conflicts and codify
the provincial land policy, the province enacted the Alberta Land
Stewardship Act (ALSA) in 2009. 163 The Act represented the
statutory embodiment of the province’s overarching land use
strategy, and was designed to manage public and private lands and
natural resources in the province.164 The provincial government, with
public comment, set Alberta’s energy policy and established planning
regions for the province.165 To affect its goals, the provincial Cabinet
was empowered to establish regional plans that are legally binding on
local governments. 166 Municipalities are required to make future
development and land use decisions in accordance with those
plans, 167 and must “amend planning documents to adopt regional
planning directions.”168
Although the ALSA contained no requirement for local
government representation in regional planning, 169 Alberta’s
provincial government intends to include municipal governments in
the process, along with industry, nongovernmental, aboriginal
groups, and “other relevant planning bodies.”170
As a practical matter, municipalities have played a significant
role in the development of Alberta’s regional plans. 171 So far,
Vanderklippe, supra note 23.
Land Stewardship Act, S.A. 2009, c. A-26.8 (Can.).
164 Harvie & Mercier, supra note 127, at 296.
165 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 58, 78.
166 Id. at 66.
167 Id.
168 Alberta Land-Use Framework, CITY OF EDMONTON (Dec. 2008),
http://www.edmonton.ca/city_government/documents/Alberta_Land_Use_Fram
ework.pdf#search=alberta%20land-use%20framework.
169 Vlavianos & Thompson, supra note 8, at 67.
170 Alberta Land-Use Framework, supra note 168.
171 See
generally Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource
Development, Regional Plans, ALBERTA.CA,
https://www.landuse.alberta.ca/RegionalPlans/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 28, 2012).
162
163
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municipal authorities, including local mayors and members of town
councils, provided input and served on the regional planning
council.172

V. ALBERTA’S EXPERIENCE IS INSTRUCTIVE FOR PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania and Alberta’s experiences with municipal
objections to oil and gas development show that localities will not be
forced into compliance with state or provincial goals. This is
unsurprising given Pennsylvanians’ penchant for strong local
government. Albertans’ reluctance is uncharacteristic for the region,
and therefore dramatically illustrates the inescapability of state and
local political conflicts, even where municipal governments exercise
comparatively little power.
In Pennsylvania, the disagreement will not subside under the
state’s current regulatory framework, especially since Act 13's key
provision was invalidated by the state's Supreme Court.173 Unless
drilling activity decreases, there is no reason to think local
governments will face fewer complaints from citizens in affected
communities. State regulators and legislators will also face pressure
from the oil and gas industry.174 Act 13 represented a failed attempt
at reconciling the interests of Pennsylvania’s various stakeholders.175

172 See
Lower Athabasca Regional Advisory Council, ALBERTA.CA,
https://www.landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/Lower%20Athabasca%
20Regional%20Advisory%20Council%20Members%20-%202009-06.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 29, 2012); see also South Saskatchewan Regional Advisory Council Members,
supra note 24.
173 See Timothy Puko, Ruling on Act 13 Won’t End Fray, TRIBLIVE, Dec.
10, 2012, 11:56 PM, http://triblive.com/news/3110483-74/state-courtact#axzz2HLw8nPnr.
174 See id.
175 See Detrow, supra note 97 (“[T]he provisions casually set aside by the
court were the result of months of compromise and negotiation, with significant
input and support from Pennsylvania’s local government associations.”).
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Rather than end the consistently prickly debate regarding municipal
regulation of oil and gas drilling, the Act resulted in new litigation.176
That the County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania and the
State Association of Township Supervisors supported Act 13 did not
influence the seven municipalities who challenged the law.177 The
municipalities’ success also emboldened other discontented localities
and environmental groups, several of which filed amicus briefs with
the Supreme Court opposing the Act.178
Pennsylvania’s local communities argued that Act 13’s onesize-fits-all approach to oil and gas regulation ignores individual
localities’ unique physical and political characteristics.179 Statewide
rules may “expedite unconventional gas drilling” and “encourage
investment by giving companies regulatory and financial certainty,”180
but Act 13 ignored fundamental differences between urban,
suburban, and rural communities. Even oil and gas companies have
recognized that drilling in large cities, for example, is impracticable.181
According to one industry spokesman, “density and distance from
any pipeline make drilling in Pittsburgh . . . a bad idea.”182

Id.
See Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d 463.
178 Cowardly “Me Too” Towns Support Act 13 Lawsuit in 11th Hour,
MARCELLUS DRILLING NEWS, http://marcellusdrilling.com/2012/09/cowardlyme-too-towns-support-act-13-lawsuit-in-11th-hour/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
179 See Special Treatment: How Did Two Counties Rate a Ban on Gas Drilling?,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 15, 2012, 12:07 AM, http://www.postgazette.com/opinion/editorials/2012/07/15/Special-treatment-How-did-twocounties-rate-a-ban-on-gas-drilling/stories/201207150129.
180 John H. Quigley & Joel P. Epstein, Go Beyond Act 13: Gas Companies
Should Acknowledge Local Needs in Community Compacts, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/gobeyond-act-13-gas-companies-should-acknowledge-local-needs-in-communitycompacts-631389/.
181 Brian O’Neill, City Drilling Ban Seems a Shallow Debate, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(July
21,
2011
12:00
AM),
http://www.postgazette.com/stories/opinion/brian-oneill/city-drilling-ban-seems-a-shallowdebate-307078/#ixzz2HUX5oSwA.
182 Id.
176
177
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In Pennsylvania, rural Bradford County’s experience
unmistakably illustrates the rural-urban divide.183 More wells have
been drilled in Bradford than anywhere else in Pennsylvania. 184
Thanks to Act 13 the county collected more than $8 million in
impact fees in 2012, and was able to reduce property taxes as a
result.185 Bradford’s struggling farmers have also been bolstered by
lease payments from energy companies.186 At the same time, though,
locals struggled with increased traffic, polluted water wells, acid spills,
and a gas well blowout.187 Pittsburghers have experienced no such
consequences of gas development.
Rural and urban Pennsylvania’s differences are not only
physical. Even before the Act 13 litigation began, two suburban
Philadelphia counties managed to exempt themselves from the Act’s
one-size fits all approach. 188 The counties’ state representatives
tucked a localized drilling moratorium into the state’s annual budget
at the eleventh hour.189 The move angered rural counties left to cope
with unrestrained gas drilling. 190 The moratorium highlighted the
dissimilar political clout enjoyed by suburban, urban, and rural
Pennsylvanians on energy issues.

Pennsylvania’s Busiest Drilling County: Bradford, STATE IMPACT,
http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/tag/bradford-county/ (last visited Jan. 9,
2013).
184 Id.
185 James Loewenstein, Bradford County’s $8.4M Impact Fee Allotment Arrives,
DAILY REVIEW, Nov. 16, 2012, http://thedailyreview.com/news/bradford-countys-8-4m-impact-fee-allotment-arrives-1.1404090.
186 Eric Boehm, Farmers Highlight Pennsylvania Gas Industry’s Positive Impact,
PENNSYLVANIA INDEP., May 11, 2011,
http://paindependent.com/2011/05/farmers-highlight-pennsylvania-gas-industryspositive-impact/.
187 Pennsylvania’s Busiest Drilling County: Bradford, supra note 183.
188 Michael Macagnone & Angela Couloumbis, Local Drilling Moratorium
Rankles Rest of State, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 11, 2012,
http://articles.philly.com/2012-07-11/news/32619938_1_south-newark-basindrilling-for-natural-gas-charles-mcilhinney.
189 Id.
190 Id. (as one rural legislator quipped, “[w]hat makes Bucks and
Montgomery [counties] so special?”)
183
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Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Bradford’s disparate experiences
with drilling and related legislation demonstrate that Act 13 was never
meant to affect all of Pennsylvania’s localities equally. The inequity
bristled some.191 After the suburban Philadelphia moratorium was
passed, State Representative Jesse White, whose district encompasses
parts of rural western Pennsylvania far from Philadelphia, criticized
the exemption as unfair.192 White argued that “[if] Act 13 isn’t good
enough for some of us [Pennsylvanians], then it isn’t good enough
for any of us.”193
Alberta’s approach to its land use framework is instructive for
Pennsylvania in this regard. The Canadian province has struck a
balance between provincial and local concerns, and with a close eye
toward physical characteristics unique to each planning region.
Alberta’s land use strategy was given legal force in 2009 with the
enactment of the ALSA,194 but the planning processes began in 2005,
and continued through 2008. 195 During that time, “landowners;
municipal leaders and planners; agricultural, forestry, transportation
and energy associations; conservation and environmental groups;
recreational groups; and academics” were provided the opportunity
to comment on the plan.196
During the course of this planning, Alberta’s local leaders
echoed Pennsylvania’s municipalities’ criticisms of Act 13. In fact,
“the lack of land use decision making authority at the municipal level
was a prevailing issue among . . . participants.”197 Also noteworthy
191 Jesse White, Op-Ed: Selective Drilling Ban Exposes Hypocrisy in PA Energy
Policy, BEAVERCOUNTIAN.COM, July 3, 2012,
https://beavercountian.com/content/op-ed/op-ed-selective-drilling-ban-exposeshypocrisy-in-pa-energy-policy.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Harvie & Mercier, supra note 127, at 296.
195 See
Developing
a
Land-Use
Framework,
ALBERTA.CA,
https://landuse.alberta.ca/PlanforAlberta/DevelopingFramework/Pages/default.a
spx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
196 Id.
197 THE
PRAXIS GROUP, MUNICIPAL CONSULTATION ON THE
PROVINCIAL LAND USE FRAMEWORK INITIATIVE SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2006),
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“was a common recognition that many land use planning issues are
regional in nature.” 198 As the report summarizing municipal
comments on the provincial plan put it—”One size does not fit
all!”199
Alberta’s solution to the municipalities’ concerns was to
divide the province into seven land-use planning regions. 200 The
seven plans are also being developed to “reflect the uniqueness and
priorities of each region.”201 Each regional plan sets “out regional
land-use objectives and provides the context for land-use decisionmaking within the region.”202 The “ERCB will now have to expand
the scope of its considerations to . . . contemplate whether the
proposed project conforms with the vision, goals, and objectives
established in the regional plan.”203
Resource extraction emerged as a higher priority in some
regions than in others. The Lower Athabasca Region, for example,
contains much of Alberta’s oil sands, and the development of this
resource is the region’s paramount objective. 204 The South
Saskatchewan Region, on the other hand, is “home to 45 percent of
Alberta’s population and contains the province’s largest city,

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:KHLLqbcTDiEJ:https:/
/landuse.alberta.ca/Documents/LUF_Municipal_Consultation_on_the_Provincial
_Land_Use_Framework_Initiative_Report-200611.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
198 Id. at 6.
199 Id. at 32.
200 ALBERTA.CA, LAND-USE FRAMEWORK 19 (2008),
available at
https://www.landuse.alberta.ca/Documents/LUF_Land-use_Framework_Report2008-12.pdf.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Harvie & Mercier, supra note 127, at 327.
204 Lower Athabasca Regional Advisory Council Advice to the Government,
ALBERTA.CA (2010),
https://landuse.alberta.ca/RegionalPlans/LowerAthabascaRegion/LARPRAC/Pa
ges/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
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Calgary.” 205 As a result, water management is the region’s “top
concern,” and “stands to be the limiting factor on future population
and economic growth.” 206 Project permitting decisions will
undoubtedly differ between regions focused on water conservation,
as in South Saskatchewan, and energy, as in Lower Athabasca.
Once all regional plans are complete, the ALSA will leave oil
and gas drillers with seven unique regulatory regimes to cope with.
From an industry standpoint this may appear a less desirable situation
than negotiating Alberta’s former province-wide land use rules
regarding energy development, but, as discussed, recent unrest in
Calgary regarding gas drilling has thrown the predictability of
Alberta’s previous regulatory regime into question.207 The ALSA will
alleviate those “cracks in the status quo . . . that foreshadow serious
challenges to come as pressures on the provincial land base rapidly
increase.”208
A comparable approach to Pennsylvania’s search for
workable uniformity and predictability would help alleviate the
tension between the energy industry, the state, and local
governments. Pennsylvania, like Alberta, is home to large swaths of
rural land, as well as dense urban areas and suburban sprawl. A
statewide land use regime applied to oil and gas must account for this
reality. A regional approach, like Alberta’s, would strike a balance
between those seeking recognition of local characteristics and the
quest for uniformity and predictability. It would also give municipal
205 SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN REGIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, ADVICE TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA FOR THE SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN REGIONAL
PLAN 5 (2011),

https://landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/South%20%20Saskatchewan
%20Regional%20Advisory%20Council%20Advice%20to%20Government%20%202011-03.pdf.
206 Id.
207 Vanderklippe, supra note 23.
208 ROBERT GIBBINS & BARRY WORBERTS, MANAGING PROSPERITY:
DEVELOPING A LAND USE FRAMEWORK FOR ALBERTA, 3 (2005),
https://landuse.alberta.ca/LandUse%20Documents/Managing%20Prosperity%20
Developing%20a%20Land%20Use%20Framework%20for%20Alberta%20%202005-09.pdf.
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officials a meaningful place at the table when crafting rules for oil and
gas drillers. Industry would also be placated, as negotiating even
dozens of regions would be preferable to the thousands of individual
municipal zoning codes currently in existence.

CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania and Alberta’s recent experiences with oil and
gas development are much alike. 209 Steady or slow development
suddenly gave way to frenzied growth, and regulators are only now
catching up. 210 Here, however, is where the similarities end.
Pennsylvania’s and Alberta’s treatment of local land use decisionmaking differ significantly. Alberta’s local governments play a
comparatively minor role to those in Pennsylvania, yet the province
intends to include them in the land use planning process.
Pennsylvania’s localities enjoy more power, but have been bullied by
the state government. Yet Pennsylvania’s political and cultural
framework requires informed reliance on local input for a successful
land-use regime to work. Regional stakeholders must be consulted,
and municipal leaders given a chance to contribute meaningfully.
And as the Canadians put it: One size does not fit all.211
Alberta’s approach to local land use as it relates to oil and gas
development bears important lessons for Pennsylvania. Unlike the
contentious and litigious relationship between Pennsylvania’s state
and local governments, Alberta’s land use framework strikes a
balance between local and provincial interests. Pennsylvania should
take note.

Pifer, supra note 1, at 622.
Schneider, supra note 4; Ayesha Rascoe, U.S. Shale Gas Regulators
Struggle To Keep Up With Rapid Development, Government Finds, HUFFINGTON POST,
Oct. 9, 2012, 9:37 PM, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/us-shalegas-regulators_n_1953135.html.
211 MUNICIPAL CONSULTATION ON THE PROVINCIAL LAND USE
FRAMEWORK INITIATIVE SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 197.
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